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Essays in Financial Economics
Assaf A. Shtauber
This dissertation consists of three essays in Financial Economics. The first essay concerns
low-income Americans’ usage of financial services. Approximately 20% of US households earning
less than $30,000 a year do not have checking or savings accounts. Rather than operate within
the financial mainstream, these households tend to rely on high-fee “alternative financial services”
such as check-cashing and payday loans for carrying out basic financial transactions, for accessing
credit, and even for saving. In this essay I examine the effects of opening a bank account, thereby
gaining access to mainstream financial services, on financial behavior and “financial wellbeing”.
Despite significant policy efforts to “bank the poor” in recent years, there has hardly been any
research about this question.
I use a unique dataset of low-income participants of financial education workshops, and exploit
quasi-random variation in the likelihood of opening a bank account after the workshop to overcome
selection bias and estimate causal effects. I find that opening an account reduces delinquency
and raises the likelihood of credit score improvement. However, contrary to the benefits often
ascribed to becoming banked, I find no effects on saving, self-reported overspending, and several
measures of “financial wellbeing” such as finances-related stress. Surprisingly, I find only small
aggregate effects of opening an account on actual usage of mainstream credit, as measured by
credit card ownership, for example. There is heterogeneity in these effects, however, based on an
individual’s level of financial literacy. Those who graduated high school and who are presumably
more financially literate do in fact increase their usage of mainstream credit when they open an
account, but those who did not graduate high school do not. This finding is consistent with
prior evidence on the links between financial literacy and usage of financial services: the less
literate have been shown to be more likely to use alternative financial services, and those who
do use mainstream services have been shown to make costly mistakes (e.g. pay high credit card
fees). Finally, I find that access to mainstream financial services enhances the effectiveness of
financial education: among the workshop participants that I study, opening an account increases
self-reported financial literacy.
In the second essay I explore the theoretical effects of one of the most important consequences
of entering the mainstream financial system: facing a higher rate of return on saving and a lower
cost of borrowing. I develop a simple two period life-cycle model of consumption in which vol-
untary default is possible and examine the effects of favorable changes in saving and borrowing
rates on consumer behavior. The incorporation of default in the model is important for its appli-
cability to the effects of entering the mainstream financial system since those who operate outside
the mainstream system tend to be low-income individuals who are more prone to default. It is
also novel: the effects of interest rate changes on consumer behavior (“the interest elasticity of
consumption”) are of great importance in economics and have been researched extensively, but
the implications of incorporating default in the basic life-cycle model have never been studied.
I find that when the cost of default is not sufficiently dependent on the amount defaulted
upon, the possibility of default weakens the link between first period consumption and second
period utility and leads to overconsumption relative to the no-default model. It also results in a
counter-intuitive negative marginal propensity to consume out of wealth: those who are wealthier
consume less. It follows that the wealth effects of favorable interest rate changes imply less rather
than more consumption and that such rate changes (the ultimate effects of which are determined
by the combination of wealth and substitution effects) are more likely to encourage saving and to
discourage borrowing than in the no-default model. Favorable rate changes decrease the probability
of default and the expected defaulted-upon amount for all savers, who may default on a pre-existing
obligation in the model, as well as for borrowers who initially borrow more than some threshold.
I extend the model to allow for partial repayment of debt (i.e. delinquency rather than full-scale
default) in both periods. I show that decreasing the borrowing rate lowers delinquency by affecting
the tradeoff between delinquency and borrowing as means to finance first period consumption.
The third essay, co-authored with Andrew Ang and Paul Tetlock, examines asset pricing pat-
terns in over-the-counter (OTC) stocks, which are stocks that trade on either the OTC Bulletin
Board (OTCBB) or OTC Link (formerly Pink Sheets, or PS) interdealer quotation system. Com-
pared to stocks that trade on the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ (“listed stocks”), OTC stocks are
far less liquid, disclose less information, and exhibit lower institutional holdings. We exploit these
different market conditions to test theories of cross-sectional return premiums. Compared to re-
turn premiums in listed markets, the OTC premium for illiquid stocks is several times higher, the
OTC premiums for size, value, and volatility are similar, and the OTC premium for momentum is
three times lower. The OTC premiums for illiquidity, size, value, and volatility are largest among
stocks that are held almost exclusively by retail investors and those that do not disclose financial
information. Theories of differences in investors’ opinions and limits on short sales help to explain
these return premiums. Our momentum results are most consistent with Hong and Stein’s (1999)
theory based on the gradual diffusion of information.
Contents
List of Figures iv
List of Tables v
Acknowledgements vi
1 The Effects of Access to Mainstream Financial Services on the Poor: Evidence
from Data on Recipients of Financial Education 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 The Theoretical Effects of Access to Mainstream Financial Services . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Empirical Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A Financial Literacy Workshops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B Collaborations with Credit Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C Sample and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
D Demographics and Incoming Financial Behavior: Descriptions and Summary
Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
E Credit Report Variables: Descriptions and Summary Statistics . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A Constructing Proximity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B Proximity as a Predictor of Account Opening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
C The Exclusion Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.6 Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A Credit Report Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
B Survey Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
i
1.7 Reduced Form Proximity Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A Proximity Effects on Credit Report Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B Proximity Effects on Survey Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.8 Additional Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A SSIV Estimates of the Effects of Opening an Account . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
B Heterogeneous Effects by Education Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2 The Theoretical Effects of Favorable Interest Rate Changes on Consumer Be-
havior in the Presence of Default 79
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.3 The Individual’s Optimization Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A The Second Period Default Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
B The First Period Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
C The FOC and the Slope of the Opportunity Cost Curve . . . . . . . . . . . 89
D The Determinants of the Sign of the Slope of the Opportunity Cost Curve . 90
2.4 Characterizing Optimal Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A Initial Wealth Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
B Marginal Propensity to Consume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.5 The Effects of Favorable Interest Rate Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A Effects on Initial Wealth Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
B Effects on First Period Optimal Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
C Effects on Expected Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.6 Extension: Voluntary Extent of Delinquency in Both Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A The Second Period Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
B The First Period Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
C Characterizing the Delinquency-Borrowing Tradeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
D Characterizing Optimal First Period Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
E The Effects of Favorable Interest Rate Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
ii
2.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3 Asset Pricing in the Dark: The Cross Section of OTC Stocks 120
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.2 Related Studies of OTC Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.3 OTC Market Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
A Institutional Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B OTCBB and PS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
C Comparison to Listed Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.4 Variable Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.5 Comparing the Cross Sections of OTC and Listed Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A Liquidity Premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
B Size and Value Premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
C Volatility Premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
D Momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
E OTC Market Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
F Multivariate Cross-sectional Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.6 Testing Theories of Limited Arbitrage and Behavioral Biases . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A Trading Costs as a Limit to Arbitrage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
B Evidence from Double Sorts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
C Testing Theories of Investor Disagreement and Limits on Short Sales . . . . 143
D Testing Theories of Momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.7 Concluding Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
A Survey Questions 178
B An Information Asymmetry Leads to a Flat Rate-Amount Schedule 186
C Proofs of Propositions in Chapter 2 190
D Model of OTC Stock Pricing 203
E Estimating Betas and Accounting for Nonsynchronous Trading 211
iii
List of Figures
1.1 NTFP’s Collaborations with Community Development Credit Unions . . . . . . . 54
1.2 Account Opening and Distance: Administrative Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.1 The Marginal Benefit and Opportunity Cost Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.2 The Value Function for Various Levels of Initial Wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
2.3 The Consumption Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.4 Initial Wealth Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.1 OTC Sample Characteristics as a Percentage of Listed Sample Characteristics . . . 148
3.2 The Value of $1 Invested in Illiquidity Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.3 Impact of Trading Costs and Rebalancing Frequency on Arbitrageur Returns . . . 150
iv
List of Tables
1.1 Initial Banking Status of Sample Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.2 Summary Statistics and the Effects of Proximity on Incoming Characteristics . . 57
1.3 Account Openings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.4 Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.5 Reduced Form Results: Credit Report Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.6 Reduced Form Results: Survey Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.7 SSIV Estimates of the Effects of Opening an Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.8 Heterogeneous Effects by Education Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1 Summary Statistics for the OTC and Listed Samples in July 1997 . . . . . . . . . 152
3.2 The Peak Sizes of the Largest 10 OTC Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.3 Cross-Sectional Summary Statistics for Key Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
3.4 Time Series Analysis of OTC and Comparable Listed Factor Portfolios . . . . . . . 156
3.5 Testing Transaction Cost Theories of the Illiquidity Premium . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.6 Cross-Sectional Regressions of Monthly Returns on Firm Characteristics . . . . . . 165
3.7 Impact of Trading Costs and Rebalancing Frequency on Arbitrageur Returns . . . 167
3.8 Double Sorted Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
3.9 Long–term Returns of Momentum Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
v
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank all of those who have contributed to the completion of this dissertation. I
thank Gur Huberman for continual guidance, support, and advice. His patience and wise sugges-
tions were essential to my progress. I am grateful to Andrew Ang and Paul Tetlock for inviting me
to co-author the OTC paper with them at an early stage of the PhD program. Working with them
has been a great learning experience for me. I have had the privilege of working especially closely
with Paul, and I thank him for all that he has taught me. I am thankful to Steve Zeldes for taking
interest in my work and for his invaluable guidance on the development of the model described
in Chapter 2. I thank Kent Daniel for his kindness and encouragement and for extending very
helpful advice at several key points along the way.
I am grateful to the management and staff of Neighborhood Trust Financial Partners for their
generosity in sharing data with me, in collecting more data for the purpose of my research, and
in answering my questions.
My classmates at Columbia have been great colleagues and friends. I am thankful to them
and to all of my other friends, in Israel and in New York City, for keeping me grounded and for
serving as a constant reminder that there is more to life than research.
My parents Nitza and Zvi have always motivated me and were very influential in my decision
to pursue a PhD. I am grateful to them and to my sister Chen and brother Matan for being a
constant source of unconditional love and support, throughout my whole life and in particular
during these years in which I was far away from home.
Finally, I would like to try and express the depth of my gratitude to my wife Anat for the
incredible support that she has provided me with during the past five years. Her wisdom, strength,
and unwavering faith in me kept me on track and helped me through every obstacle that I en-
countered. I cannot imagine having completed this dissertation without her standing lovingly by





The Effects of Access to
Mainstream Financial Services on
the Poor: Evidence from Data on
Recipients of Financial Education
“When we talk about finance we must also talk about individual access to financial services. Like
money itself, the benefits that a bank account provides are easy to take for granted until you do not
have one. And today, in the age of the Internet, derivatives, and embedded options, between 10
and 20 percent of American households still lack that basic passport to the broader economy. If it
was an important national challenge half a century ago to ensure that essentially every American
had access to electricity, to running water, and to a telephone - in [the] new economy, ensuring
access to a basic bank account must be a critical challenge for today”
– Larry Summers, then Secretary of the Treasury, 2000
1.1. Introduction
Many American households operate outside of the financial mainstream: 8% of households,
nearly 10 million in total, do not have checking or savings accounts. More than 80% of these
1
households earn less than $30,000 a year.1 These households, as well as a sizable fraction of
households who do have accounts, tend to rely on high-fee “alternative financial services” such as
check-cashing and payday loans for carrying out basic financial transactions, for accessing credit,
and even for saving.2 These services are not only expensive but also do not seem to represent a
good substitute for mainstream financial services, and the American poor are generally considered
to be credit and savings constrained (Barr (2004)). There is ample evidence to support this notion.
For example, 57% of Americans earning less than $20,000 a year reported that they would not
be able to come up with $2,000 in 30 days in a recent survey (Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano
(2011)). Further, only 32% of American families in the lowest income quintile reported saving over
the previous year in the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, compared to 60%-80% in the top two
quintiles (Bricker, Kennickell, Moore, and Sabelhaus (2012)). The association of figures like these
with the amount of households operating outside the financial mainstream, together with the high
costs and perceived predatory nature of alternative financial services, has motivated significant
policy efforts to “bank the poor”. These efforts have concentrated on both the supply and the
demand sides, providing incentives for banks to serve the poor and in particular to offer accounts
that are more suitable for their needs while encouraging the unbanked to open accounts, often
through financial literacy programs.3 Success of these efforts has been limited, however (Lyons
and Scherpf (2004)). Prescott and Tatar (1999) argue that the benefits of account ownership
are often overstated and that many unbanked individuals in fact cash their checks at no cost.
The FDIC’s 2011 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households reports that 21%
of unbanked households have in fact never used alternative financial services (Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (2012)).
In this paper I seek to estimate the causal effects of bank account ownership on the financial
behavior and “financial wellbeing” of the poor. Given the amount of policy attention and the
potential welfare implications, as well as the implications for our general understanding of house-
hold financial behavior, it is somewhat surprising that there has been almost no research on this
1The fraction of households earning less than $30,000 a year which are unbanked is 19.5%. Figures are taken
from the FDIC’s 2011 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households.
220.1% of American households have checking or savings accounts but regularly use alternative financial services,
and are referred to as “underbanked” (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012)).
Barr (2004) notes anecdotal evidence suggesting that low-income households use money orders (as well as over-
withholding of income taxes) as a saving vehicle.
3For example: the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, various FDIC programs
(http://economicinclusion.gov/) and “Bank On” initiatives (http://joinbankon.org/about/).
The main reasons that have been cited for poor households being unbanked include incompatibilities between
mainstream banking services and their needs (e.g. fee structure, minimum balance requirements, check holding pe-
riods, lack of geographical access), cultural reasons (mistrust, dislike of dealing with banks), and past delinquencies
(Barr (2004), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012), Bricker, Kennickell, Moore, and Sabelhaus (2012)).
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question, particularly in a developed country setting.4
I divide the theoretical effects of bank account ownership in two parts. First, account ownership
provides access to lower cost transactional services, raises the effective return on saving, and
lowers the cost of borrowing.5 While the demand for transactional services is likely inelastic, so
that spending on these services is reduced when becoming banked,6 economic theory does not
generate a clear answer regarding the response of saving and borrowing to changes in saving and
borrowing rates. In particular, although increased saving is one of the benefits most emphasized
by advocates of “banking the poor” (e.g. Barr (2004)), increasing the saving rate might decrease
saving if the income effect is larger than the substitution effect. In Chapter 2 I analyze the response
of optimal consumption behavior to favorable changes in saving and borrowing rates, incorporating
the possibility of failing to repay debts in full into the basic model. I elaborate on this and raise
several related points in Section 1.3. The second type of effects is behavioral. Bank accounts have
been argued to have a role as behavioral aides, helping individuals address psychological biases and
cognitive constraints that result in deviations from optimal behavior, especially with respect to
saving. Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) notably argue for the centrality of such a role. I elaborate
on this type of effects in Section 1.3 as well.
I use a unique dataset of low-income participants of financial education workshops in New
York City and exploit quasi-random variation in the likelihood of post-workshop account opening
to overcome endogeneity and estimate causal effects. Workshop participants, many of whom are
unbanked prior to the workshop, are encouraged through monetary and other means to open ac-
counts at 6 specific financial institutions with a total of 8 branches around NYC. These institutions
are Community Development Credit Unions which are dedicated to serving the poor. I assert that
the distance between a workshop participant’s home and the closest of these credit unions affects
the likelihood with which the participant will open an account in one of these institutions after
the workshop, and provide evidence indicating that this is indeed the case. I use distance as an
instrument for post-workshop account opening at one of the collaborating credit unions. Potential
endogeneity concerns such as those having to do with CDCUs’ location decisions are addressed
by including various control variables that are meant to isolate variation in account opening that
4Several studies have examined the effects of bank account ownership in developing countries (e.g. Burgess and
Pande (2005) in India, Aportela (1999) in Mexico, Dupas and Robinson (2013) in Kenya). Fitzpatrick (2009) does
this in the UK. In the US, Chin, Karkoviata, and Wilcox (2011) examine the effects of account ownership on savings
and remittances of Mexican migrant workers, and Mills, Gale, Patterson, Engelhardt, Eriksen, and Apostolov (2008)
evaluate the impact of Individual Development Account ownership. I elaborate on these studies in the next section.
5I discuss these points in Section 1.3. In particular, providing a safe place to store savings is likely enough to
raise the effective return.
6As noted above, this point is debatable. See also Section 1.3.
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is unrelated to outcomes. In particular, the setting allows controlling for possibly confounding
unobservable location effects on outcomes, to the extent that they are time-invariant, while still
retaining variation in the distance instrument. I provide evidence supporting the exogeneity of
the instrument.
Throughout the paper I distinguish between those who do not have a bank account prior to
the workshop (the “initially unbanked”) and those who do (the “initially banked”). Interestingly,
many initially banked workshop participants open accounts at the collaborating credit unions,
presumably in order to enjoy services that are more suited to their needs.7 I find no effects of
opening an account on the initially banked, however, in all of the outcomes that I examine. That
opening an account at a CDCU has stronger impacts for the initially unbanked than it does for
the initially banked is not surprising: the latter already enjoy the potential behavioral benefits
embedded in the ownership of (any type of) account, and already have access to mainstream
financial services to some extent, so that they stand to gain less from opening an account. That
I find no effect at all on the initially banked could point to little added value in CDCU account
ownership vs. account ownership at a regular bank or to the inability of the outcomes that I
examine to capture some of the effects of account ownership.
I derive most of the outcome data analyzed in this paper from credit reports, which contain
detailed information on individual credit behavior with respect to mainstream (i.e. non-alternative)
products such as credit cards and bank loans. Reports are available from the beginning of the
workshop as well as at various time intervals after the workshop, enabling the analysis of changes in
mainstream credit behavior. I begin by examining FICO scores, which aggregate the information
on the credit report and which are important outcomes in their own right.8 Less than half of
initially unbanked sample individuals have a credit score at the beginning of the workshop - the
remainder do not have sufficient recent credit activity for a score to be computed. I estimate a
significant effect of opening an account at one of the collaborating credit unions on the likelihood
of score improvement by those who start out with a score. According to my preferred estimate,
the likelihood of score improvement increases by 47% at the 0.5-3 year horizon after the workshop
as a result of opening an account. This finding is not attributable to account opening inducing
7This speaks to the evidence on the “underbanked” (see footnote 2). CDCUs are dedicated to serving the poor
and as such offer products and services that are more adequate for this population in terms of fee structure (i.e.
minimum balance requirements), credit access (i.e. secured loans), and savings products (i.e. lower denomination
Certificates of Deposit). I provide more information about CDCUs in Section 1.4. That accounts at cooperative
institutions whose mission it is to serve the poor are the type of accounts studied here should be kept in mind when
deriving policy implications.
8Scores are used for screening and for determining conditions on many types of transactions. See Section 1.6.
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increased usage of mainstream credit, as I find no evidence of an effect on credit report items
which reflect usage of credit such as credit card ownership or debt balances. Account ownership
is also not an input in the credit scoring algorithm, so the result is not mechanical. Rather, credit
score effects seem to be driven by effects of opening an account on delinquent behavior: I estimate
that opening an account reduces the recent delinquent balances9 of initially unbanked individuals
by more than $800. As I explain in Section 1.3, favorable interest rate changes (brought about by
opening an account) might reduce delinquency through their effects on the amount owed as well
as on the attractiveness of rolling over a due loan, and there are also potential behavioral effects.
Since, as the above quote suggests, one of the main supposed benefits of account ownership
is its functioning as a gateway to the mainstream financial system, I devote special attention to
mainstream credit usage on the extensive margin. Sample individuals, in particular those who
are initially unbanked, both enter and exit the mainstream credit system, as measured by having
a FICO score, by having any type of mainstream credit balance, and by having a credit card.
I find only small effects of opening an account on the likelihood of inclusion in the mainstream
credit system. I estimate that the likelihood of having a FICO score at the time of the follow-up
credit pull increases by 15% as a result of opening an account, but the effects on the likelihood
of having a mainstream credit balance or a credit card are indistinguishable from zero. I find no
effects of opening an account on mainstream credit usage on the intensive margin. While a non-
increase in overall borrowing is consistent with theory, these findings are somewhat surprising as we
might expect individuals who open accounts to switch from alternative borrowing to mainstream
borrowing.
I study the potential links between bank account ownership and financial literacy. Initiatives
to bring unbanked individuals into the financial mainstream typically involve financial education,
and financial education programs aimed at low-income individuals typically emphasize the advan-
tages of account ownership.10 Since the sample analyzed in this paper is composed entirely of
recipients of financial education, the estimated effects of opening an account might be conditional
to some extent on receiving financial education, e.g. on individuals’ levels of financial literacy. In-
deed, individuals with low financial literacy have been shown to make suboptimal use of financial
products: Lusardi and Tufano (2009) find that the less literate pay much higher credit card fees,
and that as much as one third of the fees paid by them can be attributed to lack of knowledge.
9These are delinquent debts which have not yet been sold to collection agencies. This data is only available for
follow-up credit pulls conducted as part of this study. See Section 1.4.E.
10See the programs mentioned in footnote 3, for example.
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Gerardi, Goette, and Meier (2010) examine subprime mortgage borrowers and find that those with
low numerical ability were more likely to default and have their home foreclosed on in the recent
crisis.
While I cannot directly test for interactions between the effects of opening an account and
the effects of receiving financial education since there is no control group for the latter, I exploit
plausible heterogeneity in individuals’ levels of financial literacy in order to shed some light on
this issue. In particular, I test whether initially unbanked workshop participants are differentially
affected by opening an account at one of the collaborating credit unions based on whether they
had graduated high-school. Formal education levels have been shown to be strong predictors of
financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell (2013)) and there is reason to believe that those with
more formal education might learn more in a classroom setting, i.e. gain more from the workshop,
resulting in higher post-workshop literacy levels.11
I find heterogeneity based on high school graduation status in several of the effects that I
examine. First, the negative effect of opening an account on recent delinquencies is limited to
initially unbanked workshop participants who graduated high school. Second, while only small
effects are found on the likelihood of inclusion in the mainstream credit system on aggregate, as
noted above, there is significant heterogeneity in these effects: opening an account increases the
likelihood that initially unbanked high school graduates have a FICO score as well as a credit card
at the 0.5-3 year post-workshop horizon, while it does not predict having a FICO score among those
who did not graduate high school and actually reduces the likelihood that they have a credit card.
That is, opening an account does seem to function as a gateway to the mainstream financial system,
but only for those with sufficient levels of financial literacy. Those with lower levels of literacy
open accounts at collaborating credit unions12 but do not seem to take advantage of the access to
mainstream credit that this provides. The finding that opening an account does not reduce their
delinquent balances is consistent with their effective borrowing rates remaining unchanged when
they open an account. An obvious caveat to this analysis is that having graduated high school is
not randomly assigned and might be correlated with other individual characteristics which have
to do with the effects of account ownership. An obvious concern is that those who graduated
high school are likely to be better off financially. I address this concern by examining differences
11Indeed, in a follow-up survey conducted as part of this study (see below), respondents who graduated high
school report higher self-assessed knowledge levels than those who did not graduate high school (4.04 vs. 3.76 on
a 5 point scale).
12While non-high school graduates open accounts at a lower rate than do high school graduates, about 20% of
them open an account at one of the collaborating credit unions after the workshop.
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according to employment status rather than high school graduation, and find no heterogeneity in
the effects of opening an account on the likelihood of inclusion in the mainstream system.
Low literacy individuals who open accounts might be reluctant to use mainstream credit prod-
ucts because they realize that they are likely to make the types of costly mistakes noted above,
or because they are simply uncomfortable with these products. They might also fail to realize the
relative costs of alternative financial services.13 The dependence of the demand for various types
of financial services on financial literacy is well-documented: it has been found that the less literate
are less likely to participate in the stock market (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011)) and more
likely to use alternative financial services (Lusardi and de Bassa Scheresberg (2013)). Bertrand
and Morse (2011) show that providing more cost information to payday borrowers reduces the
likelihood of future borrowing. Carter, Skiba, and Tobacman (2011) and Agarwal, Skiba, and To-
bacman (2009) document substantial payday loan borrowing by individuals with access to cheaper
sources of liquidity. My findings are consistent with this prior evidence.14
In order to supplement the credit report outcome data as well as the data on post-workshop
account opening,15 a telephone survey of sample individuals was conducted as part of this study.
One of the most important topics was saving. Using survey data, I am unable to reject the
hypothesis that opening an account does not increase reported saving among initially unbanked
workshop participants on neither the extensive margin (i.e. it does not increase likelihood of saving
vs. not saving) nor the intensive margin (i.e. it does not increase the amount saved). As noted
above, this is consistent with the optimal response to an increase in the effective saving rate brought
about by account ownership. Account ownership has also been argued to have effects on saving
through addressing behavioral biases that lead to overspending, however. In order to evaluate this
claim, survey respondents were asked whether they feel that they are currently spending more
than they should be, and whether they feel that they are now overspending less than in the past.
Here, too, I cannot reject the hypothesis that opening an account has a zero effect on self-reported
overspending by those who were unbanked prior to the workshop. Unbanked sample individuals
might not be subject to self-control problems or they might have alternative means of combating
overspending and not gain much from opening an account, in particular after having gone through
13Doyle, Lopez, and Saidenberg (1998) cite a 1989 study which found that more than 30% of unbanked users of
check-cashing stores either did not know whether banks or check-cashing stores were more expensive or believed
that banks were more expensive.
14Somewhat contradictory evidence is brought by Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2011), who show that monetary
incentives are much more effective than financial education in increasing the likelihood of bank account opening in
a field experiment in Indonesia. Education is effective, however, for those with low initial levels of education and
financial literacy.
15Data on account opening is partially available from administrative sources. See Section 1.4.
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the workshop.16
If opening an account results in increased credit access, we might expect to see an effect on
“financial fragility”, defined as confidence in the ability to raise a relatively large amount of money
in a short period of time (Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano (2011)). This is a potentially important
outcome for the welfare of low-income individuals who are likely subject to numerous income and
consumption shocks (e.g. job loss, health) and who generally have less means to deal with such
shocks (e.g. health insurance). Analyzing survey respondents’ confidence in being able to raise
$1500 in 30 days, I find no significant effect of opening an account on this level of confidence.
Similarly, I do not find an effect on economic hardship, as measured by recent difficulty in paying
bills (as in Melzer (2011)), or on self-reported finances-related stress. The lack of effects on these
measures of “financial wellbeing” is somewhat disappointing given the high expectations for the
effectiveness of banking the unbanked, as reflected in the policy efforts noted above. Again, the
individuals studied here might have developed alternative ways of coping with their economic
situation, and opening a bank account might not be the magic solution to their problems that it
is oftentimes taken to be. As suggested above, those who open accounts might be reluctant to
use the services which account ownership provides them access to because of insufficient literacy.
Unfortunately, the small number of survey responses does not allow for a meaningful analysis of
heterogeneous effects by literacy level. The small number of responses and low statistical power
are a general caveat in interpreting the survey results: confidence intervals contain both zero and
figures that are quite high.
Analyzing the survey data, I find an interesting result which speaks to the complimentarities
between financial education and access to mainstream services: opening an account raises workshop
participants’ self-reported knowledge levels about managing their money on a daily basis. This
might be because account ownership enables following one’s transactions more closely or because it
exposes individuals to different financial products (even if, as noted above, take-up is rather low).
Another potential channel is access to financial advice: the collaborating credit unions studied in
this paper offer free advice to their members, which might increase the knowledge of those who
open accounts.17 Either way, this finding points to a role of account opening in enhancing the
effectiveness of financial education.18
16Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) interpret several behavioral patterns exhibited by the poor as alternative
commitment savings mechanisms, for example the purchase of lottery tickets.
17Access to advice might play a role in some of the other findings in this paper, particularly those having to do
with credit score improvements, as I note below.
18The effect of opening an account on knowledge might be conditional on having undergone financial education,
or it might be independent of education. In any case, it seems to apply to those who receive financial education.
8
This chapter will proceed as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related literature. Section 1.3 outlines
the theoretical effects of access to mainstream financial services. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 describe
the empirical setting used in this paper and the empirical strategy. Section 1.6 describes and
summarizes the credit report and survey outcome variables. Section 1.7 reports the results of
reduced form regressions of outcomes on the distance instrument. Section 1.8 quantifies the causal
effects of opening an account on outcomes and reports the results of the heterogeneous effects
analysis. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2. Related Literature
As noted in the introduction, there have hardly been any studies which have attempted to
estimate the causal effects of bank account ownership, in particular in a developed country setting.
Chin, Karkoviata, and Wilcox (2011) randomly assign assistance in obtaining an identification card
(argued to be a major barrier to account opening in their setting and of little use otherwise) within
a group of Mexican migrant workers in the US, generating variation in account opening. They find
that total savings flows as a share of income increase by 9% for the group that received assistance 5
months after treatment (the “treatment on treated” estimate of the effect of opening an account is
23%). This finding does not seem particularly relevant for the non-migrant unbanked population
in the US, however, especially given that the increase in savings comes mostly at the expense of
remittances to Mexico, a finding which the authors relate to intra-household issues of control of
the remitted funds.
Mills, Gale, Patterson, Engelhardt, Eriksen, and Apostolov (2008) document the results of an
experiment in which access to Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) - savings vehicles which
provide matching payments when balances are used for specific purposes (e.g. home purchase,
education) - was randomized among eligible applicants in Oklahoma. They find modest increases
in homeownership but no effects on any other investments or measures of wellbeing. As IDAs are
far from being conventional bank accounts, the informativeness of this study regarding the effects
of conventional accounts is limited.
A more relevant study is Fitzpatrick (2009), which exploits a policy change in the U.K that
mandated the receipt of child benefits electronically to estimate the effects of account ownership
on credit and consumption. The study finds a 17 percentage point increase in the likelihood of
credit card ownership and little evidence of an increase in bank loans. Most of the consumption
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measures that are examined, including the level of weekly expenditures, are not affected by account
ownership. The only measure that is affected is the number of household appliances, which
increases by 3.
Several studies have examined the effects of access to mainstream financial services in develop-
ing countries. Some of these studies have exploited bank expansions as access-increasing natural
experiments. Burgess and Pande (2005) study a major state-led expansion effort in India and find
that branch opening in locations previously lacking banks succeeded in reducing local poverty.
Aportela (1999) shows that in towns affected by rapid expansion of a government-owned bank
targeted at the poor in Mexico, saving rates increased by 3-5 percentage points. Randomized
experiments seeking to answer this question have also been conducted in developing countries
recently. Dupas and Robinson (2013a) randomize access to non-interest bearing savings accounts
among self-employed individuals in rural Kenya. Even though the accounts offered an effectively
negative return (no interest and large withdrawal fees in a high-inflation environment), take-up
and usage of the accounts were high among the women in their sample, who exhibited increases in
saving, productive investment, and private expenditure. The authors offer two possible explana-
tions for the success of the accounts in increasing saving and the implied highly negative returns to
informal forms of saving: a tendency to overly spend money in hand due to self-control problems
and demands made by friends and relatives on informal savings.
In another study conducted in Kenya, Dupas and Robinson (2013) attempt to shed light on
savings mechanisms among the poor. They vary access to four different savings devices, designed
towards health investment and differing in the degree of commitment they entail, and find that
simply providing a safe box in which to keep savings (along with the key) increases preventive
health investments by 66%-75%. Based on participants’ responses to a follow-up survey, they
attribute these effects to mental accounting. According to this explanation, money put into the
box is labeled “for savings” and is therefore less likely to be spent on luxuries or given away to
others. I elaborate on this possible mechanism below.
This paper is also related to the literature on financial education. Despite growing interest in
this topic, there has not been much convincing evidence regarding the efficacy of efforts to improve
financial literacy. Hastings, Madrian, and Skimmyhorn (2012) review this literature, noting the
dearth of studies which involve random or quasi-random variation and concluding that “there is
at best mixed evidence that financial education improves financial outcomes”. Additional reviews
are provided by Gale, Harris, and Levine (2012) and Collins and O’Rourke (2010).
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1.3. The Theoretical Effects of Access to Mainstream Finan-
cial Services
In what ways would we expect the access to mainstream financial services which bank account
ownership provides to impact the behavior and welfare of individuals, and in particular those of
the poor? I divide the answer to this question in two parts. The first part consists of access to
products and services “per-se” which an account provides: transactional services, savings products,
and credit. The second part consists of ways in which an account can function as a “behavioral
aide”, helping to address biases and cognitive constraints and facilitating optimal behavior. I now
elaborate on these two parts.
1. Access to products and services per-se
Account ownership provides access to financial products and services which are otherwise
costlier or less available. One such type of service is transactional services, such as check cashing
and bill payment, which are generally less costly for bank account owners. Assuming that the de-
mand for these services is relatively inelastic with respect to price, spending on them is expected
to decrease when becoming banked. Although this is an element that is often emphasized when
discussing the benefits of account ownership (see e.g. Barr (2004)), its significance for an individ-
ual’s overall financial situation is debatable. The amounts involved are usually not very large, and
unbanked individuals are for the most part able to transact at relatively low costs at mainstream
financial institutions even without having an account.19 According to the FDIC’s National Survey
of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, only about 60% of unbanked households report using
alternative financial service providers for transactional services (money orders, check cashing, and
remittances) in the past year (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012)).20
Account ownership also provides access to a saving technology and raises the expected return
on saving. This expected return is most likely negative in the absence of an account due to
inflation and danger of loss or theft, as well as unwanted use by family members and demands by
others.21 Access to interest-bearing products such as money market accounts and certificates of
19For example, checks can usually be cashed by anyone at the issuing bank at little or no cost.
20In the sample studied here, 40% of unbanked individuals (and 11% of banked individuals) report cashing their
checks at check-cashing stores. See Table 1.2.
21Unwanted use and demands on funds have been shown to be important in the developing country context, for
example by Dupas and Robinson (2013). They are plausibly important in the setting studied here as well.
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deposit further raises the expected return on saving of account owners.22
In addition to lower-cost transactional services and to a higher expected return on saving,
account ownership also allows better access to credit. While credit is generally available to some
extent through alternative financial services (payday loans, pawnshops, etc.), it tends to be ex-
tremely costly (e.g. payday loans usually have implied APR’s of over 400% (Bertrand and Morse
(2011))) and is not always fully available (e.g. payday loans are only available for the employed
and only in some states).23 Bank account ownership does not necessarily imply eligibility to re-
ceive a bank loan, of course: low-income individuals in the US are generally thought to be credit
rationed at banks (Bolton and Rosenthal (2005)). However, owning a Community Development
Credit Union account, the effects of which are studied in this paper, most likely does result in
lower-cost credit eligibility since CDCUs are designated to serving the poor.24 More generally,
account ownership most likely improves access to credit and lowers the cost of borrowing even
for those who cannot get a loan or a credit card from their own financial institution since it is
taken into account by other lenders such as credit card companies. Moreover, taking a loan from
a mainstream financial institution establishes formal credit history, which can result in a signif-
icant expansion of the borrowing opportunity set.25 This “gateway to the mainstream financial
system” point is often emphasized in discussions about banking the poor, for example in the Larry
Summers quote brought above (“passport to the broader economy”).
Economic theory does not generate a straightforward prediction for the effects of favorable
changes in the expected return on saving and in the cost of borrowing on consumption, i.e. for
the interest elasticity of consumption. In a standard life-cycle model, an increase in the saving
rate has an ambiguous effect on the consumption of savers (since the substitution and income
effects contradict each other) while a decrease in the borrowing rate unambiguously increases the
consumption of borrowers (since the substitution and income effects work in the same direction)
(see Romer (2011)). In Chapter 2 I show that incorporating the possibility of failing to repay
debts in full (a feature that is especially relevant for low-income borrowers) in the life-cycle model
22Many of the low-income individuals studied in this paper have an account at a regular bank but open an
additional account at a Community Development Credit Union. Their effective return on saving presumably
improves as well, due to higher rates offered by CDCUs (which are cooperatively owned and have the objective of
benefiting their customers-members) as well as to saving products which are more relevant for low-income individuals
(i.e. lower denomination CDs).
23The individuals studied in this paper live in New York, which bans payday loans. These are also available on
the internet, however. The FDIC’s National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households finds that 21% of
unbanked households have never used alternative financial services (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012)).
24This point most likely applies to initially banked individuals who open accounts at CDCUs as well.
25Several of the Community Development Credit Unions studied here also offer secured “credit builder” loans,
meant to establish credit history.
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can alter these effects: under certain formulations for the cost of failing to repay, initial savers
unambiguously decrease consumption (increase saving) in response to an increase in the saving
rate and the response of initial borrowers to a decrease in the borrowing rate is ambiguous.26
These effects are further complicated in practice by the puzzling tendency of individuals to save
(at low rates) and borrow (at high rates) at the same time, contrary to the standard theoretical
dichotomy between saving and borrowing.27 Another complicating factor, potentially relevant to
low-income individuals, is liquidity constraints: if account ownership not only lowers the cost of
borrowing but also relaxes a binding liquidity constraint, it will increase borrowing. The extent to
which low-income individuals (in particular those living in a major metropolitan area such as New
York City) are liquidity constrained, i.e. cannot borrow more at any price, is debatable, however,
given the proliferation of alternative financial services.
In accordance with the theoretical ambiguity, empirical studies of the interest elasticity of
consumption have yielded a wide range of estimates (see e.g. Gross and Souleles (2002) and
Karlan and Zinman (2008) for the elasticity of borrowing with respect to the borrowing rate and
Bernheim (2002) for a survey of studies examining the elasticity of saving wrt the saving rate).
Another behavioral variable of interest for which there is no clear prediction is the amount
on which the individual is delinquent. In Chapter 2 I demonstrate two channels through which
favorable interest rate changes can affect delinquency. First, rate changes affect delinquency
through their effect on the amount owed, which is a function of consumption and the promised
rate.28 In the model studied in Chapter 2, where repayment of debt is voluntary, the expected
unpaid amount as well as the probability of not paying in full are an increasing function of the
amount owed.29 This would obviously be the case with involuntary delinquency as well. The effects
of favorable interest rate changes on the amount owed are generally ambiguous, and depend on
the interest elasticity of consumption.30 A second channel has to do with the rolling over of prior
debts. Lowering the cost of borrowing makes rolling over a given amount of debt (i.e. rolling over
26This happens when the costs of failing to repay are such that the marginal cost of consumption decreases in
the amount consumed. In that case, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is negative, as is the income
effect of a favorable interest rate change. Intuitively, a favorable interest rate change reduces the likelihood of
default and strengthens the link between current consumption and future utility, “increasing the individual’s stake
in the future”. See Chapter 2.
27This behavior has been documented by Gross and Souleles (2002), who characterize it as inconsistent with
no-arbitrage. Zinman (2007) justifies this behavior on the grounds of household liquidity management.
28If we allow for simultaneous saving and borrowing, changes in the expected return on borrowing and in the
cost of borrowing can both affect the amount owed.
29While most of that paper is devoted to full-scale bankruptcy-style default, this point applies to partial delin-
quency, which is explored in an extension to the basic model, as well.
30In particular, the amount owed decreases when the borrowing rate is lowered if the elasticity of the amount
borrowed wrt the interest rate is higher than -1.
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with the same lender or borrowing from another source to pay back the original loan/bill) more
attractive relative to delinquency, thus lowering delinquency.
A related point has to do with the role of lowering borrowing costs and removing liquidity
constraints in helping individuals face shocks to consumption and income. This has been argued
to be especially important for the poor, who face numerous potential shocks to consumption and
income (shocks related to health, crime, or job loss are presumably suffered disproportionately
by them) and who are less able to smooth these shocks out of current income and are less likely
to have access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as health insurance. The impacts
of failing to repay debts or bills as result of a shock might also be more serious for the poor:
Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) emphasize the consequences of failing to repay bills, citing a study
which estimates that 5% of the annual income of low-income individuals is spent on the costs of
reconnection of services such as phone and gas. They note the possible dynamic consequences of
failing to repay: for example, a disconnection of phone service might make it harder to find a job.
Another reason for the particular importance of credit access for the poor is the role of in-
vestment in education or entrepreneurship in emergence out of poverty, emphasized by economic
theorists (e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993)).
Better access to credit and lower borrowing costs could also be welfare reducing, however, if they
cater to self-control problems (see below). This has been argued in particular with respect to
alternative credit products aimed at low-income populations.31
2. Bank accounts as behavioral aides
In addition to providing access to financial products and services per-se, account ownership
potentially acts as a “behavioral aide”, helping address biases and cognitive constraints and facil-
itating optimal behavior. Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) are strong advocators of this approach,
arguing that “financial institutions . . . should not be simply viewed from a financial cost-saving
point of view but instead should be understood to affect the lives of people by easing their planning,
facilitating their desired actions and enabling their resistance to temptation.”
Many models of consumption behavior depict individuals as suffering from behavioral biases
which lead to a lack of self-control, in the sense that consumption is higher than what the indi-
vidual would consider optimal ex-ante. Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Laibson (1997), Banerjee and
31For more on this issue and for empirical evidence in the context of access to payday lending, see Morse (2011),
Melzer (2011), and Bertrand and Morse (2011).
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Mullainathan (2010), and Bernheim, Ray, and Yeltekin (2013) are such models. The latter two
are concerned with the special relevance of self-control problems for the poor.
Bank accounts might address lack of self-control through acting as a sort of commitment device,
the demand for which has been documented by Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) and Thaler and
Benartzi (2004).32 An account might function as a commitment device through the (admittedly
limited, in the age of debit cards) physical effort involved in spending money deposited in it, and,
perhaps more importantly, through mental accounting (Thaler (1990)). Mental accounting might
cause, as argued by Dupas and Robinson (2013) with respect to their findings, money in a savings
account to be considered as non-fungible with other sources of cash and, in particular, lower the
propensity to consume from it. According to Shefrin and Thaler (2004), the mental accounting
model suggests a hierarchy of “money locations” arranged by how tempting it is for a household to
spend the money in each, and savings accounts are at a lower level in this hierarchy than cash. If
funds can be transferred to less tempting locations, Shefrin and Thaler argue, they are more likely
to be saved.33 Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) also note this potential effect of savings accounts.
As mentioned above, Dupas and Robinson (2013) find that providing individuals with a safe box
designated for preventive health investments (along with the key) is highly successful in increasing
saving. Follow-up surveys they conduct provide support for a mental accounting story.34 Default
saving mechanisms enabled by account ownership, also mentioned in the next paragraph, may also
be seen as a type of commitment device if inertia renders them costly to break. Inertia has been
shown to be a powerful force in many domains, including saving (e.g. Thaler and Benartzi (2004),
Madrian and Shea (2001)).
In addition to behavioral biases, limited attention might also be a cause for under-saving.
Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, and Zinman (2012) propose a model in which future lumpy
expenditures are overlooked with some probability, distorting intertemporal allocations and lead-
ing to under-saving and over-borrowing. The model predicts a role for reminders in increasing
saving, which is confirmed in a randomized experiment. Account ownership itself could be seen
as an element that serves as a reminder to save, increasing the salience of specific future lumpy
expenditures through labeling (Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, and Zinman (2012)). Perhaps
more importantly, account ownership facilitates default saving mechanisms like direct deposit and
32Alternative financial products used by the poor have also been interpreted as facilitating saving through acting
as commitment devices (e.g. rent-to-own and layaway schemes) (Mullainathan and Shafir (2009)).
33Debit cards might increase the propensity to consume from money stored in a bank account if it is tempting
to use them.
34However, they find that the individuals identified as time-inconsistent in their sample were not affected by this
treatment, and reason that these individuals needed a stronger form of commitment.
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automatic transfer of funds into savings vehicles, removing the need for active saving. Through
these mechanisms, an individual who is aware of his limited attention can pre-allocate funds to
unattended-to future lumpy expenditures regularly. Of course, there also has to be a mechanism
to prevent the individual from spending these funds once they are in the account. This might be
achieved by mental accounting. Indeed, Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, and Zinman (2012)
propose that mental accounting is optimal precisely because of limited attention.
Related to the limited attention channel, another way in which bank accounts might function
as behavioral aides is by helping cognitively constrained individuals to plan and keep track of
their consumption. Individuals may be aware of the need to save but find it hard to plan their
consumption accordingly, or even to keep track of how much they are actually consuming (this
might also result in oversaving). An account might help in this respect, making it easier to maintain
and follow a budget. Similarly, features like automatic bill payment might reduce the likelihood
of missed payments and decrease delinquency. As Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) put it, bank
accounts “provide the opportunity to make infrequent, carefully considered financial accounting
decisions that can prove resistant to intuitive error.”
1.4. Empirical Setting
A. Financial Literacy Workshops
The sample is composed entirely of graduates of financial literacy workshops run by a New
York City-based nonprofit organization by the name of Neighborhood Trust Financial Partners
(NTFP).35 These workshops, titled “Getting Ahead”, are targeted at the working poor and consist
of five weekly meetings, each lasting two hours. In these meetings, workshop participants learn
basic financial concepts (e.g. “APR”, “credit limit”) as well as how the credit history system
works and how to read a credit report (they also receive a copy of their own report). They are
encouraged to save regularly and to follow a budget, which they formulate together with the
counselor during the course of a 1-on-1 counseling session that is a part of the workshop. Finally,
the costs and benefits of various financial services are discussed. Participants are highly encouraged
to refrain from using alternative financial services and to open checking and savings accounts.
The advantages of a credit union account vs. an account at a regular bank are emphasized and
participants are encouraged to open accounts at specific credit unions which NTFP collaborates
35http://www.neighborhoodtrust.org/. The organization was formerly called “Credit Where Credit Is Due”.
16
with (see below).
Workshops are conducted regularly at various sites around New York City. Most of these sites
belong to various partner organizations which serve the poor. These organizations offer a host
of services and workshops to their clients, such as job search and computer skills, and NTFP’s
financial literacy workshop is one of these services.36 Workshops are also given at NTFP’s offices
and at some of the credit unions with which it collaborates (see below). Participation in the
workshops is voluntary.
B. Collaborations with Credit Unions
Identification of the effects of account ownership is enabled by a feature of NTFP’s activity
which generates plausibly exogenous variation in the likelihood of post-workshop account opening
by the participants of its workshops. The organization operates a credit union (Neighborhood
Trust Federal Credit Union, or NTFCU) alongside its educational activities and encourages work-
shop participants to open accounts there. In order to provide more convenient options to partic-
ipants living far away from NTFCU, which is located in the Washington Heights neighborhood
of Manhattan, the organization has initiated collaborations with five other credit unions around
New York City over the past few years. These credit unions, as well as NTFCU, are “Commu-
nity Development Credit Unions” (CDCU’s), which are credit unions with the specific mission of
serving low and moderate income communities.37
Collaborations with credit unions entail several elements which are meant to increase the
likelihood of account opening among workshop graduates. First, costs are reduced: membership
fees are waived for workshop graduates at all 6 credit unions,38 and other fees and requirements
(i.e. minimum balance requirements, monthly fees) are lowered or waived, depending on the credit
union. Second, credit unions are endorsed by NTFP: workshop graduates are given a sheet of
paper with the names and addresses of collaborating credit unions. These are also printed on
the graduation certificate which participants receive at the end of the workshop. At the three
credit unions with which collaboration is strongest, there is a NTFP advisor on-site to provide
36The two organizations with the most graduates in the sample are The Hope Program (14% of sample) and
Common Ground (8.5%). http://www.thehopeprogram.org/, http://www.commonground.org/.
Clients of the Doe Fund (http://www.doe.org/), one of the major partners of NTFP, are not included in the
sample. These are individuals living temporarily in Doe Fund facilities. They (and other workshop participants
identified as living in temporary residencies or as homeless) are not included since the temporary nature of their
locations does not seem to lend itself to identification using distance.
37See http://www.natfed.org/ for more about CDCUs.
38One of the credit unions has no membership fee to begin with; others have fees ranging from $5-$20.
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counseling (other collaborating credit unions also provide counseling services). Finally, for the two
credit unions with which collaboration is strongest (the credit union operated by the organization
(NTFCU) and a Brooklyn credit union by the name of Brooklyn Co-Op, or BCFCU), remote
account opening takes place at some workshop locations. In workshops given at those locations,
participants are able to open accounts in these credit unions on the spot during the workshop.
NTFCU and BCFCU are also the only credit unions for which I have administrative account
opening data. Collaborations entail other elements in addition to those which encourage account
opening. Most importantly, workshops are given at 4 of the credit unions.39
Figure 1.1 shows a map of New York City which displays the locations of the various credit
unions with which NTFP currently collaborates and the collaboration starting dates. These dates
have been inferred from Memorandum of Understandings signed between NTFP and the various
credit unions and have been verified as approximate collaboration initiation dates by NTFP staff.
[Insert Figure 1.1 here]
C. Sample and Data Sources
The full sample consists of 2,165 individuals who underwent and graduated NTFP’s workshop40
in 2008-2011, for whom there is a valid address, and who are not identified as homeless or as living
in temporary residencies (see also footnote 36). I also exclude individuals for whom initial banking
status is not available and individuals who are members of NTFCU prior to the workshop.41 The
resulting sample includes participants from 277 workshops conducted at 50 different sites.
Comprehensive demographic and financial behavior data is collected on the first day of the
workshop via a questionnaire that participants are asked to fill out. This data is summarized
in Panel A of Table 1.2 and discussed in the next subsection. As part of the questionnaire,
participants are asked to authorize NTFP to pull their credit reports. Reports for those who agree
(almost everyone) are pulled in the first week of the workshop. Summary statistics of incoming
credit report data are reported in Panel B of Table 1.2 and discussed below.
39A potential bias that this creates is that participants who travel further to attend the workshop (and whose
“distance to the closest collaborating CU” is on average higher) may be more motivated and thus more likely to
change their behavior post-workshop, regardless of account opening. This would weaken the effects of account
opening estimated using distance.
40In order to graduate, an individual must attend at least 4 out of 5 sessions. The attrition rate is about 30%.
41Prior CU membership data is only available for NTFCU (see below). Clients of other credit unions might also
participate in the workshops, especially given that workshops are held in 3 of the other collaborating credit unions,
but I cannot identify them. Results are unchanged in a robustness check in which I filter out all those who undergo
the workshop in one of these credit unions and who indicate that they have a checking or a savings account at the
beginning of the workshop.
18
In addition to the incoming credit report pull, workshop participants are asked to authorize
NTFP to pull their reports for evaluation purposes every 6 months, indefinitely into the future,
and about 70% agree.4243 Reports for evaluation purposes have been pulled periodically for a
random subset of participants since 2008. For the purpose of this study, a large number of reports
was pulled in May-June 2012. In my analysis of credit report outcomes I consider workshop
participants for which there are at least two credit reports available: one from the beginning of
the workshop and one from at least 6 months and at most 3 years after the workshop.44 After
applying the data filters described above, there are 1,081 such participants.
In order to supplement credit report data and collect information on more outcomes, a tele-
phone survey of NTFP’s workshop participants was conducted in July 2012-March 2013. After
a brief introduction in which participants were reminded of the workshop that they had taken,45
they were asked to answer the survey in return for a chance to win a $100 American Express gift
card. Those who agreed (13% of the entire sample, or 283 individuals) were told that the survey
concerns their financial life and were asked to respond honestly. The outcome variables derived
from survey questions are summarized in Section 1.6 and in Table 1.4, and the entire survey is in
Appendix A.
In addition to comprehensive account ownership data for those who answered the survey, ad-
ministrative data on account openings is available from two of the six collaborating credit unions.
Data for NTFCU, the credit union operated by NTFP, is comprehensive: NTFCU’s client database
is periodically matched with NTFP’s database and information regarding NTFCU account own-
ership by all NTFP workshop participants is available, regardless of when they underwent the
workshop. Administrative account opening data is also available from Brooklyn Co-Op (BCFCU),
one of the other collaborating credit unions. This data is obtained from reimbursement requests
of waived account fees made by BCFCU, meaning that data on account ownership prior to the
workshop is not available. An additional caveat is that reimbursement requests were only made
starting July 2009, so account opening data is not available before that date.46 Account open-
ing/ownership data for the other collaborating credit unions is only available through the survey.
Survey data on account openings at the other credit unions shows that the vast majority of account
openings occurred in NTFCU and BCFCU, so that the missing data on openings at other credit
42Note that these are “soft pulls”, which do not affect credit scores.
43Those who agree to have their reports pulled and those who do not agree are observationally similar.
44When there is more than one report pulled 0.5-3 years after the workshop I use the latest available report. The
average time gap between pulls is 1.7 years. I consider different time intervals in a robustness check.
45This was done in order to increase the participation rate.
46Collaboration with BCFCU started in January 2009.
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unions for those who did not answer the survey might not be critical (see Table 1.3). This is not
surprising, since these are the credit unions with which collaboration has been in place for the
longest time (see Figure 1.1) and since they are the only ones in which an account can be opened
on the spot during the workshop (at some locations).
Walking distances and public transit travel times between workshop participants’ addresses
and collaborating credit unions, used to instrument for the likelihood of post-workshop account
opening, were obtained using Google Maps.47
D. Demographics and Incoming Financial Behavior: Descriptions and Summary
Statistics
Table 1.1 shows the distribution of initial banking status in the sample, as reported by par-
ticipants on the first day of the workshop. 32% of sample individuals have neither a checking
nor a savings account at the beginning of the workshop. An additional 27% have only a checking
or a savings account, and the remaining 41% have both checking and savings accounts. I divide
the sample into “initially banked” and “initially unbanked” workshop participants, defining the
latter as those who have neither type of account. This corresponds to the FDIC’s definition in its
National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households. To get a sense of how the 32%-68%
unbanked-banked distribution in the sample compares to that of the general population, note
that 34% of households in the New York metropolitan area (MSA) earning less than $15,000 a
year are unbanked (26% of households earning less than $30,000). These figures are somewhat
higher than the national averages, which are 28% and 19%, respectively (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (2012)).
[Insert Table 1.1 here]
The first two columns of Panel A of Table 1.2 show means of demographic and incoming
financial behavior variables based on data collected at the beginning of the workshop. Means
are computed separately for the initially banked and the initially unbanked, as defined above.
Examining these figures, it can be seen that the sample is primarily composed of females. This is
especially true for the initially banked, only 28% of which are male. The vast majority of sample
individuals (more than 85%) are black or Hispanic, and about 40% are non-US born. Education
47Public transit travel times, used in a robustness check, were obtained during several weekdays, in mornings and
in afternoons, and then averaged. Correlations between different runs were all higher than 98%.
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levels are relatively high among the initially banked: the average banked sample individual has
more than 13 years of schooling, i.e. attended college. The average unbanked individual, on the
other hand, has slightly less than 12 years of schooling. Only 18% of the initially unbanked and
30% of the initially banked are married or in a domestic partnership. Average age is around 40.
Unemployment rates are very high, in particular among the unbanked: 58% of initially unbanked
sample individuals report being unemployed at the time of workshop (as well as 29% of the initially
banked). In light of this, it is not surprising that a large fraction of the unbanked (63%) report
receiving some type of welfare payments.48 Average annual earned income, conditional on being
positive, is much higher for the initially banked, though still quite low: $29,410 vs. $14,890 for the
initially unbanked.49
The bottom three rows of the first two columns of Panel A show summary statistics for sev-
eral variables which concern incoming financial behavior. While 51% of initially banked sample
individuals report saving at the beginning of the workshop, only 8% of those who are initially
unbanked report doing so. 40% of the initially unbanked and 11% of the initially banked report
using check cashing stores to cash their checks. Finally, only 34% of initially unbanked sample
individuals report having ever seen their credit report prior to attending the workshop, compared
to 67% of those who are initially banked.
[Insert Table 1.2 here]
E. Credit Report Variables: Descriptions and Summary Statistics
The first two columns of Panel B of Table 1.2 report summary statistics for variables con-
structed using credit reports pulled at the beginning of the workshop. These reports contain
information about an individual’s credit history that is meant to help potential lenders assess
creditworthiness. Information is collected by credit bureaus - the three major ones are Experian,
Equifax, and Transunion - from lenders, collection agencies, and public records concerning legal
action that has to do with debt. This study uses reports pulled from Transunion which include,
in addition to credit history information, FICO scores.50 These scores, based on an algorithm
developed by the Fair Isaac Corporation and ranging between 300-850, are the most popular
48Defined here as public assistance, Supplemental Security Income, Disability Insurance, and food stamps.
49These figures are after removing the top 5% values.
50There are several types of scores. The scores used here are “FICO classic 04”.
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aggregator of credit report information and are widely used to assess creditworthiness.51 For
example, borrowers with a score below 620 are usually considered “risky” or “subprime”.
Importantly, FICO scores are only computed for individuals with sufficient recent credit ac-
tivity.52 When there is insufficient recent activity, the phrase “Insufficient Credit” (“IC”) appears
on the report instead of a number score. This is a relevant fact for the individuals studied here,
many of whom are not active users of mainstream credit. As the first row of Panel B shows, only
45% of initially unbanked sample individuals have a credit score at the beginning of the work-
shop. Initially banked individuals are far more likely to have a score: 78% of them have one. I
come back to the score/IC issue when describing the outcome variables I examine, in Section 1.6.
Among those who do have FICO scores at the beginning of the workshop, the mean score for the
initially banked is 624, just above the conventional “poor-OK” cutoff of 620. This corresponds to
about the 20th percentile of the US population. For the initially unbanked, the mean score is 555,
corresponding to about the 7th percentile of the US population.53
The remainder of Panel B provides summary statistics of specific credit report items. The debt
accounts reported on a credit report can be divided in two. Some accounts are “active”, i.e. have
not been sent to a collection agency or involved legal action. 67% of initially banked and 39%
of initially unbanked sample individuals have a non-zero active credit balance. Unsurprisingly,
these figures correspond quite closely to the figures for having a FICO score above. The average
outstanding balance (conditional on being positive) is quite high: over $11,000 for the initially
banked and over $9,000 for the initially unbanked.54
Most initially banked sample individuals (57%) have at least one open credit card versus just
17% of the initially unbanked. For those that have a positive credit card balance, the average
balance is higher among the initially banked than it is among the initially unbanked.
In addition to “active” accounts, credit reports contain information about accounts at advanced
stages of delinquency. Most sample individuals - 52% of the initially banked and 73% of the
initially unbanked - have at least one account in collections, i.e. an account that had been sold by
51For more information on credit reports and FICO scores see:
http://www.myfico.com/Downloads/Files/myFICO_UYFS_Booklet.pdf, http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/articles/.
52In order for a score to be computed, a credit report must contain an account (a “tradeline”) that
has been open for at least 6 months and an account that has been updated in the past 6 months. See
http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/questions/requirement-for-fico-score.aspx.
53For the national distribution of FICO scores see http://www.fico.com/en/Company/News/Pages/09-19-
2011b.aspx.
54These figures are after removing mortgage balances, which are very rare (less than 5% of the sample) but
relatively extremely high, and dropping the top 5% values. Still, this variable is skewed: median values for the
initially banked and the initially unbanked are $6,435 and $3,643, respectively. The top 5% values are also removed
from the credit card balance data and collections and judgments data summarized in this table.
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the creditor to a collection agency. Judgments are accounts where the creditor has been awarded
a legal claim on an individual’s assets by the court. Around 30% of sample individuals have at
least one judgment against them at the beginning of the workshop. This fraction is similar across
initially banked and initially unbanked individuals. Average combined collection and judgment
balances, conditional on being positive, are also similar at around $3,000.
1.5. Empirical Strategy
Since opening an account at a mainstream financial institution is an endogenous choice, selec-
tion might bias any direct non-experimental examination of the effects of opening an account on
future behavior and outcomes. In the particular setting studied here, workshop graduates who
decide to follow the counselor’s recommendation and open an account at one of the collaborat-
ing credit unions are likely different than those who do not follow this recommendation on both
observable and unobservable dimensions. For example, since opening an account is one of the
main things advocated in the workshop, it may reflect a better understanding of workshop content
or increased motivation to implement the lessons learned in the workshop. In turn, participants
who choose to open an account might be more likely to, say, make an effort to reduce temptation
spending, regardless of having opened the account. It is therefore important to find an exogenous
source of variation in account opening in order to establish causal effects.
I use variation in the location of workshop participants’ homes and in the time in which
they underwent the workshop (relative to the existence of collaborations between NTFP and the
different credit unions) as a source of exogenous variation in account opening. In particular, I use
the distance between workshops participants’ homes and the closest collaborating credit union at
the time in which they underwent the workshop as an instrument for opening an account at one
of these credit unions. In the next subsection I explain how I construct this distance variable,
which I call Proximity. I proceed by discussing the validity of this variable as an instrument for
account opening. I first provide evidence regarding Proximity’s strength as a predictor of account
opening at collaborating credit unions and in general. I then discuss the exclusion restriction and
present evidence indicating that variation in Proximity is, indeed, exogenous.
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A. Constructing Proximity
The distance measure I use as an instrument for account opening is based on Google Maps
walking distances between participants’ addresses and the different collaborating credit unions. As
noted above, initial collaboration dates are inferred from Memorandum of Understanding signings
between NTFP and the various credit unions and have been confirmed with NTFP staff. A credit
union is considered as “collaborating” at all dates following the MOU signing date.
Proximity is defined for participant i who begins the workshop on day t by:
Proximityi = −log( min
k∈collt
{distance(homei, CUk)})
where collt is the subset of collaborating credit unions with which collaboration was in place
at time t, i.e. with which an MOU had been signed prior to participant i starting the workshop.
I use proximity, the negative of distance, so that regression coefficients have an intuitive sign.
I take the natural log of distance so that Proximity decreases in distance at a decreasing rate.
This makes intuitive sense (e.g. decreasing the distance to the closest credit union from 1.1 miles
to 0.1 miles would seemingly have a larger effect on the likelihood of opening an account than
decreasing the distance from 5 to 4 miles), and seems to fit the data slightly better than linear
distance.
In order to control for unobservable, time-invariant place effects, I construct an additional
distance variable. Proximity_No_Coll is identical to Proximity except that it does not take




That is, Proximity_No_Coll is the proximity to the closest collaborating credit union, regardless
of whether that credit union already collaborates with NTFP at the time in which the individual
undergoes the workshop. I elaborate on the use of this variable as a control below, where I discuss
the exclusion restriction.
I winsorize both proximity variables at the 5% level on each side in order to minimize the
effects of outliers. As a robustness check, I construct analogous variables using public transit
travel times between participants’ homes and collaborating credit unions, also from Google Maps.
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The variables (and the results) are similar.55
B. Proximity as a Predictor of Account Opening
The basic premise behind using Proximity as an instrument for account opening is that indi-
viduals are more likely to open accounts at institutions that are closer to their homes, other things
equal. This is intuitive and is also supported by evidence from the 2010 Survey of Consumer
Finances, where “location” was by far the most popular reason given for choosing the financial
institution where respondents had their checking accounts (Bricker, Kennickell, Moore, and Sabel-
haus (2012)). Location might be important because of the costs of going to the bank and opening
the account56 as well as because the benefits of having an account at an institution might be
related to distance from that institution.57
In any case, distance from a particular institution predicting account opening at that institution
is not enough for proximity to the closest collaborating credit union to predict account opening
in the setting studied here. If workshops are very effective in persuading participants to open
accounts at collaborating credit unions and the rate of account opening in those institutions is
very high, proximity to a particular credit union might predict account opening at that credit union
(versus account opening at other credit unions), but Proximity will not be a good predictor of
account opening in collaborating credit unions in general.
A further, similar caveat is that even if Proximity does predict account opening at the collab-
orating credit unions, those who live far away from them might be more likely to open accounts
at other institutions that are closer to their homes.58 This would complicate the analysis: in
the extreme case where overall account opening rates are not affected at all by Proximity (i.e.
Proximity only determines the likelihood of opening an account at a collaborating credit union
versus opening an account elsewhere), the effective control group would be those who open ac-
counts elsewhere. The exercise conducted here would then be interpreted as the estimation of the
effects of opening an account at one of the collaborating credit unions vs. opening an account
elsewhere. If, on the other hand, the rate of account opening in institutions other than the collab-
orating credit unions is not significantly affected by Proximity, the effective control group would
55Correlation between Proximity and the corresponding variable based on public transit travel time is 91.5%.
56Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) note the importance of such “channel factors” in facilitating certain behaviors
and cite a study showing the importance of distance from a student health center in predicting utilization.
57See the discussion regarding the exclusion restriction, below, for more on this issue.
58That is, the value of opening an account at a nearby institution that is not a collaborating credit union might
be higher than some “account opening threshold” after having gone through the workshop.
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be those who do not open accounts at all.
These considerations motivate the analysis summarized in Figure 1.2 and in Table 1.3. As noted
above, administrative account opening data is available from NTFCU and BCFCU, the two credit
unions with which collaboration is the closest, as well as through the survey. I begin by analyzing
the administrative account opening data. Panel A of Table 1.3 shows summary statistics of this
data, according to which 12.2% of initially banked individuals and 9.1% of initially unbanked
individuals opened accounts at NTFCU (the credit union operated by NTFP) after the workshop
whereas 12.8% of initially banked and 11.7% of initially unbanked individuals for which data is
available opened accounts at BCFCU.59 I use this data to plot the likelihood of account opening
in these two credit unions as a function of the distance to them in Figure 1.2. The figure is
constructed by estimating the following regression:






η2jDj ∗ Unbanked+ φUnbanked+ ε
where Opened_at_NT_BC is a dummy variable indicating whether an account was opened
at either NTFCU or BCFCU after the workshop and X ′ includes an intercept, the demographic
control variables listed in footnote 93, and fixed effects for the quarter in which the workshop was
taken. Dj is equal to 1 for individual i if the distance between individual i’s home and the closest
out of NTFCU/BCFCU is smaller than j ∗0.5 and larger than (j−1)∗0.5. In other words, Dj are
0.5 mile-wide distance interval dummies, indicating whether an individual lives within a certain
distance of either of these credit unions.60
Figure 1.2 displays the estimated η1j and η2j coefficients, representing distance interval effects
on account opening for the initially banked and the initially unbanked, respectively. Examining
the two plots in Figure 1.2, a strong distance effect whereby those who live closer are more likely to
have opened accounts is evident for both the initially banked and the initially unbanked, especially
for the second group. The effect seems to be decreasing in distance.
[Insert Figure 1.2 here]
59Administrative data for BCFCU is only available since July 2009. This is reflected in the smaller number of
observations used to derive the summary statistics, as noted in Table 1.3.
60For individuals who participated in the workshop prior to July 2009 I consider only distance to NTFCU, since
BCFCU account opening data is not available for that period.
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I proceed to run regressions of the following general form:
Opened = X ′pi + η1Proximity ∗Banked+ η2Proximity ∗ Unbanked+ φUnbanked+ ε
where X’ includes an intercept and different combinations of control variables.
Columns (1)-(4) of Panel B of Table 1.3 report the results of regressions which use the ad-
ministrative account opening data. Opened is equal to Opened_at_NT_BC in these regressions
and Proximity is constructed as explained above, except it only takes NTFCU and BCFCU into
account.
[Insert Table 1.3 here]
Regression (1) controls for the demographic variables listed in footnote 93 as well as for fixed
effects for the quarter in which the workshop was taken. Regression (3) adds fixed effects for the site
in which the workshop was taken.6162 The estimated coefficients on both Proximity∗Banked and
Proximity ∗Unbanked are statistically significant in both specifications, indicating that distance
to these two credit unions significantly affects account opening in them by both initially banked
and initially unbanked workshop graduates. Although the coefficients for the initially unbanked are
larger in both specifications, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal to the coefficients
for the initially banked, as indicated by F statistics displayed towards the bottom of Panel B.
Since Proximity is a log transformation of distance, we can interpret the coefficients as 100*the
increase in the likelihood of opening an account at NTFCU/BCFCU associated with a 1% increase
in proximity (or decrease in distance) to the closest collaborating credit union of these two.
While regressions (1) and (3) establish that distance to NTFCU and BCFCU predicts ac-
count opening in these credit unions, the conclusion that minimum distance to the 6 collaborating
credit unions predicts account opening in any of the 6 collaborating credit unions is not obvi-
ous. As discussed above, it might be the case that the overall rate of account opening in the
collaborating credit unions is high and that distance to NTFCU/BCFCU is effectively a proxy for
NTFCU/BCFCU being the closest out of the 6. Regressions (2) and (4) provide evidence against
this story by including a dummy variable indicating whether the closest collaborating credit union
61Recall that workshops are given at many different sites, corresponding to different partner organizations. I
discuss the importance of including these fixed effects in the context of the exclusion restriction, below.
62Note that it is infeasible to include a version of Proximity_No_Coll in these regressions because NTFCU
is owned by NTFP, so there is no pre-collaboration period, and for BCFCU there is no account opening data
pre-collaboration.
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to the individual’s home is NTFCU/BCFCU or one of the other collaborating credit unions. The
results hardly change, supporting the notion that Proximity predicts account opening at any of
the collaborating credit unions.
I now turn to account opening data derived from the telephone survey. This data is compre-
hensive in the sense that it includes information on account ownership at any financial institution,
but it is only available for a small subset of the sample: data is available for 222 initially banked
and 61 initially unbanked workshop graduates. The righthand side of Panel A of Table 1.3 sum-
marizes account opening data derived from the survey. Figures for account opening at NTFCU
and BCFCU are similar to those obtained from administrative data with the exception of initially
unbanked individuals’ opening rate at NTFCU. While administrative data indicates that 9.1% of
the initially unbanked opened an account at NTFCU after the workshop, survey data indicates
that this figure is 19.7%. This is most likely due to data errors in one or both of these sources.63
Regressions (5)-(7) in Panel B report the results of account opening regressions similar to regres-
sions (1)-(4) but based on survey data. Control variables are identical to those in specification (2)
(it is infeasible to include workshop site fixed effects because of the small number of observations).
Regression (5) is identical to regression (2): the dependent variable is Opened_at_NT_BC and
the proximity measure used only takes distance from NTFCU and BCFCU into account. Coeffi-
cients are, however, much larger than in regression (2), in particular for the initially unbanked:
0.266 vs. 0.079.64 This is, again, most likely due to data errors. In Section 1.8, where I quantify
the effects of account opening, I use each of these data sources and generate two sets of estimates
for each outcome.
In regressions (6) and (7) I define Proximity considering distances from all collaborating
credit unions rather than just NTFCU and BCFCU. In regression (6) the independent variable
is Opened_at_Coll_CU , which is an indicator for having opened an account at any of the col-
laborating credit unions after the workshop. Summary statistics for this variable, displayed on
the righthand side of Panel A, indicate that the vast majority of account openings at collaborat-
ing credit unions occurred at either NTFCU or BCFCU: only 3% of workshop graduates report
opening accounts at other collaborating credit unions. Together with the relative similarity of the
coefficients on the Proximity interactions across regressions (5) and (6), this supports the validity
63I add to each data source by considering an individual as having opened an account if the other source indicates
so (this is effective for a small amount of individuals). Since the survey data is only available for a small subset of
the sample, errors in one or both of these data sources might still cause differences in measured account opening
rates.
64Note that both estimates are quite large, considering that the unconditional likelihood of initially unbanked
workshop graduates opening accounts at NTFCU or BCFCU is 15-35% (depending on the data source used).
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of using data on account openings at NTFCU and BCFCU to estimate the effect of Proximity
on the likelihood of account opening at any of the collaborating credit unions.
In regression (7) the dependent variable is Opened_Anywhere, indicating whether an account
had been opened at any mainstream financial institution following the workshop.65 Importantly,
the coefficient on Proximity ∗ Unbanked is very similar across regressions (6) and (7).66 This
provides evidence against workshop graduates living relatively far away from all collaborating
credit unions being more likely to open accounts at other mainstream financial institutions (in
fact, the coefficient in regression (7) is slightly larger than the one in regression (6), implying the
opposite). We can therefore use Proximity to estimate the effects of opening an account at a
collaborating credit union versus not opening an account at all.
C. The Exclusion Restriction
In addition to having a clear effect on the likelihood of opening an account, Proximity must
not be related to outcomes for any other reason in order for it to be a valid instrument. Proximity
is, however, a combination of place and time, which raises a number of potential concerns.
Time effects may be cause for concern since collaborations were signed gradually over the
sample period, so that individuals undergoing the workshop in the latter part of the 2008-2011
sample were more likely to have been living close to a collaborating credit union, other things
equal. Economy-wide fluctuations, in particular those of the magnitude of the last few years, may
thus induce correlation between Proximity and outcomes that is unrelated to account opening. I
include fixed effects for the quarter-year in which the workshop was taken (i.e. Q3 2009) in order
to address this concern.
A potentially more serious concern is place effects: Proximity reflects the location of an indi-
vidual’s home. Individuals living in different places might exhibit different financial behavior and
different propensities to change this behavior following financial education, other things equal.67
65Note that this variable is identical to Opened_at_Coll_CU for the initially banked. Survey respondents were
asked about their current ownership of checking and savings accounts. Initially unbanked individuals who reported
having an account were categorized as having opened an account after the workshop. Initially banked individuals
who reported having an account at one of the collaborating credit unions were asked if they had opened the
account before or after attending the workshop, and this is what the survey variables Opened_at_NT_BC and
Opened_at_Coll_CU are based on. There is no data on whether initially banked individuals had opened accounts
at other institutions after the workshop. This is, however, likely to be rare.
66Coefficients on Proximity ∗Banked in regressions (6) and (7) are too small to be statistically significant, given
the amount of noise in these regressions. In analyzing survey outcomes I concentrate on the initially unbanked.
67Note that most of the outcomes studied in this paper are changes relative to the beginning of the workshop (e.g.
“the change in credit score from the beginning of the workshop to 0.5-3 years after the workshop”). For this type of
outcomes, exclusion restriction violations would entail individuals living closer to collaborating credit unions being
more or less likely to change their behavior following the workshop rather than being more or less likely to exhibit
certain behavior at a certain point in time.
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There are several specific reasons to believe that Proximity might be correlated with outcomes
through place effects. First, the locations of the credit unions with which NTFP collaborates are
not random: these credit unions, which are dedicated to serving low-income communities, pre-
sumably choose their locations based on the characteristics of residents of the surrounding areas
as well as on the centrality of the specific location. Collaborations themselves are not random:
NTFCU chooses to collaborate with certain credit unions and not with others. To the extent that
collaborations were signed with credit unions located in places around which residents are likely
to exhibit different outcomes for some reason, this will induce bias.
Second, as explained above workshops are conducted at different sites that belong to specific
partner organizations. Individuals undergoing the workshop at a specific site are relatively ho-
mogenous, in terms of both geographical location and other personal characteristics that may
have to do with outcomes (i.e. they are all single mothers or formerly homeless).68 This is another
channel through which place effects might induce spurious correlation between Proximity and
outcomes.
I address this problem by controlling for several types of variables. First, I control for various
observable individual characteristics which seem relevant to outcomes and which may proxy for
place-related differences. I include dummy variables for whether the individual is male, black,
Hispanic, born in the US, unemployed, graduated high school, is married/in a domestic partner-
ship and is receiving some form of welfare (public assistance, SSI, SSD, or food stamps) as well
as a variable equal to the individual’s age. Second, I control for unobservable differences related
to workshop sites by including fixed effects for the different sites.69 Including these variables
should also decrease residual variance and result in more precise estimates. Finally, I am able to
directly control for any time-invariant place effects which may confound estimation - observable
and unobservable - by exploiting the fact that collaborations were not all in place at the beginning
of the sample period. This enables the inclusion of the control variable Proximity_No_Coll
which, as explained above, is based on the distance between workshop participants’ homes and
the closest collaborating credit union, regardless of whether collaboration was in place at the time
in which they underwent the workshop. The remaining variation in Proximity is due to collabo-
ration initiation with each credit union increasing Proximity for some of those who undergo the
workshop from that time on, but not for those who underwent the workshop before collaboration
68Individuals undergoing the workshop at a specific site are also likely to receive similar educational content, as
counselors are often assigned to workshops in specific sites.
69Recall that the sample includes participants of 277 individual workshops conducted at 50 different sites. One
might also wish to control for specific workshop fixed effects, but this severely limits variation.
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was initiated. To the extent that place effects are invariant over time, and in particular pre- and
post-collaboration, they will be captured by this control variable.
A remaining potential source of bias is unobservable time-specific place effects that are related
to Proximity. These may arise if the timing of collaborations with specific credit unions was
somehow related to outcomes in their surrounding areas. For example, collaborations with specific
credit unions might have been signed as part of some bigger process which the neighborhood around
them had been going through at the time and which also led to better outcomes. However, NTFP
staff has indicated that the timings of collaboration initiations have been practically random.
In order to provide evidence in support of the empirical approach, I examine whether Proximity
predicts differences in incoming observable characteristics. The rightmost 6 columns of Panel A
of Table 1.2 report the results of regressions of the following form:
Incoming = X ′β + ρ1Proximity ∗Banked+ ρ2Proximity ∗ Unbanked+ φUnbanked+ ε
where Incoming includes the demographic and incoming financial behavior variables described
in Section 1.4 and X ′ includes different combinations of the non-demographic control variables
described above, as indicated in the bottom of the panel.
Three regressions are estimated for each dependent variable. The first two columns in the right-
hand side of Panel A report coefficients on the Proximity interactions from the first regression,
where no control variables are included. These coefficients indicate that workshop participants
living closer to collaborating credit unions are less likely to be male, black, and born in the US and
more likely to be Hispanic and married or in a domestic partnership. These coefficients are mostly
smaller and less likely to be statistically significant, however, when I include control variables in
regressions (2) and (3). Regression (1) indicates that unbanked workshop participants with larger
values of Proximity are also more likely to receive welfare payments and have lower average
earned income. While the former difference is not robust to the inclusion of control variables in
regressions (2) and (3), Proximity negatively predicts the earned income of initially unbanked
individuals in all regressions.70 Education level, age, and employment status are not predicted
by Proximity. The same is true for all of the incoming financial behavior variables examined in
Panel A: saving, using check-cashing stores, and having ever seen one’s credit report.
The righthand side of Panel B of Table 1.2 performs the same exercise for incoming variables
70This difference disappears when conditioning on other demographic variables, however.
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taken from credit reports. The coefficients on the Proximity interactions are small and statistically
insignificant for virtually all of the variables in all three specifications. Having a FICO score (vs.
having “IC”), the actual score, having an active balance or an open credit card, and having
accounts in collections or judgments, as well as the balances of all of these, are not significantly
predicted by Proximity. Overall, the results presented in this table lend support to the exogeneity
of Proximity. In particular, variables which have to do with financial/credit behavior do not seem
at all related to Proximity, even unconditionally.
A final issue with regard to the exclusion restriction has to do with the possible dependence of
the effects of opening an account on Proximity. For example, one might argue that, conditional
on having opened an account at one of the collaborating credit unions, those living closer to their
credit union are more likely to deposit cash in their account rather than keep it at home, where
it is more prone to temptation spending. Conversely, funds kept in the account might be more
accessible for those living closer, making temptation spending more likely.71 Those living closer to
their credit union might also be more likely to seek the financial advice given at the credit union.
Strictly speaking, this would be a violation of the exclusion restriction since it is a causal effect
of the instrument on outcomes.72 In this case, however, it seems to be more an issue of defining
the treatment instrumented for (“opening an account” vs. “opening an account and visiting the
branch”).
1.6. Outcome Variables
In this section I describe and summarize the outcome variables. This is important for being
able to interpret the results in Sections 1.7 and 1.8. Summary statistics of outcome variables
for sample individuals, all graduates of the financial literacy workshops, might also be taken as
informative regarding the effects of these workshops. It should be kept in mind, however, that
participation in these workshops is voluntary, so that selection is likely an issue.
71Anecdotally, an NTFP employee has told me that some of their clients prefer to live far away from their financial
institution for this reason.
72As Angrist and Pischke (2008) (p. 117, 152-161) emphasize, the exclusion restriction has two parts when
we allow for treatment effect heterogeneity. First, the instrument should be independent of potential outcomes,
conditional on covariates (“independence assumption”). This is the part argued for above. Second, the instrument
should not causally affect outcomes other than through the first stage (“exclusion restriction”).
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A. Credit Report Outcome Variables
Most of the outcome data in this paper comes from credit reports. I construct credit report
outcome variables by comparing data from reports pulled between 6 months and 3 years after the
workshop (“follow-up reports”) to data from reports pulled at the beginning of the workshop.73
Panel A of Table 1.4 provides summary statistics for these outcome variables, which I divide into
variables having to do with credit scores or a lack thereof (see Section 1.4.E), variables having to
do with mainstream credit usage, and variables having to do with delinquent credit activity. I
discuss each of these types of outcomes in turn. More information on credit reports and summary
statistics of incoming variables are found in Section 1.4.E.
[Insert Table 1.4 here]
1. Credit scores
As described in Section 1.4, credit scores are an aggregator of information regarding an indi-
vidual’s creditworthiness. They are broadly based on the extent of an individual’s (mainstream)
credit usage and on past delinquencies.74 While examining the specific items that make up the
score is better in order to pick up specific behavioral changes, some of these items are unavailable
to me (e.g. recent credit inquiries made about the individual). The credit score provides a simple
creditworthiness assessment that considers all of the information available to the credit bureau.
Perhaps more importantly, credit scores are not only a reflection of credit behavior but also an
extremely important outcome in their own right. They are used to determine credit conditions,
from interest rates to cell-phone deposits, to screen prospective renters, and even to evaluate job
applicants.75 The importance of credit scores might reduce their informational content, however,
since individuals clearly have an incentive to try to optimize their scores in various ways which
do not necessarily reflect better credit behavior.76 This is an especially relevant point here since
most CDCU’s offer free financial advice, where valuable tips for credit score optimization might
be transmitted.
The first part of Table 1.4 summarizes variables which have to do with credit scores, separately




76Examples are correcting mistakes on the credit report, asking lenders to erase old delinquencies, and opti-
mizing the mix of credit cards used. See http://money.msn.com/credit-rating/9-fast-fixes-for-your-credit-scores-
weston.aspx.
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for the initially banked and the initially unbanked. While 79% of initially banked individuals had
a FICO score at the beginning of the workshop, only 47% of the initially unbanked had one.77
Improved_Score is a dummy variable that is defined only for those who had a FICO score at the
beginning of the workshop. It takes the value of 1 if the score in the follow-up pull was higher
than the initial score and 0 otherwise. A similar fraction of those with an initial score were able
to improve it across the initially banked and the initially unbanked: 56-59%. Those who did not
improve their score either had a lower score at the time of the follow-up pull or had no score at all
at that time (“Became IC” in the table). FICO_Change is the change in FICO score between
the initial pull and the follow-up pull. It is defined only for those who have scores in both pulls.78
The mean of FICO_Change is positive for both groups: it is 13 points for the initially banked
and 31 points for the initially unbanked.
Established_Score is a dummy variable that is defined only for those who had “Insufficient
Credit” rather than a FICO score at the beginning of the workshop. It takes the value of 1 if a
score had been “established” by the time of the follow-up pull, i.e. if the follow-up pull resulted
in a number score. This is the case for 33% of the initially banked and just 16% of the initially
unbanked who started out “IC”. I also construct the dummy variable Has_Score which is defined
for everyone and equal to 1 if the follow-up pull resulted in a FICO score rather than in “IC”. This
variable captures score establishment as well as “score loss”, whereby an individual who had a
FICO score at the beginning of the workshop does not have one at the time of the follow-up pull.
This is the case for a non-trivial fraction of individuals. In particular, 23% of initially unbanked
individuals who had FICO scores at the beginning of the workshop do not have a score at the
time of the follow-up pull (“Became IC”).
Established_Prime_Score is defined similarly to Established_Score, except that it only
takes the value of 1 if the follow-up pull resulted in a score higher than 620, the conventional
cutoff between “poor” and “OK” credit. This was achieved by only a small fraction of those who
had no score at the beginning of the workshop: 18% of the initially banked and just 7% of the
initially unbanked, roughly half the fraction of those who started out “IC” and had any score at
the time of the follow-up pull.
In order to make use of all available credit report observations, I construct the variable
Improved_Established. This variable combines Improved_Score and Established_Prime_Score
77These figures are slightly different than the ones reported in Table 1.2 since they only take into account
individuals for which there is a valid follow-up credit report pull.
78This might cause selection bias. See footnote 96.
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to indicate whether the FICO score had improved / a 620+ score had been established.79
Improved_Established can be seen as capturing a general improvement in the individual’s credit
situation, as reflected by his credit score.
2. Measures of mainstream credit usage
I examine several measures of mainstream credit usage which appear on the credit report,
summary statistics for which are found in the second part of Panel A of Table 1.4.80
Has_Bal is a dummy variable equal to 1 for those who had an “active” debt balance (see
Section 1.4.E) at the time of the follow-up credit pull. This is the case for 79% of the initially
unbanked and 49% of the initially banked. Unsurprisingly, these figures are very similar to the
ones for Has_Score. Comparing these two variables to the corresponding beginning-of-workshop
variables, it is evident that workshop participants do not exhibit an increased likelihood of taking
part in the mainstream credit system at the time of the follow-up pull, on average. As can be seen
in Table 1.4, Has_Bal reflects both entry to and exit from the mainstream credit system (similar
to Has_Score): some individuals begin the workshop with an active balance and have no active
balance at the time of the follow-up pull, and vice-versa.
Change_Bal is the change in the outstanding active debt balance of an individual, from the
beginning of the workshop to the time of the follow-up credit pull. Mortgage balances, which are
very rare (less than 5% of the sample have them) but relatively extremely high, are ignored here
in order to reduce noise, and the extreme top and bottom 5% are dropped. The mean change is
positive at around $500 for both the initially banked and the initially unbanked.
#_Active_Accts is the number of active accounts on the individual’s credit report at the time
of the follow-up credit pull (this variable is not available for beginning-of-workshop pulls). After
dropping the top 5% values, initially banked individuals have about 8 active accounts on average
while the initially unbanked have about 3.81
While credit reports contain detailed information on all types of mainstream credit, I devote
special attention to credit cards. 43% of the initially banked and 82% of the initially unbanked
had no open credit cards at the beginning of the workshop. Has_CC is defined analogously to
79Predicting initial FICO scores for those without an initial score based on various observables and defining
Improved_Established using improvement relative to the predicted values results in a very similar distribution of
Improved_Established.
80I also consider Established_Score and Has_Score, defined above, to be measures of mainstream credit usage.
81Conditional on having a positive number of accounts, means are about 10 and about 4.5 for the initially banked
and for the initially unbanked, respectively.
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Has_Score and Has_Bal, measuring credit card ownership at the time of the follow-up credit
pull. The overall fraction of credit card owners increases somewhat between the beginning of the
workshop and the time of the follow-up pull: from 57% to 64% for the initially banked and from
18% to 23% for the initially unbanked. Rev_Cred_Limit is an individual’s total revolving credit
limit, i.e. the total credit line available on all credit cards, at the time of the follow-up pull (data
is not available for beginning-of-workshop pulls). Average post-workshop revolving credit limits
are much higher for the initially banked: $2,541 vs. $589 for the initially unbanked. This is mostly
due to the fact that the vast majority of the initially unbanked don’t own credit cards: when
conditioning on a positive limit, means are much closer ($4,684 vs. $3,457).
3. Measures of delinquent credit activity
I examine the following measures of delinquent mainstream credit activity, summarized in the
third part of Panel A of Table 1.4.
Amount_P_Due is the total amount that is listed as past due on active credit report accounts
at the time of the follow-up pull. It is an amount that is considered delinquent but has not yet
been transferred to collections, i.e. it reflects relatively recent delinquent behavior. Similar to
#_Active_Accts and Rev_Cred_Limit, this variable is only available from follow-up credit
reports. Around 35% of sample individuals have some amount past due at the 0.5-3 year post-
workshop horizon (the figures for the initially banked and the initially unbanked are virtually
identical). This may seem to be a low number, but note that in order to have amounts past due
on active accounts, one needs to have an outstanding mainstream credit balance, and this is the
case for 79% and only 49% of initially banked and initially unbanked individuals, respectively. The
average of Amount_P_Due, after dropping the top 5% values, is $542 for the initially banked
and $699 for the initially unbanked (when conditioning on a positive amount, averages are $1,764
and $2,065 for the initially banked and the initially unbanked, respectively).
Collections and judgments are debts at advanced stages of delinquency. Change_Colls_Jdgs
and %_Change_Colls_Jdgs are, respectively, amount and percentage changes in the total amount
in collections and judgments, from the beginning of the workshop to the time of the follow-up credit
pull. These balances are reduced by quite a bit, on average, following the workshop: 15% for the
initially banked and 22% for the initially unbanked (after dropping the top 5% values). I devote
less attention to collections and judgments, however, since debts in advanced stages are likely to
be impacted by negotiations and by strategic behavior (for example, in some cases it is better to
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wait for a statute of limitations to take effect than it is to pay off relatively old debt).
B. Survey Outcome Variables
Panel B of Table 1.4 summarizes outcome variables taken from the survey described in Section
1.4.C. 222 surveys were completed by initially banked workshop graduates and 61 surveys were
completed by initially unbanked graduates. The small number of surveys completed by the initially
unbanked limits statistical power for this group. I therefore only examine questions where there
is reasonable variation in responses.
The first outcome variable in Panel B is Saving. I report the fraction of survey respondents
who report that they are saving at the time of the survey,82 conditional on whether or not they had
reported saving at the beginning of the workshop (“initially saving”). The increase in the fraction
of those who report saving is significant: while 56% of initially banked respondents and only 13%
of initially unbanked respondents reported saving at the beginning of the workshop, 68%-69%
of survey respondents report currently saving, and there is virtually no difference between the
initially banked and the initially unbanked. For the initially unbanked, this represents an increase
of more than 400%.
The second outcome variable summarized in Panel B, Saving_More, incorporates saving
changes on the intensive margin, based on self-reported information. Respondents were asked to
recall whether or not they were saving 3 years ago83 and to assess whether they were now saving
more, less, or about the same as 3 years ago.84 The answers to these questions indicate that 46%
of initially banked survey respondents and 54% of initially unbanked respondents feel that they
are now saving more than they did 3 years ago. Around 25% of respondents in both groups feel
that they are now saving less than they did 3 years ago.
The next two variables concern self-reported overspending. The fraction of respondents who
reported feeling that they were spending more than they should be85 is about 44% and is very
82The question was: “Do you currently save? That is, do you put some money aside in most months?”
83The survey was conducted in July 2012-March 2013 among individuals who had undergone the workshop in
2008-2011. 3 years was chosen as a benchmark for self assessment of changes since around the time of the workshop,
obviously applying to some respondents more than to others. The fraction of initially unbanked respondents who
reported having been saving 3 years ago in the survey is much higher than the fraction that had reported saving
in the questionnaire given at the beginning of the workshop (36% vs. 13%). For the initially banked, fractions are
virtually identical at 56%. Correlation between these variables is somewhat low at 29%. In any case, this survey
question and an analogous question on overspending are important since they represent valuable information on
self-assessed changes in behavior.
84This question was presented only to those who indicated that they were currently saving as well as saving 3
years ago. I include those who report saving now but not 3 years ago in the “more” category and those who report
saving 3 years ago but not now in the “less” category.
85The question was: “Do you feel that you’re currently spending more than you should be?”
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similar across initial banking status. Respondents were then asked to assess their current over-
spending relative to 3 years ago.86 62% of initially banked respondents and 41% of initially
unbanked respondents report overspending less now than they did 3 years ago, and 19% and 34%,
respectively, report overspending more now. I use this data to construct the outcome variable
Overspending_Less.
The next question summarized in Panel B is adapted from Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano
(2011). Respondents were asked how confident they were that they would be able to come up
with $1,500 within the next 30 days.87 Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano (2011) take this level of
confidence to be a measure of “financial fragility”. 47% of initially banked and 30% of initially
unbanked respondents reported being certain that they could come up with the full $1,500 in
30 days, while 29% of the initially banked and 34% of the initially unbanked reported that they
could probably come up with the funds (the other options, summarized in Table 1.4, were “I could
probably not come up with $1,500” and “I am certain I could not come up with $1,500”). For
the purpose of the analysis I construct the dummy outcome variable 1500_Confidence which
takes the value of 1 if either of the first two options was chosen. The mean of this variable, 76%
for the initially banked and 64% for the initially unbanked, reflects much lower “fragility” than
that found by Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano (2011). They report that only 50% of the general
population (25-30% of those earning less than $30,000 a year, who are the comparable population)
respond that they are certain or that they could probably come up with $2,000 within the next
month. This difference is significant and likely reflects more than just the difference in the amount
of money stated in the question.
The next two questions summarized in Panel B are constructed using questions in which
respondents were asked to report, on a scale of 1-5, how knowledgeable they feel about managing
their money on a daily basis and how stressed they feel about their personal finances and debt.
These questions had also been asked in the questionnaire administered at the beginning of the
workshop, which enables comparison over time.88 Average self-reported knowledge is higher at the
time of the survey than it is at the beginning of the workshop, at about 4 vs. about 3.2. Average
86This question, which followed the question about current overspending, was: “Many people spend money on
things and later wish that they hadn’t. Compared to 3 years ago, do you now spend more, less, or about the same
on these types of things?“
87The question was: “Say that some unexpected need arose and you had to come up with $1500 within the next
month. How confident are you that you would be able to do so?” I use “30 days” and “a month” interchangeably
here, following Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano (2011). The question concerns $1,500 rather than the $2,000 used
in that paper to accommodate the fact that the population studied here is low-income. $1,500 is an amount which
Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano (2011) mention as being relevant for low-income households, citing Brobeck (2008).
88However, the questions had only been included in the beginning-of-workshop questionnaire in the latter part
of the sample period (2010-2011).
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self-reported stress is lower at the time of the survey, at about 3.15 vs. about 3.65 at the beginning
of the workshop. Interestingly, knowledge and stress levels are similar across initial banking status
at both points in time. I use the responses to these questions to construct the outcome variables
Knowledge and Stress.
The final question summarized in Panel B was adapted from Melzer (2011), who uses data
from the National Survey of America’s Families. Respondents were asked whether they had been
unable to pay their bills on time during the past 6 months.89 29% of initially banked and 34% of
initially unbanked survey respondents reported being unable to pay on time at some point during
the past 6 months. I use these responses, which Melzer (2011) takes to be a measure of economic
hardship, to construct the variable Unable_Bills.
1.7. Reduced Form Proximity Effects
In this section I report the results of reduced form OLS regressions of the form:90
Outcome = X ′pi + δ1Proximity ∗Banked+ δ2Proximity ∗ Unbanked+ φBanked+ ε
where Outcome is a credit report or survey outcome, as described above, and X’ contains
control variables and an intercept, as well as the initial value of Outcome, where available. In
this type of specification, δ1 and δ2 represent proximity effects on the initially banked and on the
initially unbanked, respectively.91 I also test for differences between these coefficients, i.e. between
proximity effects on the initially banked and the initially unbanked, in every regression. Note that
while the effects estimated in this section are reduced form effects, they have the same sign and
are indicative of the statistical significance of the causal effects of opening an account on each
group. Given the partial availability of account opening data, I devote significant attention to
these effects. In Section 1.8 I employ the SSIV method (Angrist and Krueger (1995)) to quantify
the effects of opening an account on the outcomes for which I find statistically significant reduced
89The question was: “During the last 6 months, was there a time when you and your family were not able to pay
your rent, mortgage, or utility bills on time?”
A similar question was asked regarding postponing medical care due to economic hardship, but there was insuf-
ficient variation to enable meaningful analysis. In particular, only 8 initially unbanked respondents answered this
question with a “yes”.
90I use a linear probability model for the many binary outcomes examined here rather than nonlinear models
such as Probit or Logit. This is advocated on the grounds of simplicity, in particular in the context of instrumental
variable estimation, by Angrist and Pischke (2008). The OLS coefficients I report here are similar to average
marginal effects estimated using a Logit model.
91This is equivalent to including Proximity and Proximity ∗ Unbanked on the RHS but more convenient for
examining the proximity effect for each group.
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form effects.
A. Proximity Effects on Credit Report Outcome Variables
Panel A of Table 1.5 reports regression results for the outcome variable Improved_Established.
The regression reported in column (1) includes no control variables except for a dummy variable
for whether the individual had a FICO score at the beginning of the workshop and the initial
score.92 These variables are included in all of the regressions reported in Panel A. Regression (2)
also includes demographic variables93 and fixed effects for the quarter in which the individual took
the workshop.94 Regression (3) includes workshop quarter fixed effects and Proximity_No_Coll,
which effectively captures all observable and unobservable time-invariant place effects, as explained
in Section 1.5.C. Regression (4) includes demographic variables, workshop quarter fixed effects,
and workshop site fixed effects.
[Insert Table 1.5 here]
Across all of the specifications in Panel A, coefficients on Proximity interacted with Banked
are small and statistically insignificant, whereas those on Proximity interacted with Unbanked are
positive and significant. That is, proximity to a collaborating credit union significantly affects the
likelihood of improving one’s credit score relative to the beginning of the workshop or of establish-
ing a non-subprime score (in case that there is no initial score), but only for initially unbanked indi-
viduals. Below I analyze the effects on each of these outcomes (improving one’s score and establish-
ing a non-subprime score) separately. Coefficients for each group are similar across specifications
and range from 0.062 to 0.074 for the initially unbanked. The finding that adding control variables
does not have dramatic effects on the estimated coefficients lends further support to the exogeneity
of Proximity. In particular, the coefficient on Proximity ∗ Unbanked in regression (3), which
controls for unobservable, time-invariant place effects through Proximity_No_Coll, is similar
in magnitude to the other specifications, though far noisier since including Proximity_No_Coll
severely limits the variation in Proximity. In later analyses, which often involve fewer obser-
vations, I concentrate on specifications (2) and (4), which generate more precise estimates. The
92Those without a FICO score are given a value of zero for the latter variable.
93Demographic variables include indicators for being male, black, Hispanic, US-born, employed, married, a high
school graduate, and a recipient of welfare payments, as well as the individuals’ age. Variables are defined in Section
1.4.D and summarized in Table 1.2. These are the variables used in all regressions which control for Demographics.
94The sample consists of individuals who participated in workshops in 2008-2011, so there are 15 workshop quarter
fixed effect dummy variables (one is omitted).
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magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the initially unbanked, which is around 0.070, should be
interpreted as “living 1% closer to a collaborating credit union raises the likelihood of improving
one’s credit score/establishing a 620+ score by approximately 0.070%”, since Proximity is logged.
The coefficients on the dummy variable Unbanked, tabulated below the coefficients on the
Proximity interactions, are insignificant and vary widely across specifications, which makes sense
given their presumed correlation to many of the control variables used. Test statistics for the
equality of Proximity ∗ Banked and Proximity ∗ Unbanked, tabulated towards the bottom of
the table, enable us to reject the hypothesis that they are equal at conventional significance levels
for all specifications. In Table 1.3 I show that while Proximity is a stronger predictor of account
opening for the initially unbanked, it also predicts account opening by the initially banked. The
null results for the initially banked, which are replicated for virtually all of the outcomes studied
in this paper, should therefore not be taken as placebo effects but rather as evidence of the null
effects of opening an account at a Community Development Credit Union on those who already
have accounts at other institutions.
Panel B of Table 1.5 concentrates on those who had a FICO score at the beginning of the
workshop and reports the results of regressions where Improved_Score and FICO_Change are
the dependent variables. The coefficients on Proximity ∗ Unbanked in regressions (1)-(4), which
are identical to those reported in Panel A in terms of the control variables used, are much larger
than those in Panel A. It follows that the effects reported in Panel A on Improved_Established,
which is a combination of Improved_Score and Established_Prime_Score, mostly reflect credit
score improvement by those who had a score to begin with rather than score establishment by
those who had no score.95 Coefficients range around 0.110-0.130, implying that decreasing the
distance from the closest collaborating credit union by 1% increases the likelihood of credit score
improvement by 0.110-0.130%. In regressions (5)-(8) FICO_Change, the difference in FICO
scores between the beginning of the workshop and the time of the follow-up pull, is the dependent
variable.96 Coefficients on Proximity ∗Unbanked are all positive and around 10, though only the
95Regressions where Established_Prime_Score is the dependent variable yield non-significant coefficients. Panel
C presents related evidence.
96In order to be included in regressions where FICO_Change is the dependent variable, an individual must have
a score (rather than “IC”) in both credit pulls. There might be a form of selection here, whereby Proximity affects
the composition of those who have FICO scores at the time of the follow-up pull. In particular, since Proximity
predicts account opening, those who live closer to collaborating credit unions might be more likely to have a score
at the time of the follow-up pull. If those who are “selected in” have worse (or better) scores on average, coefficients
on Proximity will be biased. In practice, however, Proximity does not strongly predict having a follow-up score
(see Panel C) and results derived using the method introduced in Heckman (1976), which accounts for this potential
selection problem, are very similar to OLS results.
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one in regression (7) is statistically significant at conventional levels.97
Panels C and D of Table 1.5 provide evidence regarding the origins of credit score improvements,
as well as further evidence regarding the effects of proximity to collaborating credit unions on
subsequent financial behavior. Panel C reports the results of regressions where various measures
of mainstream credit usage are the dependent variables. I divide these variables into those having
to do with the extensive margin of mainstream credit usage (“entering the mainstream credit
system”) and those having to do with the intensive margin (“changes in credit usage for those
already in the mainstream system”). Each column contains results for a different dependent
variable, and all regressions include as controls demographics, workshop quarter fixed effects,
and workshop site fixed effects (similar to specification (4) in Panel A). In regressions (1)-(3),
the dependent variables have to do with the extensive margin of mainstream credit usage. In
order to increase statistical power and capture both entrance into and exit out of the mainstream
credit system (both of which occur to some extent, as Table 1.4 shows), I use variables that reflect
inclusion in the mainstream system at the time of the follow-up pull and control for the beginning-
of-workshop state.98 Regression 1 shows a small, statistically significant effect of Proximity
on the likelihood of having a credit score at the time of the follow-up pull (Has_Score) for
initially unbanked workshop participants, controlling for having a score initially as well as for the
initial score. Regressions (2) and (3), however, find no effect on having an active mainstream
debt balance (Has_Bal) or on having an open credit card (Has_CC). All in all, Proximity
(opening an account at a collaborating credit union) does not seem to have a substantial effect
on inclusion in the mainstream credit system. This is disappointing given the “gateway to the
mainstream financial system” label often given to bank account ownership. In the next section I
show that initially unbanked workshop participants who graduated high school do seem to enter
the mainstream system as a result of becoming banked, and propose that there is a minimal level
of financial literacy that is required for this to happen.
Regressions (4)-(6) in Panel C, which include only individuals who had an active mainstream
credit balance at the beginning of the workshop, show that Proximity does not have any statis-
tically significant effects on the intensive margin of mainstream credit usage. In particular, the
effects on the change in the total active debt balance (Change_Bal), the number of active accounts
97Other coefficients are on the verge of statistical significance. In particular, the p-value of the coefficient in
regression (8) is 11.6%.
98Regressions which examine the effects of Proximity on entrance into the system for those who are out (e.g.
credit card issuance for those who do not have an open credit card at the beginning of the workshop) yield similar
results.
42
(#_Active_Accts), and the total revolving credit limit (Rev_Cred_Limit) are all insignificant.
Note that the point estimate on Proximity∗Unbanked in the regression where Change_Bal is the
dependent variable is negative. Given that we do not observe alternative credit usage, which most
likely decreases, it is plausible that overall borrowing decreases as a result of becoming banked
and facing a lower borrowing rate, consistent with the theoretical effects outlined in Section 1.3.99
As a whole, Panel C shows that mainstream credit usage hardly changes on aggregate as a result
of opening an account at a collaborating credit union, and provides evidence against this channel
playing a part in the credit score improvements found in Panels A and B. Note that coefficients
on Unbanked (not interacted with Proximity) are negative and quite large in most regressions in
Panel C. That is, those who are initially unbanked increase their mainstream credit usage by less
after the workshop, on average, than do the initially banked, other things equal.
Panel D of Table 1.5 reports the results of regressions where measures of delinquent credit
activity are the dependent variables. Regressions (1)-(4) show that Proximity negatively predicts
Amount_P_Due for initially unbanked individuals. That is, relatively recent delinquent amounts,
not yet sold to collection agencies, are lower at the time of the follow-up credit pull for those who
live closer to collaborating credit unions and are more likely to open accounts in them. In addition
to the control variables specified in the table, these regressions control for having a FICO score
at the beginning of the workshop and for that initial score, similar to the regressions in Panel
A. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients implies that living 1% closer to a collaborating
credit union decreases amounts past due by about $2. The results of these regressions point to
reduced delinquency as a possible mechanism through which initially unbanked individuals who
open accounts at collaborating credit unions are more likely to improve their credit scores. The
effects are consistent with the theoretical effects outlined in Section 1.3, where several channels
through which becoming banked can reduce delinquency are described. Proximity effects for the
initially banked are not statistically significant, though we cannot reject the hypothesis that they
are equal to the effects for the initially unbanked.
Regressions (5)-(8) in Panel D (with the exception of (7)) show that %_Change_Colls_Jdgs,
the percentage change in the amount in collections and judgments, is not predicted by Proximity
for neither the initially banked nor the initially unbanked.100 Coefficients are positive, implying,
99Strictly speaking, we do not observe mainstream borrowing either but rather mainstream debt balances (equal
to borrowing*(1+interest)). Borrowing per-se might increase even if debt balances are unchanged. In that case,
however, we might expect #_Active_Accts to increase (a caveat is that different accounts might be consolidated
when becoming banked).
100Coefficients are also insignificant in all specifications but (7) in regressions where the level change
Change_Colls_Jdgs is the dependent variable.
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if anything, a larger increase (or smaller decrease) in the amount in collections and judgments for
those who are more likely to open accounts. As noted above, changes in collections and judgments
likely reflect negotiations with collection agencies and strategic non-payment, and as such are less
indicative of actual changes in individual financial behavior. I therefore do not attribute particular
significance to these results.
B. Proximity Effects on Survey Outcome Variables
Panels A and B of Table 1.6 report the results of reduced form regressions where outcome
variables are taken from the survey, as described in Section 1.6.B.
Recall from Table 1.3 that the effect of Proximity on account opening by initially banked
workshop graduates who responded to the survey is positive but too small to be statistically
significant. Proximity is therefore not a valid instrument for this group in the survey sample (the
corresponding effect for the initially unbanked is large and statistically significant). Nevertheless,
I include the initially banked in the reduced form regressions analyzed in this section in order to
preserve statistical power. Due to the small number of survey observations, I control for workshop
year rather than workshop quarter fixed effects. All regressions also control for the demographic
variables listed in footnote 93.
[Insert Table 1.6 here]
In regressions (1) and (2) Saving and Saving_More are the dependent variables. The coeffi-
cients on Proximity ∗ Unbanked are statistically indistinguishable from zero in both regressions.
That is, we cannot reject the hypothesis that initially unbanked survey respondents living closer
to collaborating credit unions (and more likely to open accounts in them) do not save more. This
is true on both the extensive margin (as measured by Saving) and the intensive margin (as mea-
sured by Saving_More).101 While the theoretical effects of opening an account, as described in
Section 1.3, do not necessarily imply increased saving, this result is somewhat disappointing in
light of the widespread notion that account ownership encourages saving, in particular through
behavioral mechanisms (Barr (2004), Mullainathan and Shafir (2009)).
Regressions (3) and (4) provide related evidence, examining self-reported overspending. If
bank account ownership helps address behavioral biases which result in overspending (see Section
101A dummy variable indicating whether the individual had reported saving at the beginning of the workshop is
included in regression (1). A variable indicating whether having been saving 3 years ago was reported in the survey
is included in regression (2).
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1.3), we would expect to see negative proximity effects in these regressions. The coefficients on
Proximity ∗ Unbanked are, however, indistinguishable from zero. If anything, those who live
closer to a collaborating credit union are slightly more likely to report that they are currently
overspending and slightly less likely to report that they are overspending less than 3 years ago (as
measured by Overspending and Overspending_Less, respectively), though the coefficients are
far from being statistically significant.
In regression (5) 1500_Confidence is the dependent variable. Bank account ownership might
be expected to influence confidence in being able to raise a relatively large amount of money within
a short time (to decrease “financial fragility”) by improving credit access or by increasing savings.
The coefficient on Proximity ∗ Unbanked in regression (5) is, however, negative and statistically
insignificant. While regressions (1) and (2) show no evidence of an effect on saving, credit access
does presumably improve when an account is opened at a CDCU, so it is surprising that no effect
is found. Respondents who did not indicate that they were certain they could not come up with
$1500 within a month were also asked how they would go about getting the $1,500 if they had
to do so. Interestingly, only 38% of those who had an account at a collaborating credit union at
the time of the survey indicated that they would take out a loan from their credit union.102 This
might point to a perceived inability to receive loans at the credit union or to an unwillingness to
borrow (see heterogeneous effects analysis, below). It might also be that the initial question was
phrased in a way that seemed to preclude taking out an official loan (“able to come up with $1500”
may have been understood in this way), though the relatively high rates of confidence implied by
the responses would seem to contradict this interpretation.
The only statistically significant result in Table 1.6 is in regression (6), where Knowledge is the
dependent variable. Living 1% closer to a collaborating credit union results in a 0.0026 higher self-
assessment of knowledge about managing one’s money on a daily basis (recall that the scale in this
question was 1-5).103 Account ownership might increase knowledge through enabling individuals
to follow their transactions more closely or through exposing them to different financial products.
Another potential channel through which knowledge might increase is access to financial advice,
which collaborating credit unions provide for free. Advice might also play a role in the credit
report results, as credit scores are optimizable to some extent (see footnote 76). The null credit
report results for the initially banked, who also gain access to free financial advice when they
10269% indicated that they would draw on their own funds while 55% indicated that they would borrow from
family or friends; 14% of those with accounts were certain that they could not come up with the $1500.
103The initial level of self-assessed knowledge is not controlled for in this regression since that reduces the number
of observations considerably. The coefficient on Proximity ∗ Unbanked more than doubles in that case.
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open an account at one of the collaborating credit unions, provide evidence against this channel,
however.
Regressions (7) and (8) examine the effects of Proximity on self-reported finances-related stress
and on economic hardship (as measured by having been unable to pay bills in the past 6 months),
respectively. Stress and Unable_Bills might be expected to decrease as a result of account
ownership due to increased credit access and increased savings, similar to 1500_Confidence, as
well as, perhaps, to a general improvement in one’s economic situation. However, both coefficients
on Proximity ∗ Unbanked are positive rather than negative and statistically insignificant.
The analysis of survey outcomes implies that opening an account at a collaborating credit
union affected none of the dimensions of behavior and wellbeing examined except for knowledge.
The results should, however, be taken with a grain of salt due to the small number of observations
and low statistical power. Since standard errors are large, confidence intervals for some of the
estimated coefficients include zero as well as figures that are quite large. For example, the 95%
confidence interval for the coefficient on Proximity ∗ Unbanked in regression (1) in Table 1.6,
where Saving is the dependent variable, is approximately [−0.14, 0.22].
1.8. Additional Analyses
A. SSIV Estimates of the Effects of Opening an Account
In this section I employ the Split Sample Instrumental Variables estimator introduced by
Angrist and Krueger (1995) to estimate the effects of opening an account at a collaborating credit
union. The goal is to quantify the effects found in the reduced form regressions.104 SSIV (also
referred to as two-sample 2SLS) is identical to ordinary 2 Stage Least Squares estimation except
that first stage and second stage regressions are estimated using different samples.105 This is a
useful method for this study because of differences in the availability of account opening data and
outcome data. Recall from Section 1.4 that account opening data is available from two sources.
First, administrative data is available on all account openings at NTFCU during the 2008-2011
sample period and on all openings since July 2009 at BCFCU. This data is available for many
104The reduced form coefficients are approximately inflated by the inverse of the first stage coefficient to generate
the causal coefficient of interest. Where the reduced form effect (the proximity effect, in this case) is zero, the
causal effect is zero and there is no point in performing this exercise.
105See Angrist and Pischke (2008), p. 149-150.
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individuals for which there is no credit report outcome data.106 Including these individuals in
first stage regressions increases the precision of first stage estimates. Second, more comprehensive
account opening data is available from the survey, but only for a small subset of the sample. I
use both of these data sources to estimate the first stage, i.e. the effects of Proximity on account
opening. Recall from Table 1.3 that these effects were quite different when estimated using each
of the account opening data sources. I therefore generate two SSIV estimates for each outcome.
I begin by estimating the following first stage regressions for the two endogenous variables,
Opened ∗Banked and Opened ∗ Unbanked, using each account opening data source:
Opened∗Banked = X ′pi1+η11Proximity∗Banked+η12Proximity∗Unbanked+φ1Unbanked+ε1
Opened∗Unbanked = X ′pi2+η21Proximity∗Banked+η22Proximity∗Unbanked+φ2Unbanked+ε2
The results of these four regressions are in Panel A of Table 1.7. In regressions (1) and (2),
where administrative data on account openings in NTFCU and BCFCU is used, Opened is equal
to Opened_NT_BC and Proximity only takes these two credit unions into account, similar to
specifications (1)-(4) in Table 1.3. I control for either of these two credit unions being the closest to
the individual’s home out of all of the collaborating credit unions. I also control for demographics,
workshop quarter fixed effects, whether the individual had a FICO score at the beginning of the
workshop, and the value of that score.107 In regressions (3) and (4), where account opening
survey data is used, Opened is equal to Opened_Coll_CU (see Section 1.5.B) and Proximity is
constructed considering all collaborating credit unions (rather than just NTFCU and BCFCU).
[Insert Table 1.7 here]
The coefficients on Proximity ∗ Banked (Proximity ∗ Unbanked) in regressions (1) and (3)
(regressions (2) and (4)) are similar to those in specifications (2) and (6) in Table 1.3. Here,
too, estimated coefficients for the initially unbanked obtained using administrative data are quite
different from those obtained using survey data (0.091 vs. 0.241), though both are highly statis-
tically significant. The coefficient on Proximity ∗ Banked obtained using survey data is positive
106This is mostly due to many workshop graduates (about 30%) not authorizing NTFP to pull their credit reports
for evaluation purposes.
107Including the latter two variables reduces the number of observations by about 220 (the specification is otherwise
similar to specifications (2) and (5) in Table 1.3). It is necessary, however, in order to include these variables in the
second stage regressions.
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and larger than that obtained using administrative data (0.073 vs. 0.056), but is statistically
insignificant.
Using the estimated coefficients from these first stage regressions, I generate two sets of pre-
dicted account opening probabilities for each individual in the sample: ̂Opened_Banked and
̂Opened_Unbanked. I then proceed to run the following second stage regressions:
Outcome = X ′pi3 + ρ1 ̂Opened_Banked+ ρ2 ̂Opened_Unbanked+ φ3Unbanked+ ε3
where Outcome are the four outcomes for which there are significant reduced form effects in
Tables 1.5 and 1.6: Improved_Score, Has_Score, Amount_P_Due, and Knowledge. Panel B
of Table 1.7 displays the estimated ρ1, ρ2, and φ3 for the different outcomes, using each of the
first stage data sources. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Given the differences in first stage
estimates, it is not surprising that second stage estimates differ widely depending on the account
opening data source used. I take the two estimates for each outcome variable as defining a range
of possible causal effect values.
Columns (1) and (2) report second stage results for Improved_Score, the indicator for hav-
ing improved one’s FICO score, defined only for those who had a score at the beginning of the
workshop. The estimated coefficient on ̂Opened_Unbanked using administrative (survey) account
opening data implies a 120% (47.4%) increase in the likelihood of improving one’s score as a result
of opening an account. The former estimate is obviously implausibly large. The 47.4% increase
in Improved_Score implied by the estimate obtained using survey account opening data is also
quite large, given that the unconditional mean of Improved_Score for the initially unbanked,
reported at the bottom of the table, is 56.4% (the predicted values for those who open and those
who don’t open accounts are 66.9% and 19.5%, respectively).
Columns (3) and (4) report second stage results for Has_Score, the indicator for having a
FICO score at the time of the follow-up credit pull. Recall that a modest proximity effect on
this variable was observed for the initially unbanked in Table 1.5. Accordingly, the coefficients on
̂Opened_Unbanked in regressions (3) and (4) are relatively small and statistically insignificant.
The more precise coefficient in regression (4), which uses survey account opening data, implies
a 14.6% increase in the likelihood of having a score at the time of the follow-up pull as a result
of opening an account for the initially unbanked (the p-value is 15%; the unconditional mean of
Has_Score is 44.7%). That is, the impact of opening an account on inclusion in the mainstream
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credit system is not trivial but is rather small: it is about 1/3 of the impact on improving one’s
credit score found in regression (2).
Columns (5) and (6) report second stage results for Amount_P_Due, the amount that the
individual is delinquent on but has not yet been sold to collection agencies. The coefficient on
̂Opened_Unbanked in regression (5), which uses administrative account opening data, is large but
quite noisy, and is far from being statistically significant (the p-value is 41.2%). The coefficient in
regression (6), which uses survey account opening data, is smaller and much more precise, though
it is still too noisy to be considered statistically significant at conventional levels (the p-value
is 14.9%). It implies a decrease of $828 in Amount_P_Due as a result of opening an account
(the predicted values for those who open and those who don’t open accounts are $335 and $1163,
respectively)
Columns (7) and (8) report the results for Knowledge, the survey question in which respon-
dents were asked to assess their level of knowledge with respect to managing their money on a daily
basis on a scale of 1-5. As with the other dependent variables, the coefficient on ̂Opened_Unbanked
in regression (7), which uses administrative account opening data, is implausibly large. The co-
efficient in regression (8), which uses survey account opening data, is plausible in size at around
1 but is far from being statistically significant (the p-value is 31%). This might be expected
given the small number of survey observations. Coefficients on ̂Opened_Banked are statistically
insignificant in almost all of the second stage regressions reported in Panel B, in accordance with
the reduced form results.
B. Heterogeneous Effects by Education Level
In this section I aim to examine whether there is an interaction between bank account ownership
and financial literacy, i.e. whether the effects of account ownership are different for individuals
with different levels of literacy. In Table 1.8 I report the results of regressions in which triple
interactions between Proximity, Banked, and HS are included. The latter is a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if the individual has a high-school diploma (this is the case for 60% of the
initially unbanked and 83% of the initially banked).108 The premise behind using formal education
levels to split the sample is that those with a higher level of education are more financially literate
by the end of the workshop: they are likely more financially literate to begin with (Lusardi and
108Using an indicator for whether the individual had attended college (true for 28% of the initially unbanked and
65% of the initially banked) yields similar results but reduces statistical power for the initially unbanked, who are
less in number and who are more interesting to examine given the aggregate results.
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Mitchell (2013)) and are presumably able to learn more in a classroom setting, i.e. gain more from
the workshop. Indeed, Knowledge is on average higher for respondents who graduated high school
(4.04 vs. 3.76).
Regressions take the following general form:
Outcome = X ′pi + δ11(Proximity ∗Banked) ∗HS + δ12(Proximity ∗Banked) ∗Not_HS +
+δ21(Proximity ∗ Unbanked) ∗HS + δ22(Proximity ∗ Unbanked) ∗Not_HS +
+φ1Banked+ φ2HS + ε
where Not_HS is the complement of HS, i.e. an indicator for not having graduated high school.
All regressions include as controls the demographic variables listed in footnote 93 as well as work-
shop quarter fixed effects.
[Insert Table 1.8 here]
Regression (1) in Panel A of Table 1.8 uses account opening data from the two credit unions
for which this data is widely available (NTFCU and BCFCU) to show that proximity to these two
credit unions significantly predicts account opening in them (see Section 1.5) for all Banked / HS
groups except for the initially banked who are not high school graduates.109 110 In the analysis
I concentrate on the initially unbanked and examine proximity effects for high school graduates
and non-graduates. The coefficients on Proximity ∗Unbanked∗HS and Proximity ∗Unbanked∗
Not_HS in column 1 of Panel A (the estimated δ21 and δ22, in the third and fourth rows of Panel
A) show that it is valid to use Proximity to instrument for the effects of opening an account for
these two groups (assuming that the exclusion restriction is satisfied for both), though the effect
for unbanked non-graduates (0.048) is smaller than the effect for unbanked graduates (0.084). The
hypothesis that Proximity effects are equal for both subgroups of unbanked individuals cannot
be rejected, however, as can be seen towards the bottom of column 1 (the F statistic is 1.87).
The remaining columns in Table 1.8 report heterogeneous proximity effects on credit report
outcomes. Regression (2) in Panel A shows that Proximity significantly influences the likelihood of
FICO score improvement (as measured by Improved_Score) for both groups of initially unbanked
109Recall that this group is relatively underrepresented in the data (83% of the initially banked graduated high
school).
110Using survey rather than administrative account opening data in this exercise produces similar results, with
larger and more noisy coefficients (in line with the results in Table 1.3).
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workshop participants (high school graduates and non-high school graduates). Coefficients are
similar (0.112 and 0.119), though noisier for non-graduates (as noted above, first stage coefficients,
hence the implied causal effects, are different). Regression (3) shows, however, that the proximity
effect on the actual change in FICO score between the beginning of the workshop and the follow-up
pull (as measured by Change_FICO) is much larger for high school graduates and is statistically
insignificant for non-graduates.
Interestingly, regression (4) shows that the negative proximity effect on Amount_P_Due
documented in Panel D of Table 1.5 for the general initially unbanked population is in fact limited
to those who graduated high school. The coefficient for this group is large at -$424 and strongly
statistically significant. Unbanked individuals who did not graduate high school do not exhibit
proximity effects on Amount_P_Due, i.e. opening an account at a collaborating credit union
does not result in lowered delinquency for this group.
The regressions reported in Panel B of Table 1.8 examine heterogeneity in the effects of
Proximity on the measures of mainstream credit usage explored in Panel C of Table 1.5. Recall
that there were no substantial proximity effects on credit usage for the general initially unbanked
population on neither the extensive nor the intensive margins. The results in Panel B show
that there is considerable heterogeneity in these effects. First, regression (5) shows that initially
unbanked workshop participants who graduated high school exhibit a positive and statistically
significant proximity effect on the likelihood of having a credit score at the time of the follow-up
pull, while non graduates do not exhibit a statistically significant effect (the point estimate is
actually negative for the latter group). Second, regression (7) shows a positive and statistically
significant proximity effect on the likelihood of having an open credit card at the time of the follow-
up pull for initially unbanked high school graduates and a negative significant effect for initially
unbanked non-graduates (coefficients are 0.065 and -0.070, respectively). On the intensive margin,
there are no statistically significant coefficients for either group of initially unbanked individuals
in regressions (8)-(10), although the coefficient in the regression (10), where Rev_Cred_Limit is
the dependent variable, is large for initially unbanked high school graduates and significant at the
17% level.
That initially unbanked high school graduates increase their usage of mainstream credit on the
extensive margin while initially unbanked non-graduates do not do so is consistent with financial
literacy being necessary for the access to mainstream financial services provided by account own-
ership to be taken advantage of. As discussed in the introduction, this might be because literacy
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is necessary in order to avoid costly mistakes and benefit from relatively sophisticated products
like credit cards, or it might be because it is necessary in order to realize the relative costs of
alternative financial services.
That opening an account lowers the likelihood of credit card ownership for the initially un-
banked who did not graduate high school is surprising. Note that while this is the only statisti-
cally significant result for this group in Panel B, all of the coefficients on Proximity ∗Unbanked ∗
Not_HS in the Panel are negative. That is, Proximity (opening an account) seems to predict
less mainstream credit usage for initially unbanked non-high school graduates. A potential mech-
anism is financial advice given at the credit unions: if financial literacy is indeed necessary for
beneficial usage of mainstream financial products, those who have low literacy might be better off
not owning credit cards, and opening an account might increase the likelihood of receiving finan-
cial advice and decreasing credit card usage. The finding in Panel A that Proximity significantly
increases the likelihood of credit score improvement for this group although delinquent balances
do not decrease is consistent with a role for financial advice. This is highly speculative, however.
While the analysis described in this section demonstrates heterogeneity in the effects of account
ownership on eventual inclusion in the mainstream credit system, it should be kept in mind that
having graduated high school is not randomly assigned and might proxy for characteristics other
than financial literacy. An obvious candidate is the individual’s overall financial position, likely
correlated with both formal education levels and the likelihood of being eligible for mainstream
credit. To evaluate this possibility, I perform a robustness check in which I replace HS with
an indicator for being employed at the time of the workshop. This analysis (untabulated) yields
no heterogeneity in proximity effects on variables which measure mainstream credit usage on the
extensive margin.
1.9. Conclusion
This paper finds that opening an account at a Community Development Credit Union affects
certain dimensions of the financial lives of low-income recipients of financial education and does
not affect others. On the one hand, opening an account raises the likelihood of credit score im-
provement, lowers delinquent balances, and raises self-reported knowledge about managing one’s
money. These are important outcomes, especially for low-income individuals. On the other hand,
opening an account does not seem to result in increased saving or in decreased overspending. Gen-
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eral “financial wellbeing”, as measured by financial fragility, finances-related stress, and economic
hardship, is not significantly affected either.
The lack of effects might have to with the finding that opening a bank account is, surprisingly,
not synonymous with inclusion in the financial mainstream, in the sense that it does not necessarily
imply actual usage of mainstream credit. A heterogeneous effects analysis which uses high school
graduation to proxy for financial literacy implies that some level of literacy is needed in order to
take advantage of the credit access which a bank account provides, and that even graduates of a
comprehensive financial education workshop are not necessarily at that level. This highlights the
importance of complementing efforts to increase account ownership with financial education.
The findings in this paper also offer lessons for the design of financial education programs aimed
at the poor. The large fraction of workshop participants who opened accounts at collaborating
credit unions and the strong proximity effects on the likelihood of opening an account imply that
encouraging participants of financial education programs to open accounts at specific institutions
can be highly successful, but critically depends on the convenience of these options. Account
ownership seems to play a role in enhancing the financial literacy of program participants, and as
such should be in the direct interest of financial education programs. Further research might reveal
more about the complimentarities between financial education and the improvement of access
to mainstream financial services. This would improve our general understanding of household
financial behavior as well as help realize the potential of the financial system to increase the
welfare of the most vulnerable members of society.
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Figure 1.1: NTFP’s Collaborations with Community Development Credit Unions
This figure shows a map of New York City with the locations of the various credit unions with which
NTFP collaborates. “MOU signed” dates are dates in which Memorandum of Understandings were signed
between NTFP and the various credit unions. These dates are used as collaboration starting dates in
the construction of the Proximity instrument. Neighborhood Trust, located in the upper left corner of
the map, is a credit union operated by NTFP and is considered as “always collaborating”. Several of the
credit unions have more than one branch.
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Figure 1.2: Account Opening and Distance: Administrative Data
This figure plots coefficients estimated using the regression:







where Opened_at_NT_BC is an indicator for whether an account was opened at either of the two credit
unions for which administrative account opening data is available (NTFCU and BCFCU); X ′ includes an
intercept, demographic control variables, and workshop quarter fixed effects; and Dj are indicators for
the distance between the individual’s home and the closest of these two credit unions being smaller than

















































Table 1.1: Initial Banking Status of Sample Individuals
This table reports the distribution of initial banking status, as reported by sample individuals on the
first day of the workshop. Individuals with no checking or savings accounts are considered “unbanked”
throughout the paper.
Initial banking status % of sample
No checking and no savings accounts (Unbanked = 1) 32.0%
Has just checking account (Unbanked = 0) 18.0%
Has just savings account (Unbanked = 0) 8.6%




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables
This table presents summary statistics for the outcome variables studied in this paper, computed separately
for initially banked and initially unbanked workshop participants. Panel A presents statistics for outcome
variables based on credit report data, defined in Section 1.6.A. Panel B presents statistics for outcome
variables based on survey data, defined in Section 1.6.B.
Panel A: Credit report outcomes
Initially Banked Initially Unbanked
# Observations 748 333
I. Credit Scores
Had FICO score 79% 47%
Improved_Score 59% 56%
Became IC 6% 23%
Score decreased 35% 21%
Had "Insufficient Credit" 21% 53%
Established_Score 33% 16%
Established_Prime_Score 18% 7%
Has_Score (post-workshop) 81% 45%
Improved_Established 50% 30%
FICO_Change (mean) 13 31
II. Mainstream Credit Usage
Had active debt balance 75% 46%
Has active balance (post-workshop) 94% 85%
Had no active debt balance 25% 54%
Has active balance (post-workshop) 32% 18%
Has_Bal (post-workshop) 79% 49%
Change_Bal (mean) ($) $510 $512
#_Active_Accts (post-workshop) 7.8 2.9
Had no open credit cards 43% 82%
Has open card (post-workshop) 28% 13%
Had an open credit card 57% 18%
Has open card (post-workshop) 92% 69%
Has_CC (post-workshop) 64% 23%
Rev_Cred_Limit (post-workshop mean) ($) $2,541 $589
Rev_Cred_Limit (post-workshop mean) (>0) ($) $4,684 $3,457
III. Delinquencies
Has past due (post-workshop) 33% 33%
Amount_P_Due (post-workshop mean) ($) $542 $699
Amount_P_Due (post-workshop mean) (>0) ($) $1,764 $2,065
Had Collections/judgments 61% 80%
Change_Colls_Jdgs (mean) ($) -$108 -$293
%_Change_Colls_Jdgs (mean) -15% -22%
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Panel B: Survey outcomes
Initially Banked Initially Unbanked
# Observations 222 61
I. Saving
Initially Saving 56% 13%
Saving at time of survey 71% 88%
Initially not saving 44% 87%
Saving at time of survey 64% 65%
Saving (at time of survey) 68% 69%
Saving_More (relative to 3 years ago) 46% 54%
Saving about the same as 3 years ago 27% 21%
Saving less than 3 years ago 27% 25%
II. Overspending
Overspending 43% 44%
Overspending more than 3 years ago 19% 34%
Overspending about the same as 3 years ago 19% 23%
Overspending_Less 62% 41%
III. Financial fragility
Certain that could come up with $1500 in 30 days 47% 30%
Could probably come up with $1500 in 30 days 29% 34%
Could probably not come up with $1500 in 30 days 10% 7%
Certain that could not come up with $1500 in 30 days 14% 30%
IV. Self-assessed knowledge (Knowledge)
Beginning of workshop 3.20 3.25
Survey 4.10 3.94
V. Finances-related stress (Stress)
Beginning of workshop 3.60 3.68
Survey 3.10 3.19
VI. Economic hardship


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: Reduced Form Results: Survey Outcomes
This table reports the results of reduced form regressions of the form:
Outcome = X ′pi + δ1Proximity ∗Banked+ δ2Proximity ∗ Unbanked+ φBanked+ ε
where Outcome are various outcome variables constructed using survey data, specified in the top of each
panel, and X ′ contains control variables, as detailed in the bottom of each panel. All outcome variables
are defined in Section 1.6.B. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the workshop site
level. Statistical significance is denoted at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels using *, **, and *** symbols,
respectively.
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Saving Saving_More Overspending Overspending_Less
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proximity ∗Banked 0.034 0.007 -0.027 0.019
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Proximity ∗ Unbanked 0.043 0.002 0.080 -0.047
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Unbanked 0.050 -0.008 0.120 -0.190**
(0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09)
Obs. 263 271 269 270
R2 0.104 0.218 0.064 0.081
F stat for eq. of coeffs 0.01 0.00 1.15 0.56
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workshop Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B
Dependent Variable: 1500_Confidence Knowledge Stress Unable_Bills
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Proximity ∗Banked 0.020 0.117 0.005 -0.055
(0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04)
Proximity ∗ Unbanked -0.057 0.259* 0.125 0.013
(0.07) (0.15) (0.18) (0.08)
Unbanked -0.158 -0.057 -0.067 0.036
(0.10) (0.23) (0.25) (0.12)
Obs. 270 270 268 269
R2 0.098 0.087 0.064 0.069
F stat for eq. of coeffs 0.82 0.8 0.33 0.58
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
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The Theoretical Effects of
Favorable Interest Rate Changes




The effects of changes in the return to saving and in the cost of borrowing on consumer behavior
have long been of significant interest to economists and policy makers. The main motivations
behind studying these effects have been interest in how capital income taxation can stimulate or
discourage individual saving and in how the response of households to changes in monetary or fiscal
policy could impact the effectiveness of such policy changes.1 Another piece of motivation, which
has not been highlighted in the literature so far, is the implications for the effects of bank account
ownership. There have been significant efforts in recent years to promote account ownership
among the 8% of American households (20% of households earning less than $30,000 a year) that
are unbanked (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012)).2 Individuals who become banked
face a higher expected return on saving as well as a lower cost of borrowing.3
In this paper I study the effects of interest rate changes on consumer behavior when defaulting
on debt is possible. The analysis is relevant for the general understanding of these effects in
light of the high prevalence of bankruptcy. It is particularly relevant, however, for thinking about
the value of becoming banked, since the unbanked tend to be lower-income individuals who are
relatively more likely to default.4 With the banking context in mind, I concentrate on the effects
of favorable interest rate changes - an increase in the saving rate and a decrease in the borrowing
rate - on consumer behavior.
I study these effects using a simple two period life-cycle model with uncertain second period
income. Individuals start the first period with some initial wealth and can borrow or save. In the
second period, income realizes and debts are due. Individuals choose between paying in full and
defaulting, in which case debts are discharged in full and a cost of default is incurred. I derive
optimal consumption and default behavior and the responses of these to favorable changes in
saving and borrowing rates, and show that incorporating the possibility of default in the standard
model has potentially important implications.
1See Boskin (1978) for several other issues for which these effects are central.
2There have also been efforts elsewhere to promote account ownership and general access to lower cost financial
services. In particular, micro-finance initiatives lower the cost of borrowing for low-income households in developing
countries. The model explored here is relevant for thinking about the effects of such initiatives as well.
3The expected return on saving in the absence of a bank account is most likely negative, due to inflation, danger
of theft and unwanted use by family members. Alternative lenders such as payday lenders, pawnshops and loan
sharks offer loans at notoriously high rates.
In addition to improving saving and borrowing rates, account ownership lowers the cost of transactional services
(e.g. check cashing) and is believed to help individuals overcome behavioral biases and cognitive constraints (see
e.g. Mullainathan and Shafir (2009)).
4Median annual income for the approximately 1.3 million households who filed for bankruptcy in 2011
was $33,372. See http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2011/BAPCPA-
report.pdf
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I begin by showing that when the cost of default is not sufficiently dependent on the amount
defaulted upon,5 first period consumption of individuals who know they might default in the second
period6 is higher than it would have been absent the possibility of default. The intuition is simple:
the intertemporal tradeoff between first period and second period consumption is altered when
default is introduced since second period consumption is not affected by the amount consumed in
the first period in states in which the individual defaults. If the cost of default is not sufficiently
dependent on the amount defaulted upon, first period consumption is less costly in terms of its
marginal effect on second period utility than it would have otherwise been and is thus higher.
Important for the effects studied in this paper, introducing the possibility of default also affects
the way in which the intertemporal tradeoff changes with first period consumption: when the cost
of default is not sufficiently dependent on the defaulted-upon amount, the marginal cost associated
with first period consumption (“the opportunity cost of first period consumption”) decreases in
first period consumption for those who might default. This has important implications: not only
is optimal consumption higher than it would have otherwise been, but the effects of changes in
variables that influence the consumption choice are also different. First, marginal propensity to
consume out of initial wealth is negative for individuals who might default. That is, higher initial
wealth results in lower first period consumption for these individuals. This happens because
additional wealth strengthens the link between first period consumption and second period utility
by decreasing the probability of default, i.e. by increasing the number of states in which reducing
current consumption increases own future consumption as opposed to decreasing the amount
defaulted upon. In other words, it gives individuals “more stake in the future” and encourages
lower consumption, moving them closer to the amount they would have consumed absent the
possibility of default.
Second, and related to the MPC result, the effects of favorable interest rate changes on the optimal
consumption of individuals who know they might default are more likely to be negative, i.e. to
decrease consumption, than they would have been absent default. Favorable rate changes make
both savers and borrowers better off, but where MPC is negative this works to decrease consump-
tion rather than to increase it as standard intuition would predict. This negative wealth effect of
5In particular, throughout the paper I assume a fixed cost of default, i.e. a cost that is independent of the
amount defaulted upon. Modeling the cost of default as independent of this amount is the standard practice in the
literature (e.g. Athreya (2008), Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007),Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ríos-Rull
(2007)).
6I show that there is an initial wealth threshold such that relatively wealthy individuals never find it optimal to
default in the second period. Relatively poor individuals default in relatively bad second period states and repay
their debts in relatively good states.
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rate changes, which is combined with a substitution effect to determine the ultimate response of
consumption, again reflects the strengthening of the link between first period consumption and
second period utility brought about by a reduction in the probability of default. The substitu-
tion effect of favorable rate changes works to increase consumption for those who initially borrow
(i.e. those who borrow prior to the rate changes) and to decrease it for those who initially save,
regardless of the possibility of default.7 For initial borrowers who might default, the income ef-
fect contradicts the substitution effect and the result is that consumption increases in response
to a decrease in the borrowing rate for some parameter values and levels of initial borrowing and
decreases for others. For initial savers who might default,8 both effects go in the same direction
and consumption always decreases in response to an increase in the saving rate. This stands in
contrast to the standard effects of favorable interest rate changes on consumption (i.e. the effects
absent the possibility of default), whereby initial borrowers always increase their consumption and
the response of initial savers could be positive or negative, depending on the parameters used and
the level of initial saving.
I also examine the effects of favorable interest rate changes on expected default: the probability
of default and the expected defaulted-upon amount. I show that both of these quantities move
together with Debt, the amount owed in the second period, in response to rate changes. While all
initial savers who might default decrease Debt (and expected default) in response to an increase
in the saving rate, some initial borrowers decrease Debt in response to a decrease in the borrowing
rate and some increase it. The condition for Debt (and expected default) of borrowers to decrease
is that the fraction of consumption that is financed by borrowing is higher than the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.9
In an extension to the model I allow for partial repayment of debt in both periods. I focus on
the first period, which the individual starts with some pre-existing debt. Here the individual
chooses how much of this debt he wishes to repay, where the remainder is considered delinquent.
Simultaneously, he chooses how much he wishes to save or borrow. First period consumption can
be viewed as being financed by delinquency and borrowing, and there is an optimal mix of these
for different levels of consumption. Decreasing the borrowing rate makes borrowing relatively
more attractive and reduces delinquency. This analysis highlights another channel through which
7The substitution effect is stronger for a given initial consumption level when default is possible.
8Default is possible when saving because there is a pre-existing obligation. See below.
9With time-separable utility, the EIS is the inverse of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, so
that with CRRA preferences with a coefficient of 3, for example, Debt decreases for all those who initially borrow
more than one third of how much they consume.
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favorable interest rate changes can affect optimal consumption and debt repayment when it is
possible not to repay in full.
This paper contributes to a wide literature on the interest elasticity of consumption in life-cycle
type models of intertemporal utility maximization.10 The factors that impact this elasticity in
the basic life-cycle model (e.g. the substitution and income effects) are well-understood and ap-
pear in many economics textbooks (e.g. Romer (2011)). Feldstein and Tsiang (1968) is an early
paper which derives the elasticity formally for the basic model. Later studies have refined the
basic derivation (Summers (1981) is an early example) and have explored the implications for this
elasticity of some of the many extensions to the basic life-cycle model that have been proposed
over the years. Bernheim (2002) surveys studies which have examined the implications of incor-
porating various types of bequest motives, uncertain earnings, and liquidity constraints as well
as bounded rationality and self-control problems in the model. Attanasio and Wakefield (2010)
note several types of extensions to the basic model for which implications for the interest elasticity
of consumption have not been studied. These include endogenous labor supply, intertemporal
nonseparabilities (e.g. durable goods and habit formation type models) and housing.11
This paper explores the unstudied implications of another type of extension to the life-cycle model,
namely the incorporation of default (in the basic model, debt is assumed to be paid with certainty).
Several recent papers have studied elaborate general equilibrium models where individuals can take
on unsecured debt and subsequently default (see e.g. Athreya, Tam, and Young (2012), Athreya
(2008), Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2010)). These papers
have, however, focused on explaining aggregate quantities such as the amount of debt outstanding,
the rate of default and the distribution of interest rates as well as on analyzing different default
arrangements and proposed reforms to bankruptcy laws. None of these papers examines how the
incorporation of the possibility of default in the model impacts the effects of changes in variables
10Studies of this elasticity have typically framed it as measuring the effect of capital income taxation on individual
saving. Bernheim (2002) and Attanasio and Wakefield (2010) provide comprehensive surveys of the theoretical and
empirical literature.
11In addition to the theoretical literature, many papers have attempted to empirically estimate the the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, i.e. the sensitivity of expected consumption growth to the interest rate (e.g. Hall
(1998), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)), or to directly estimate the interest elasticity of consumption. Studies of the
latter type have estimated the elasticity of borrowing with respect to the borrowing rate (e.g. Gross and Souleles
(2002), Karlan and Zinman (2008)) or the elasticity of saving with respect to the saving rate (see Bernheim (2002)
for a survey). Both types of studies have yielded a wide range of estimates. A common finding is that elasticity is
lower for those who are closer to their debt limits, have lower incomes or have lower credit scores (see e.g. Gross and
Souleles (2002), Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou (2008)). This is normally taken as evidence of the importance
of liquidity constraints but is also consistent with negative wealth effects for low-income, default-prone individuals,
as shown in this paper.
Some papers have also looked at the effect of lowering the borrowing rate on consumer default. Karlan and
Zinman (2008) and Ausubel (1999) find that default is reduced.
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such as wealth and the interest rate on optimal consumption. This is not surprising since the
effects studied here, which depend critically on the marginal cost of first period consumption (the
“opportunity cost”) decreasing in first period consumption for those who might default, most
likely do not exist in the models examined in those papers. In those models, interest rates are
determined on a loan-by-loan basis. Higher first period consumption (and borrowing) implies a
higher probability of default, other things equal, and thus a higher break-even interest rate. The
opportunity cost, which depends on the interest rate, might therefore be increasing rather than
decreasing in consumption when interest rates vary in the amount borrowed, in which case the
effects established in this paper would not hold.12
Here I assume that there is a single borrowing rate for loans of all sizes, corresponding to the
lender’s zero profit condition holding on aggregate rather than on a loan-by-loan basis. In Ap-
pendix B I show that if there is an information asymmetry whereby expected second period income
varies across different “types” and is unknown to the lender, no screening contract based on the
borrowed amount can be incentive compatible and there must be a single borrowing rate for loans
of all sizes. Asymmetric information about borrowers’ risk of default is one common justification
for a lack of dispersion in borrowing rates,13 the other being the fixed costs of creating differenti-
ated credit contracts. Athreya, Tam, and Young (2012) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2011)
argue that improvements in available information and technological advances which have reduced
these fixed costs have caused the large increase in the dispersion of interest rates reported by credit
card holders in the past few decades. The increased dispersion in rates might, however, reflect an
increase in the number of lenders (who also compete on dimensions other than price) rather than
non-flat rate-amount curves offered by specific lenders. Moreover, while information available to
lenders has certainly improved, it is still relatively poor for some populations, for example for
unbanked individuals who usually have little credit history. This is another sense in which this
paper is especially relevant for thinking about the effects of banking the unbanked.
This chapter will proceed as follows. After a brief description of the model in Section 2.2, I examine
the individual’s optimization problem in Section 2.3. I find that there is a second period income
12Indeed, in Athreya (2008) the incorporation of default significantly lowers the borrowing and consumption of
young households (corresponding to the first period here) rather than increasing borrowing, as would be implied if
incorporating default meant switching from an increasing to a decreasing opportunity cost. This despite of the cost
of default being independent of the amount defaulted upon which, I show below, leads to a decreasing opportunity
cost when interest rates do not vary in the amount borrowed. Modeling the marginal cost of default as decreasing
in the amount defaulted upon might produce a decreasing opportunity cost with loan-by-loan pricing.
13For example, Athreya (2002) justifies his use of a single rate with the difficulty in assessing the default probability
for any single lender given poor information from credit bureaus, in particular the absence of good labor income
data.
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threshold below which it is optimal to default and above which it is optimal to repay. I then turn to
the first period problem, distinguishing consumption levels that imply zero probability of default
(i.e. imply that it will never be optimal to default in the second period) from levels that imply
positive probability of default and characterizing the first order condition in each region. I examine
the slope of the opportunity cost of first period consumption, which plays an important role in
the paper, as explained above, and show that it is negative where default is possible when the cost
of default is fixed. In Section 2.4 I characterize optimal consumption. I establish the existence
of initial wealth thresholds which determine whether an individual’s optimal consumption leads
to positive probability of second period default, whether it implies saving, borrowing or neither
and whether it implies borrowing up to the borrowing constraint. In this section I also derive the
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth and show that it is negative for individuals who have
positive probability of default. In Section 2.5 I examine the effects of favorable interest rate changes
on optimal behavior. I first examine the effects on the initial wealth thresholds established in the
previous section and show that as a result of favorable rate changes more individuals consume
an amount such that they have zero probability of default, less individuals borrow up to the
borrowing constraint, and more individuals save and more borrow (as opposed to doing neither).
I then turn to examining the effects of favorable rate changes on optimal consumption and on
expected default, which are at the heart of the paper. I extend the model to allow for voluntary
extent of delinquency in both periods, as described above, in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
In Appendix B I demonstrate that an information asymmetry can lead to a single interest rate
for all borrowed amounts being the only incentive compatible contract. In Appendix C I provide
proofs omitted from the main text.
2.2. Model
I model an individual consumer who lives for 2 periods and derives utility from consumption
in both, maximizing a time-separable expected utility function with discount rate β:
U = U1 + βE(U2)
The individual starts the first period with initial wealth Y114 and chooses first period consump-
14More precisely, Y1 is what the individual is left with after repayment of all previous debts, termed “cash on
hand” in the literature.
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tion C1. The difference, (C1 − Y1), which I denote by B1, represents borrowing if positive and
saving if negative.
Borrowing is allowed up to a borrowing constraint B1.15 The borrowing (saving) rate for any
borrowed (saved) amount is RB (RS).16 There is a positive spread RB −RS .
In the second period, the individual receives stochastic income Y˜2. It is distributed uniformly
over some interval: Y˜2 ∼ U [Y2, Y2] where (Y2− Y2) is normalized to 1. Y˜2 is meant to capture any
shocks to income and to unavoidable expenses (such as medical expenses) that the individual is
exposed to in the second period.
After Y˜2 realizes, debts are due. If the individual had saved in period 1, i.e. if B1 = C1−Y1 < 0,
he receives B1RS . If the individual had borrowed, i.e. if B1 > 0, he owes B1RB . Where it is not
important whether the individual is saving or borrowing, I use R to denote the applicable interest
rate.
There is also a pre-existing fixed obligation D¯0 due in the second period, regardless of the
first period consumption decision. In particular, it is due even if the individual saves in the first
period. D¯0 can be thought of as representing utility bills or older installment loans that cannot
be re-financed.17
If the individual owes on net, i.e. if Debt = B1R + D¯0 > 0, he can choose to default after
having observed Y˜2.18 Default here is similar to chapter 7 bankruptcy: in case of default, all debts
are discharged and second period consumption is equal to second period income Y˜2 (in case of
no-default, it is equal to Y˜2 − Debt).19 Default involves a cost, generally denoted as Λ(Debt),
representing the pecuniary (i.e. legal fees, seizure of non-exempt assets, exclusion from formal
credit markets) as well as non-pecuniary (i.e. stigma) costs of default. Throughout most of the
paper I assume that the cost of default is fixed, i.e. independent of Debt, as is standard in the
literature.
15I provide more information regarding the borrowing constraint in the next section
16In Appendix B I show that an information asymmetry results in a single borrowing rate for all loan sizes being
the only incentive compatible contract.
17Y1 is defined net of this fixed obligation. Gross and Souleles (2002) show evidence of simultaneous saving and
borrowing.
18Note that when Y˜2 < Debt, the individual is unable to cover all of his debts and is forced to default.
19In Section 2.6 I model partial delinquency, where the individual can choose how much of his debt he wishes to
repay.
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2.3. The Individual’s Optimization Problem
A. The Second Period Default Decision
The individual comes into the second period owing Debt (or due to receive −Debt, if Debt < 0).
The period starts with the realization of Y˜2, followed by the default decision. As noted above, the
individual is forced to default when Y˜2 < Debt.
When Y˜2 ≥ Debt, paying in full and consuming C2 = Y˜2 − Debt is possible. The individual
might also choose to default (this is only possible if Debt > 0), consuming Y˜2 and incurring a cost
Λ(Debt). Default is optimal when Y˜2 ≥ Debt if and only if:
u(Y˜2)− Λ(Debt) > u(Y˜2 −Debt) (2.3.1)
Proposition 1 shows that there exists a second period income threshold Ŷ2 that determines second
period behavior. In relatively good states, where Y˜2 ≥ Ŷ2, it is optimal to pay back debts. In
relatively bad states Y˜2 < Ŷ2, default is optimal.20
Proposition 1. There exists a second period income threshold Ŷ2 such that:
• If Y˜2 < Ŷ2 , the individual defaults, consuming Y˜2 and incurring the cost of default Λ(Debt)
• If Y˜2 ≥ Ŷ2, the individual pays Debt in full, consuming Y˜2 −Debt
Ŷ2 is a function of Debt, defined by:
u(Ŷ2)− Λ(Debt) = u(Ŷ2 −Debt) (2.3.2)
Proof. See Appendix C.
B. The First Period Problem
In the first period the individual chooses C1, implicitly choosing Debt = (C1−Y1)R+D¯0. Since
Ŷ2 is increasing in C1,21 there is, for any initial wealth level Y1, some first period consumption
level Ĉ1 s.t.:
20I assume that Ŷ2 > Debt for all possible levels of Debt, i.e. there is always some range of Y˜2 where the individual
is able to pay in full (Y˜2 > Debt) but chooses not to do so. This amounts to assuming u(Debt) > Λ(Debt) for all
possible levels of Debt.
21This can be seen easily by applying the implicit function theorem on (2.3.2).
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Ŷ2(Ĉ1) = Y2 (2.3.3)
For first period consumption levels C1 ≤ Ĉ1, we have Ŷ2 ≤ Y2, i.e. the individual chooses
to repay in full even in the worst possible second income realization and the ex-ante probability
of default in the second period is zero. These are “default impossible” C1 levels, and I refer to
individuals who choose such C1 levels as “never defaulters”.
For C1 > Ĉ1, we have Ŷ2 > Y2 and the ex-ante probability of default in the second period is
positive (it is known ex-ante that if a low income state realizes in the second period, the individual
will choose to default). These are “default possible” C1 levels, and I refer to individuals who choose
them as “potential defaulters”.












(u(Y˜2)− Λ(Debt))dY˜2) ∗ 1(C1 > Ĉ1)
(2.3.4)
Note that expected second period utility, in the second and third rows, takes on a different
functional form depending on whether there is ex-ante potential for default.
In the first period, the individual solves:
max U(C1)
C1
s.t. C1 − Y1 ≤ B1
where B1 is a borrowing constraint, limiting the amount that the individual can consume in
the first period to C1 = Y1 +B1. Although there is a single borrowing rate here, implicitly set on
aggregate rather than loan-by-loan,22 the lender should still be reluctant to make individual loans
on which it is certain to lose, and should thus limit the amount it is willing to lend for any given
interest rate. Moreover, I assume below that the cost of default is fixed, and show that in that
case the value function increases without bound for high C1 values. The existence of a solution to
the individual’s problem therefore requires that consumption and borrowing are limited at some
point.
22See the introduction and Appendix B for discussions of this point.
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An intuitive rule for setting this limit is that the individual should not be allowed to borrow an
amount such that he will always default (recall that the lender gets nothing in case of default).23
According to this rule, the borrowing constraint B1 is set s.t.:
Ŷ2(B1) = Y2
That is, an individual who borrows B1 is indifferent between defaulting and repaying in full if
the best second period income state realizes, and prefers to default if any other state realizes.
C. The FOC and the Slope of the Opportunity Cost Curve











Λ′(Debt))dY˜2)] ∗ 1(C1 > Ĉ1) (2.3.5)
The LHS of the first order condition is the marginal benefit of first period consumption and
the RHS is the marginal cost, equal to the expected loss of second period utility associated with
consuming another unit in the first period. The latter quantity, which I refer to as “the opportunity
cost of first period consumption” or “opportunity cost” and denote opp_cost, plays a central role
in this paper. In particular, the sign of its derivative with respect to C1 will be shown to have
important implications.
Let us examine this derivative in the two regions defined by Ĉ1. At C1 ≤ Ĉ1 values, where de-
fault is impossible (i.e. it will not be chosen even in the worst second period state), the opportunity
cost is increasing in C1, as is standard:
d
dC1
opp_cost | C1 ≤ Ĉ1 = −βR2
Y2ˆ
Y2
u′′(Y˜2 −Debt)dY˜2 > 0
The region C1 > Ĉ1, where default is possible (i.e. where default will be chosen in relatively
23Note that the particular value of the borrowing constraint does not generally influence the results derived in
this paper, as long as it is set at a level of borrowing which implies positive probability of default. See footnote 7
in Appendix C for the only caveat to this.
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(−u′(Ŷ2 −Debt) + Λ′(Debt))]
The main insight of this paper is that when (2.3.6) is negative (“when the opportunity cost
is decreasing”), which is the case for certain formulations of Λ(Debt), the optimal consumption
behavior of potential defaulters and its response to changes in variables such as wealth and the
interest rate are different than they would have been absent the possibility of default. In par-
ticular, optimal consumption is higher for any given initial wealth level, the marginal propensity
to consume out of wealth is negative, and the response of consumption to favorable interest rate
changes is different. I explore these implications in detail in Section 2.4.
The intuition behind the effects of the sign of (2.3.6) is simple: when it is negative, the marginal
cost associated with C1 (which is balanced against the marginal benefit of C1 in the first order
condition) decreases in C1. This alters the intertemporal tradeoff as well as how this tradeoff
changes with respect to C1. First, for any level of C1 the opportunity cost (the marginal cost of
C1) is lower than it would have been if the opportunity cost were increasing, so that the optimal
C1 is higher than it would have been.24 Second, the effects of changes in variables that impact
the intertemporal tradeoff, such as initial wealth and the interest rate, are different since they
depend on how the opportunity cost and the marginal benefit of consumption change in C1 (how
the intertemporal tradeoff changes).
D. The Determinants of the Sign of the Slope of the Opportunity Cost Curve
Given the importance of the sign of ddC1 opp_cost for the results, I examine the elements of
(2.3.6) one by one. The first element is similar to the derivative of the opportunity cost in the
“default impossible” region C1 < Ĉ1 and represents the effect of increasing C1 on marginal utility
in second period states in which debts are paid in full. Increasing C1 decreases consumption
in those states, increasing overall opportunity cost (since marginal utility is decreasing). Note,
24Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) show that social insurance programs with means tests based on assets
discourage wealth accumulation through a similar mechanism.
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however, that the lower limit of the integral is Ŷ2 rather than Y2: consumption in Y˜2 < Ŷ2 states
is equal to second period income and is not affected by increasing C1. This is a crucial point.
The second element is non-zero if and only if the marginal cost of default changes in C1. If
it decreases in C1, as seems plausible, increasing C1 decreases the marginal cost of default and
works to decrease overall opportunity cost. Note that this occurs only in second period states in
which the individual defaults, i.e. those in which Y˜2 < Ŷ2.
The third element reflects the effect of increasing C1 on Ŷ2, the default threshold. Increasing
C1 increases Debt, which increases Ŷ2, i.e. the individual defaults in more second period states.25
This has the effect of decreasing the number of states in which the opportunity cost is u′(Y˜2−Debt)
and increasing the number of states in which it is Λ′(Debt). Since u′(Ŷ2 −Debt) > Λ′(Debt) for
any level of Debt,26 C1 has the effect of decreasing overall opportunity cost through this channel.
As is apparent from (2.3.6), the way in which we model the cost of default Λ(Debt) determines
how the opportunity cost changes wrt C1. In particular, if the marginal cost of default is not
sufficiently high (for example, if it is zero, as with a fixed cost of default), the opportunity cost
decreases in C1. To see this, rewrite (2.3.6):
d
dC1
opp_cost | C1 > Cˆ1 = (2.3.7)
= βR2[(1− dYˆ2
dDebt
)u′(Ŷ2 −Debt)− u′(Y2 −Debt) + dŶ2
dDebt
Λ′(Debt) + (Ŷ2 − Y2)Λ′′(Debt)]
The sign of (2.3.7) depends on Λ′(Debt).27 Proposition 2 shows that when the cost of default
is fixed, s.t. Λ(Debt) = Λ, the opportunity cost decreases in C1. This makes intuitive sense: when
the cost of default is not dependent on the extent of default, C1 has no effect on second period
utility in states in which the individual already defaults (Y˜2 < Ŷ2), i.e. the opportunity cost in
these states is zero, regardless of the level of C1. Increasing C1 therefore increases the opportunity
cost through its effect on second period consumption, but only in non-default (Y˜2 ≥ Ŷ2) states.
Importantly, increasing C1 increases Ŷ2, i.e. decreases the number of states in which C1 matters,
thereby decreasing the opportunity cost. The net effect is negative: increasing C1 decreases the
25I show that dŶ2
dDebt
> 0 in the proof of Proposition 2.
26This is always the case for Ŷ2(Debt) if u′(.) is decreasing and Λ′(.) is non-increasing
27The sign of the first element depends on the sign of (1 − dŶ2
dDebt
). As I show in the proof of Proposition
2, dŶ2
dDebt
≥ 1 if and only if u′(Ŷ2) ≥ Λ′(Debt). The second element is always negative. The third element is
dŶ2
dDebt
Λ′(Debt). As I show in the proof of Proposition 2, dŶ2
dDebt
> 0, so that this element is non-negative and
depends on Λ′(Debt). The fourth element is non-positive if we assume Λ′′(.) ≤ 0, which seems reasonable.
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opportunity cost.
It is important to note that modeling the cost of default as non-dependent on the extent
of default is the common practice in models which feature consumer default (see e.g. Athreya
(2008),Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ríos-Rull (2007)).
However, as I explain in the introduction, the opportunity cost most likely does not decrease in
C1 in those models since the interest rate is determined on a loan-by-loan basis rather than on
aggregate.
Proposition 2. When the cost of default is fixed, s.t. Λ(Debt) = Λ, the opportunity cost increases
in C1 where default is impossible (at C1 ≤ Ĉ1) and decreases in C1 where default is possible (at
C1 > Ĉ1).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Figure 2.1 plots the marginal benefit and the opportunity cost of C1 with a fixed cost of default
for two initial wealth levels. The point where the opportunity cost curve is kinked in each plot
is Ĉ1, the first period consumption threshold that separates “default impossible” and “default
possible” C1 levels (i.e. C1 levels where default is never chosen in the second period and C1 levels
where it is sometimes chosen). As can be seen in the figure, and as I show in Proposition 2, the
opportunity cost curve is increasing at C1 < Ĉ1, where default is impossible, and decreasing at
C1 > Ĉ1, where it is possible. Note that the kink point Ĉ1 represents a higher C1 level in the
top plot, where initial wealth is higher. This is because Ŷ2, the second period income threshold
above which it is optimal to repay and below which it is optimal to default, is a function of
Debt = (C1 − Y1)R + D¯0. Ĉ1, the C1 level for which Ŷ2(C1) = Y2, is thus increasing in initial
wealth Y1.
In the top plot of Figure 2.1, where wealth is relatively high, the two curves cross in the upwards
sloping part of the opportunity cost curve. That is, optimal consumption is lower than Ĉ1, and
default is never chosen in the second period. In the bottom plot, where wealth is relatively low,
the two curves cross in the downwards sloping part and optimal consumption is higher than Ĉ1,
so that the ex-ante probability of default is positive. In Proposition 3 I formally show that there is
an initial wealth threshold which separates “never defaulters”, i.e. those who choose C1 < Ĉ1(Y1)
levels, from “potential defaulters”, i.e. those who choose C1 > Ĉ1(Y1) levels. Note that in the
bottom plot, where optimal consumption is such that default is possible, optimal consumption is
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lower than it would have been absent the possibility of default (the opportunity cost curve would
have intersected the marginal benefit curve at a lower level of C1 had there not been a kink).
[Insert Figure 2.1 here]
2.4. Characterizing Optimal Consumption
In this section I characterize optimal consumption behavior. I operate under the assumption
of a fixed cost of default,28 but derive general results where possible. I first establish the existence
of initial wealth thresholds which determine consumption behavior. I then discuss the marginal
propensity to consume out of initial wealth, showing that it is negative for potential defaulters.
A. Initial Wealth Thresholds
The next several propositions establish that optimal consumption behavior is determined to a
large extent by initial wealth and describe behavior in different initial wealth regions. Proposition
3 establishes the existence of a threshold Ŷ1 which separates “never defaulters” from potential
defaulters: those with initial wealth Y1 ≥ Ŷ1 choose C1 such that their ex-ante probability of
default is zero (they choose C1 ≤ Ĉ1(Y1) and know ex-ante that they will not find it optimal
to default in any Y˜2 state), while those with initial wealth Y1 < Ŷ1 choose C1 such that they
have positive ex-ante probability of default (they choose C1 > Ĉ1(Y1)). Proposition 4 establishes
the existence of a threshold Yˇ1 which separates those who borrow up to the borrowing constraint
from those who borrow less than the borrowing constraint or save. Proposition 5 establishes the
existence of thresholds Y`1(RB) and Y`1(RS) which separate savers from borrowers. Proposition
5 also shows that those with initial wealth between these thresholds (Y`1(RB) < Y1 < Y`1(RS))
neither borrow nor save. The propositions establish the ordering of thresholds shown in Figure
2.4.
Proposition 3. There exists an initial wealth threshold Ŷ1 which separates “never defaulters”
from “potential defaulters”:
• Individuals with initial wealth Y1 ≥ Ŷ1 are “never defaulters”: they choose C1 ≤ Ĉ1(Y1) and
have zero ex-ante probability of default.
28Note that all of the results would hold with any other form of Λ(.) which leads to a decreasing opportunity
cost in the “default possible” region.
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• Individuals with initial wealth Y1 < Ŷ1 are “potential defaulters”: they choose C1 > Ĉ1(Y1)
and have positive ex-ante probability of default. At low second income realizations Y˜2 < Ŷ2,
they default on their debts, consume their entire second period income and incur the cost of
default. At high second period income realizations Y˜2 ≥ Ŷ2, they pay back in full.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 4. For any borrowing constraint B129 there exists an initial wealth threshold Yˇ1,
where Yˇ1 ≤ Ŷ1, such that individuals with initial wealth Y1 ≤ Yˇ1 borrow up to the constraint and
individuals with initial wealth Y1 > Yˇ1 borrow less than the constraint or save.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 5. For saving and borrowing rates RS < RB , there exist first period income thresh-
olds Y`1(RB) and Y`1(RS), such that Yˇ1 < Y`1(RB) < Y`1(RS) < Ŷ1, for which:
• Individuals with initial wealth Y1 < Y`1(RB) borrow; Borrowing decreases in Y1 over Yˇ1 <
Y1 < Y`1(RB).
• Individuals with initial wealth Y`1(RS) < Y1 save; Saving increases in Y1 over Y`1(RS) < Y1.
• Individuals with initial wealth Y`1(RB) < Y1 < Y`1(RS) neither borrow nor save.
Proof. See Appendix C.
B. Marginal Propensity to Consume
Proposition 6 shows that when the cost of default is fixed, the marginal propensity to consume
out of initial wealth is negative for potential defaulters. That is, rather than the standard splitting
of an additional $1 of wealth between the present (through increased current consumption) and
the future (through increased saving or decreased borrowing), potential defaulters increase their
saving/decrease their borrowing by more than $1 when their initial wealth increases by $1, thereby
decreasing their current consumption.
29I assume that any borrowing constraint implies maximum first period consumption C1 s.t. C1 > Ĉ1, i.e. s.t.
there is positive ex-ante probability of default.
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This result, which is directly related to the opportunity cost of C1 decreasing at “default possi-
ble” C1 levels,30 is central to the effects of favorable interest rate changes on optimal consumption
behavior, as I discuss in the next section. A similar result is obtained by Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes (1995) who show that means-tested social insurance could lead to a decreasing opportunity
cost and to negative MPC over some wealth ranges.31
To better understand the result and its relation to the sign of the slope of the opportunity
cost curve, consider an individual who is initially optimizing, and moves an entire additional $1 of
initial wealth to the second period, leaving C1 unchanged. Let us analyze this consumption choice
relative to the new, higher wealth, optimum, for the standard case of an opportunity cost that is
increasing in C1 and for the case of an opportunity cost that is decreasing in C1.
A necessary condition for an optimum is u′(C1) = opp_cost. In both cases, u′(C1) is un-
changed. Since ∂∂Y1 opp_cost = − ddC1 opp_cost,32 opportunity cost will be lower than it was in
the old optimum in the case of an opportunity cost that is increasing in C1, and we will have
u′(C1) > opp_cost. The new optimum can be reached by moving some of the extra $1 back to
the first period, i.e. by increasing C1. This will lower u′(C1) and increase opp_cost, eventually
equating them. The implied MPC is between 0 and 1.
In the case of an opportunity cost that is decreasing in C1, moving the entire $1 to the second
period will increase the opportunity cost, so that u′(C1) < opp_cost. The new optimum will
therefore involve decreasing C1, which will increase both u′(C1) and opp_cost. A new optimum
will indeed be reached since u′(C1) increases faster than opp_cost around an optimum,33 and they
will be equated at a lower C1 level than the old optimal choice, implying MPC < 0.
The intuition behind this exercise can be understood by recalling the discussion in Section 2.3.C
and noting that receiving an extra $1 in initial wealth and keeping C1 unchanged is the same as
lowering C1 by $1 in terms of the effect on the opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of potential
defaulters is therefore higher when the extra $1 is moved to the second period, and the current level
30“Never defaulters”, for whom the opportunity cost is increasing in C1 at the optimum, do split additional
wealth between the present and future (e.g. have 0 < MPC < 1). Assuming a cost of default that generates an
increasing opportunity cost at “default possible” C1 levels (see Section 2.3.C) would generate 0 < MPC < 1 for
potential defaulters as well.
31However, they describe negative MPC as the result of the effect of extra wealth on the relative value of several
local maxima, representing different probabilities of receiving insurance payments (in the example they give, second
period income has a discrete distribution and the opportunity cost increases in between several downward jumps,
corresponding to the different states, rather than decreasing continuously, leading to multiple maxima (see p.
395)). Here there is at most a single “default possible” maximum for a given initial wealth level. Negative MPC
corresponds to the single optimal C1 decreasing as initial wealth increases rather than to switching between several
maxima (see Figure 2.2).
32Increasing Y1 while holding C1 constant has the same effect on Debt (and on the opportunity cost) as decreasing
C1 since Debt = (C1 − Y1)R+ D¯0.
33This follows from the concavity of the value function around an optimum.
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of consumption seems too costly in terms of its effect on second period utility. The opportunity
cost is higher because moving the extra $1 to the second period increases the number of no-
default states (decreases Ŷ2). That is, it increases the number of states in which reducing current
consumption increases own future consumption as opposed to decreasing the amount defaulted
upon (decreasing the lender’s losses).34 In this sense, extra wealth gives potential defaulters "more
stake in the future”: they expect to get more of their own marginal saving, so they are encouraged
to save more (borrow less).35
Proposition 6. Marginal propensity to consume out of initial wealth Y1 is negative for potential
defaulters (those with initial wealth Y1 < Ŷ1, see Proposition 3). For “never defaulters” (Y1 > Ŷ1),
it is positive and smaller than 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
To illustrate the negative MPC result as well as some other results derived earlier, Figure 2.2
plots the value function, i.e. expected utility as a function of first period consumption, for several
initial wealth levels. At the initial wealth levels plotted in the top row (Y1 = 23 and Y1 = 25), the
value function reaches its peak, marked by ∗, at the C1 level implied by the borrowing constraint,
where the value function drops to zero. That is, both wealth levels are lower than the borrowing
constrained threshold Yˇ1 with the parameters used in this exercise, and individuals with these
initial wealth levels choose to borrow up to the constraint. At the initial wealth levels plotted in
middle row (Y1 = 27 and Y1 = 29), the value function reaches its peak at an interior C1 level, i.e.
at a value lower than that implied by the borrowing constraint. The peaks of both value functions
are attained at higher C1 values than the respective Ĉ1 values (marked by the dashed lines), i.e. at
“default possible” C1 values. Individuals with initial wealth levels Y1 = 27 and Y1 = 29 therefore
choose C1 levels which imply that they will find it optimal to default in low second period income
states. Note that the amount consumed at Y1 = 29 is lower than the amount consumed at Y1 = 27
(27.28 vs. 29.93), e.g. MPC is negative (the maximum of the value function moves to the left as
we increase initial wealth).
At the initial wealth levels plotted in the bottom row (Y1 = 31 and Y1 = 33), the value function
reaches its peak at lower C1 values then the respective Ĉ1 values (note that Ĉ1 increases in Y1),
34Recall that in default states the individual consumes his second period income, regardless of how much he
consumed in the first period.
35As Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) note in the context of means-tested social insurance, there is an implicit
tax of 100% on saving in the states in which the individual defaults.
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i.e. at “default impossible” C1 values. Individuals with initial wealth levels Y1 = 31 and Y1 = 33
therefore choose C1 levels which imply that they will never find it optimal to default in the second
period (both initial wealth levels are lower than Ŷ1, the “never default” threshold). The amount
consumed at Y1 = 33 is higher than the amount consumed at Y1 = 31 (26.52 vs. 25.44), e.g.MPC
is positive (the maximum of the value function moves to the right as we increase initial wealth in
this region).
[Insert Figure 2.2 here]
Figure 2.3 plots the consumption function - optimal consumption as a function of initial wealth
- for a range of initial wealth values, with the same parameters used in the previous figures. The
slope of the curve is the marginal propensity to consume. At low initial wealth levels Y1 < Yˇ1,
such as those in the top row of Figure 2.2, this slope is 1 since the individual borrows up to the
borrowing constraint so that C1 = Y1 + B1. At Yˇ1 there is a sharp drop in consumption as the
individual moves from a regime of borrowing up to the constraint to one of choosing an interior
solution. At initial wealth levels Yˇ1 < Y1 < Ŷ1, such as those in the middle row of Figure 2.2,
interior solutions which imply positive ex-ante probability of default are chosen, and consumption
decreases with initial wealth (MPC is negative). At initial wealth levels Y1 > Ŷ1, such as those in
the bottom row of Figure 2.2, interior solutions which imply zero probability of default are chosen,
and consumption increases with initial wealth (MPC is positive).
[Insert Figure 2.3 here]
2.5. The Effects of Favorable Interest Rate Changes
In this section I analyze the effects of favorable changes in interest rates, i.e. an increase in the
saving rate RS and a decrease in the borrowing rate RB , on optimal consumption behavior. I first
examine the effects of such changes on the initial wealth thresholds established in Propositions
3, 4 and 5. I then examine the effects on optimal consumption. Finally, I examine the effects of
interest rate changes on expected default. As in Section 2.4, I operate under the assumption of a
fixed cost of default.36
36See footnote 28
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A. Effects on Initial Wealth Thresholds
Proposition 7 shows that favorable interest rate changes affect the initial wealth thresholds es-
tablished in previous propositions in the following way. Ŷ1, the threshold which separates potential
defaulters from “never defaulters”, decreases, increasing the fraction of “never defaulters”. The
borrowing constrained threshold Yˇ1 increases, decreasing the fraction of individuals who hit the
borrowing constraint (which increases when RB decreases). The saving and borrowing thresholds
Y`1(RB) and Y`1(RS) move closer to each other so that more individuals borrow and more save.
There is no transition between saving and borrowing or vice-versa. The changes are summarized
in Figure 2.4.
Proposition 7. Favorable interest rate changes, i.e. an increase in the saving rate and a decrease
in the borrowing rate, have the following effects on the thresholds established above:
1. Ŷ1 decreases
2. Under reasonable assumptions, Yˇ1 decreases
3. Y`1(RB) increases and Y`1(RS) decreases
Proof. See Appendix C.
[Insert Figure 2.4 here]
B. Effects on First Period Optimal Consumption
In Proposition 8 I derive the effects of favorable interest rate changes on optimal consumption.
As is well-known, changing the interest rate generally has the following effects on optimal first
period consumption:37
• An increase in the interest rate raises the price of current consumption relative to future
consumption, while a decrease in the interest rate lowers this relative price (“substitution
effect”)
• An increase in the interest rate allows for higher second period consumption, all else equal,
making the individual better off, while a decrease in the interest rate makes him worse off
(“income effect”)
37See Deaton (1992), p. 3
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• An increase in the interest rate decreases the present discounted value of second period
income and makes the individual worse off, while a decrease makes him better off (“human
capital effect”)
I refer to the combination of the latter 2 effects as “the wealth effect”. As might be obvious, this
combined effect is always positive for favorable interest rate changes. That is, favorable interest
rate changes always make the individual better off.38
In Proposition 8 I derive the following expression for the elasticity of first period consumption





= −(1−MPC)EIS + Y1 − C1
C1
MPC (2.5.1)
where EIS(C1) is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at C1 and MPC is the marginal
propensity to consume out of initial wealth at C1.
The first term represents the substitution effect, and is always negative. That is, an increase
in the relative price of C1 works to decrease C1. It is more negative for a given C1 level when
default is possible, since the term multiplying EIS is (1 −MPC), which is larger than 1 when
default is possible and smaller than 1 when it is not. While the EIS determines how expected
consumption growth responds to a change in R, how much of that response is manifested in
changes in C1 versus changes in expected C2 (that is, changes in expected C2 in non-default
states) depends on how the intertemporal tradeoff between C1 and expected C2 changes with C1.
1−MPC = u′′(C1)
u′′(C1)− ddC1 opp_cost
measures how the tradeoff changes,39 and is larger where default
is possible and the opportunity cost is decreasing (where ddC1 opp_cost < 0).
40
The second term represents the wealth effect. The amount saved/borrowed (scaled by C1),
representing the impact of a change in R on the individual (“by how much does a change in R
make the individual better off”), is multiplied by MPC to determine the effect on C1. It follows
that whereMPC is positive, i.e. where default is impossible, the wealth effect of favorable interest
38An increase in the interest rate has a positive wealth effect on savers and a negative effect on borrowers. A
decrease has the opposite effects. Favorable rate changes are defined as an increase in the saving rate and a decrease
in the borrowing rate, and always have positive wealth effects.
39u′′(C1) measures how the marginal benefit of C1 changes while ddC1 opp_cost measures how the opportunity
cost, or marginal cost of C1, changes with C1.













substitution effect dictates that a 1% increase in the interest rate decrease C1 by (1 −MPC)EIS% and increase
C2 by MPC ∗ EIS%, so that the growth rate C2/C1 increase by EIS%. When MPC < 0, the substitution effect
of a 1% increase in the interest rate on C1 is a decrease of more than EIS%, and the effect on C2 is negative rather
than positive.
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rate changes implies increased consumption, as is standard. Where MPC is negative, however,
i.e. where default is possible,41 the wealth effect of favorable rate changes works to decrease
consumption.
The elasticity is ultimately determined by the combination of wealth and substitution effects.
Let us examine this combination where default is possible and where it is impossible, keeping in
mind that the “default impossible” case corresponds to the standard textbook case (with uncertain
second period income). For savers, an increase in RS yields a negative substitution effect, implying
lower C1, regardless of the potential for default. Where default is impossible, MPC is positive
and the wealth effect implies higher C1, contradicting the substitution effect and overpowering
it for some parameters and levels of initial saving. Where default is possible, however, MPC
is negative and the wealth effect reinforces the substitution effect. It follows that while savers
might increase or decrease their consumption in response to an increase in RS where default is
impossible, depending on the parameters used and the level of initial saving,42 savers who are
potential defaulters always decrease their consumption in response to this change.
For borrowers, it is a mirror image.43 A decrease in RB yields a positive substitution effect,
implying higher C1, regardless of the potential for default. Where default is impossible,44 MPC is
positive and the wealth effect reinforces the substitution effect, while where default is possible, it
is negative and contradicts the substitution effect, overpowering it for some parameters and levels
of initial borrowing. It follows that while borrowers always increase their consumption in response
to a decrease in RB where default is impossible, borrowers who are potential defaulters might
increase or decrease their consumption in response to this change, depending on the parameters
used and the level of initial borrowing.45
That is, the potential for default shifts the effects of favorable interest rate changes in a
more conservative direction in the sense that all savers decrease their consumption in response
to an increase in RS (where only some would have otherwise) and some borrowers decrease their
consumption in response to a decrease in RB (where all would have increased it otherwise). This
is brought about by the negative sign of the slope of the opportunity cost curve where default
41As shown in Section 2.4.B, the MPC is negative where the opportunity cost is decreasing in C1. As shown
in Section 2.3.D, this is the case for potential defaulters if the marginal cost of default is not high enough and in
particular in the case of a fixed cost of default.
42For certain parameters there is a threshold level of initial saving (corresponding to a threshold level of initial
wealth) above which the wealth effect is stronger than the substitution effect.
43The effect of decreasing RB is the negative of (2.5.1).
44Although there are no borrowers with zero probability of default here by assumption (see footnote 4 in Appendix
C), this is useful as a benchmark for evaluating the effects of incorporating the possibility of default.
45For certain parameters there is a threshold level of initial borrowing (corresponding to a threshold level of initial
wealth) above which the wealth effect is stronger than the substitution effect.
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is possible, and stands in contrast to the standard effects of favorable rate changes on optimal
consumption.
Let us now compare the actual elasticities (rather than just signs) where default is possible
and where it is not possible, for given levels of initial consumption. It should be noted that this
comparison ignores the higher initial consumption brought about by the possibility of default (as
does the above, which compares savers and borrowers from both groups). Still, it is instructive to
consider the differences in elasticities holding C1 fixed.
For given levels of C1 which imply saving, the substitution effect is stronger where default is
possible (implying a stronger decrease in consumption) and the wealth effect implies decreasing
rather than increasing consumption. It follows that the interest elasticity of consumption is always
more negative (implying a stronger decrease in consumption in response to an increase in RS)
where default is possible. For given levels of C1 which imply borrowing, the stronger substitution
effect where default is possible implies a stronger increase in consumption while the wealth effect
implies decreasing rather than increasing consumption. It follows that, although the elasticity is
positive for some parameters where default is possible and always negative where it is not, which
elasticity is larger for borrowers depends on the parameters used.
Proposition 8 derives the effects discussed in this section formally.
Proposition 8. Favorable interest rate changes, i.e. an increase in the saving rate and a decrease
in the borrowing rate, have the following effects on optimal consumption:
1. Where default is impossible (among “never defaulters”):
(a) Initial savers decrease consumption (increase saving) if and only if the wealth effect is




(b) All initial borrowers increase consumption (increase borrowing)46
2. Where default is possible (among “potential defaulters”):
(a) All initial savers decrease consumption (increase saving)47
46See footnote 44
47Moreover, some potential defaulters who are savers increase their saving enough to become “never defaulters”
(see Proposition 7).
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(b) Initial borrowers increase consumption (increase borrowing) if and only if the wealth




3. For given levels of C1 which imply saving, the interest elasticity of C1 is more negative where
default is possible than where it is not possible. For C1 levels which imply borrowing, this
depends on the parameters used.
Proof. See Appendix C.
C. Effects on Expected Default
In this section I examine the effects of favorable interest rate changes on expected default: the
probability of default as well as the closely related expected defaulted-upon amount.49
Recall that a potential defaulter defaults on his entire debt in relatively low income states
Y˜2 < Ŷ2. The expected defaulted-upon amount is therefore:50
E(Def) = Pr.(Def) ∗Debt = (Ŷ2 − Y2)Debt





Debt+ (Ŷ2 − Y2)dDebt
dR
where the first term represents the effect of changing R on the default threshold Ŷ2, i.e. on
the probability of default, and the second term represents the effect of changing R on Debt, the
amount owed (and potentially defaulted upon).
48This applies to those who transition between interior solutions in response to interest rate changes. Note that
there will also be a small initial wealth interval where borrowers decrease their consumption sharply in response
to a decrease in RB as they transition from a corner solution (hitting the borrowing constraint) to an interior one
(see Proposition 7).
49As shown in Proposition 7, favorable rate changes cause some potential defaulters to become “never defaulters”
(but not “never defaulters” to become potential defaulters). Here I examine the effects for potential defaulters who
still have positive probability of default following the rate changes.
50Recall that Y˜2 ∼ U [Y2, Y2] and that we normalize Y2 − Y2 = 1.
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Proposition 9 shows that the directions of the effects of favorable interest rate changes on
the probability of default and on the expected defaulted-upon amount are the same, and that
they depend on the sign of dDebtdR . As the proposition shows, increasing RS always decreases
Debt for initial savers, therefore always decreases both the probability of default and the expected
defaulted-upon amount.51
Decreasing RB increasesDebt for some initial borrowers and decreases it for others. Proposition








That is, if and only if C1−Y1C1 , the fraction of first period consumption that is financed using
borrowing, is larger than minus the elasticity of C1 with respect to R.52 Where this elasticity is
positive, i.e. where decreasing RB lowers the amount borrowed, the condition always holds and
decreasing RB always lowers expected default among borrowers. As Proposition 8 shows, the
elasticity is positive for certain parameters where default is possible, and always negative when
it is impossible (note that the condition might hold where the elasticity is negative as well).53







where ρ is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, also equal to the inverse of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. That is, probability of default and expected defaulted-
upon amount decrease for borrowers who finance at least 1ρ of their consumption through borrow-
ing.
The fraction of consumption financed through borrowing decreases in initial wealth and in-
creases in borrowing, so that the condition corresponds to an initial wealth and an initial bor-
rowing threshold, s.t. those who are relatively poor and initially borrow relatively large amounts
decrease expected default when RB decreases, while those who are relatively wealthy and initially
borrow relatively small amounts increase expected default.
51Recall that some savers have Debt > 0 because of the pre-existing obligation D¯0, which they can default on.
The assumption that second period consumption in case of default is equal to second period income implies that
any savings are seized in default and that D¯0 is partially paid back rather than defaulted upon in full when an
individual who had saved in the first period defaults.
52This corresponds to the elasticity of the amount borrowed (C1 − Y1) wrt R being higher than −1.
53In other words, if borrowing (B1) decreases when RB decreases, Debt = B1RB also decreases. If borrowing
increases, the product might still decrease.
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Note that (2.5.3) is a general condition for decreasing RB to decrease Debt and increase second
period consumption in no-default states.54 That is, it is a condition for the elasticity of second
period consumption with respect to RB to be positive, reflecting the combination of substitution
and wealth effects on second period consumption.
Although the slope of the opportunity cost does not appear in (2.5.3), the possibility of default
and its implications for optimal consumption behavior impact the effects of favorable rate changes
on Debt. First, where default is possible C1 and C1−Y1C1 are higher for given initial wealth. There
is therefore an initial wealth range for which (2.5.3) holds where default is possible but not where
it is not possible. Second, the possibility of default impacts the magnitude of the effect on Debt.
Proposition 9 shows that with CRRA preferences, the derivative of Debt wrt R is:
dDebt
dR





For given C1 levels, the term multiplying (C1−Y1C1 − 1ρ ) is larger where default is possible, since
MPC is smaller. It follows that for C1 levels for which dDebtdR is positive (for which decreasing RB
decreases expected default for borrowers), the effect is larger where default is possible.55 For C1
levels for which dDebtdR is negative,56 whether the effect is smaller or larger where default is possible
depends on the parameters.
Proposition 9 derives the effects discussed in this section formally.
Proposition 9. Favorable interest rate changes, i.e. an increase in the saving rate and a decrease
in the borrowing rate, have the following effects on the probability of default and the expected
defaulted-upon amount of potential defaulters:
1. Savers who are potential defaulters (who might default on D¯0, the pre-existing obligation)
decrease their probability of default as well as their expected defaulted-upon amount.
2. Borrowers decrease their probability of default as well as their expected defaulted-upon







54Second period consumption in no-default states is Y˜2 −Debt, so ddRDebt = − ddRC2 in those states.
55Note that a given C1 implies a higher level of C1−Y1C1 where default is possible relative to where it is not possible,
which contributes to the larger effect.
56This includes all C1 levels which imply saving (for which increasing RS decreases expected default), as well as
C1 levels which imply borrowing for which decreasing RB increases expected default.
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where ρ is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion. C1−Y1C1 corresponds to an
initial wealth threshold and an initial borrowing threshold.
3. As shown in Proposition 7, favorable rate changes cause some of those who were initially
neither borrowing nor saving to start saving and some to start borrowing. Those who start
saving lower their probability of default and expected defaulted-upon amount while those
who start borrowing increase these quantities.
Proof. See Appendix C.
2.6. Extension: Voluntary Extent of Delinquency in Both
Periods
In this section I extend the basic model in two ways. First, I allow the individual to choose how
much of his debt he wishes to repay. That is, the choice is not between defaulting on all obligations
and repaying in full: there is flexibility to choose any point between these two extremes. This
might be thought of as corresponding to delinquency, i.e. failing to repay some portion of the debt
on time, rather than to bankruptcy and full discharge of debts.57
More importantly, I allow for first period delinquency. In the main version of the model, failing
to repay in full is possible only in the second period: D¯0, the pre-existing fixed obligation that is
due in every period, is assumed to always be paid back in full in the first period (recall that Y1
is defined as net of D¯0). Here I relax this assumption and allow the individual to be delinquent
on D¯0 in the first period. The goal is to examine how favorable interest rate changes might affect
consumption and delinquency when borrowing is possible (in the main version of the model, it is
not possible to be delinquent and borrow at the same time).
The analysis here, which shows that lowering the borrowing rate reduces the likelihood and
extent of first period delinquency, illustrates another channel through which favorable changes
57Athreya, Sánchez, Tam, and Young (2012) make the distinction between bankruptcy (corresponding to the
all-or-nothing default setup used above) and delinquency in their model and examine the tradeoff between them.
Dawsey and Ausubel (2004) show that delinquency, which they term “informal bankruptcy”, is quite prevalent,
even among relatively creditworthy borrowers, and study it empirically using data on credit card accounts.
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in interest rates can affect consumer behavior, in particular the repayment of debts. Individuals
essentially trade off borrowing and delinquency in the first period to finance consumption: every
dollar of D¯0 that is repaid has to be borrowed in order to maintain the same level of consumption.
Lowering the cost of borrowing lowers delinquency by making borrowing and repaying (i.e. rolling
over) more attractive relative to delinquency.
I first solve the second period problem in which the individual chooses the extent to which
he wishes to be delinquent on Debt. Assuming a constant marginal cost of delinquency,58 the
solution is characterized by a floor level of consumption C2: the individual is delinquent if and
only if second period income is insufficient to cover Debt as well as consume C2, and the extent
of delinquency is as much as is needed in order to consume this level. I then move on to the first
period problem and show that there is a tradeoff between using borrowing and being delinquent
on D¯0 as means of financing first period consumption. I characterize the optimal delinquency-
borrowing mix for different levels of C1 and then, given this optimal mix for the different levels of
C1, characterize the optimal choice of C1 for different first period income levels. As in the second
period, there is a floor level of consumption C1 that delinquency is used to ensure. Finally, I derive
the effects of favorable interest rate changes on optimal first period delinquency.
A. The Second Period Problem
In this version of the model, the individual enters the second period with Debt = B1R + D¯0,
receives Y˜2 and then chooses Del2, the delinquent amount. Second period consumption is:
C2 = Y˜2 −Debt+Del2
The cost of delinquency is Λ2(Del2). In this case, this cost can be thought of as reflecting
damage to the individual’s credit score (resulting in higher future borrowing costs) as well as any
future expected payments as a result of delinquency (i.e. at least some of the delinquent amount
might be expected to be paid eventually, possibly in addition to interest and fees).59
If Y˜2 is insufficient to cover Debt, the individual must be delinquent to some extent (i.e. C2
cannot be negative). Moreover, Del2 cannot be negative and cannot exceed Debt. The resulting
second period optimization problem is:
58Note that in this case, the opportunity cost curve increases in C1 everywhere. See footnote 9 in Appendix C.
59This can be modeled explicitly in a model with more than 2 periods (see conclusion).
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max u(Y˜2 −Debt+Del2)− Λ2(Del2)
Del2
s.t. Del2 ≥ max{0, Debt− Y˜2}
Del2 ≤ Debt
The interior solution to this problem is defined by the first order condition:
u′(Y˜2 −Debt+Del2) = Λ′2(Del2) (2.6.1)
For simplicity, I assume a constant marginal cost of delinquency: Λ2(Del2) = Λ2 ∗ Del2.60
Denoting the C2 level at which marginal utility is equal to the marginal cost of delinquency by
C2:
(u′)−1(Λ2) ≡ C2
The interior solution (which satisfies (2.6.1)) is:
Del2 = C2 − (Y˜2 −Debt)




0 if Y˜2 ≥ C2 +Debt
C2 − (Y˜2 −Debt) if C2 ≤ Y˜2 < C2 +Debt
C2 =

Y˜2 −Debt if Y˜2 ≥ C2 +Debt
C2 if C2 ≤ Y˜2 < C2 +Debt
That is, in the second period the individual is delinquent if and only if Y˜2 is not sufficiently
high to ensure some floor level of consumption C2. The extent of delinquency, in that case, will be
as much as is needed in order to consume C2. This pattern is not surprising, given the assumption
60A fixed cost of delinquency as in the basic model would effectively reduce this to the “all or nothing default”
case analyzed above.
61This assumption ensures that the constraint Del2 ≤ Debt is never hit, i.e. the individual never wishes to be
delinquent on more than he owes. In particular, when the individual saves enough s.t. Debt < 0, i.e. −B1RS > D¯0,
he pays D¯0 in full (Del2 = 0).
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that the marginal cost of delinquency is constant and given that marginal utility is monotonically
decreasing.
B. The First Period Problem
The individual starts the first period owing D¯0.62 After receiving Y1 (termed “first period
income” rather than “initial wealth” here to emphasize that it is not defined net of prior debt,
as it is in the main version of the model), he chooses C1 and Del1. Assume that the cost of
delinquency is fixed in this period as well: Λ1(Del1) = Λ1.63
Going back to the second period problem, define a second period income threshold:
Ŷ2 = max{Y2, C2 +Debt}
and note that similarly to the original version of the model, the individual optimally chooses
to pay his second period obligations in full if and only if Y˜2 ≥ Ŷ2. If Y˜2 < Ŷ2, delinquency occurs
to some extent.
Assuming Y1 > D¯0, i.e. first period income is always sufficient to cover the pre-existing obli-
gation, the individual solves the following problem in the first period:








s.t. Debt = B1R+ D¯0
B1 = (C1 − Y1) + (D¯0 −Del1)
0 ≤ Del1 ≤ D¯0
Del2 = max{C2 − (Y˜2 −Debt), 0}
(2.6.2)
C. Characterizing the Delinquency-Borrowing Tradeoff
(2.6.2) can be viewed as a two stage problem, where there is an optimal mix of delinquency and
borrowing that is used to finance any C1 level in excess of Y1. This point is clear when re-writing
62Note that D¯0 is owed in each period.
63In principle, the delinquent amount in the first period should be due in the second period, but I ignore that
here for simplicity.
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the first period budget constraint:
C1 = Y1 +B1 + (Del1 − D¯0)
The optimal mix of delinquency and borrowing is determined by the constraint 0 ≤ Del1 ≤ D¯0








where the LHS is the marginal cost of delinquency and the RHS is the marginal cost of borrowing.







u′(Y˜2 − B˘1R− D¯0)dY˜2) (2.6.4)
Proposition 10 shows that a constant marginal cost of delinquency leads to the delinquency-
borrowing tradeoff having three distinct first period consumption regions. Relatively low levels
of consumption are completely financed by borrowing (or, at C1 < Y1, the individual is saving)
and D¯0 is paid in full (the constraint Del1 ≥ 0 is binding in this region). At intermediate levels
of consumption, B˘1 is borrowed and the individual is delinquent on D¯0 to the extent needed to
finance consumption in excess of Y1− D¯0 + B˘1 (this is the only region in which there is an interior
solution, i.e. in which (2.6.3) holds). At high levels of consumption, the individual is delinquent
on the entire D¯0 and borrows as much as is needed (the constraint Del1 ≤ D¯0 is binding in this
region).
Proposition 10. When the marginal cost of delinquency is constant, the delinquency-borrowing
tradeoff is characterized by three C1 regions:
1. C1 < Y1 − D¯0 + B˘1: the individual borrows B1 ≤ B˘1 and pays D¯0 in full
2. Y1 − D¯0 + B˘1 ≤ C1 < Y1 + B˘1: the individual borrows B1 = B˘1 and is delinquent on
(C1 − (Y1 − D¯0 + B˘1))
3. Y1+B˘1 ≤ C1: the individual borrows B1 > B˘1 and is delinquent on the entire fixed obligation
D¯0
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where B˘1 is defined by (2.6.4).
Proof. See Appendix C.
D. Characterizing Optimal First Period Consumption
Now that we have established the optimal delinquency-borrowing mix for any C1 level, let us









Incorporating the findings of Proposition 10, Proposition 11 characterizes optimal first period
consumption and delinquency for different levels of first period income, establishing regions that
correspond to the consumption regions established in Proposition 10.
As in the second period, there is a floor level of consumption C1 where the marginal utility of
consumption is equal to the marginal cost of delinquency. At high levels of first period income,
consumption is higher than this level and is financed completely by borrowing (D¯0 is paid in full;
the constraint Del1 ≥ 0 is binding). At intermediate levels of first period income, B˘1 is borrowed
and the individual is delinquent on as much of D¯0 as is needed in order to finance the floor level
of consumption C1. At low levels of first period income, the individual is delinquent on the entire
D¯0 (the constraint Del1 ≤ Debt is binding), borrows more than B˘1 and consumes less than C1.
Proposition 11. First period consumption and delinquency are characterized by the following
first period income (Y1) regions:
1. Y1 > C1 + D¯0 − B˘1: the individual borrows B1 < B˘1 and consumes C1 > C1. There is no
delinquency: D¯0 is paid in full.
2. C1 − B˘1 < Y1 ≤ C1 + D¯0 − B˘1: the individual borrows B˘1 and consumes C1 = C1. There is
partial delinquency: Y1 − (C1 − B˘1) out of D¯0 is paid.
3. Y1 ≤ C1 − B˘1: the individual borrows B1 > B˘1 and consumes C1 < C1. The individual is
delinquent on the entire D¯0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
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E. The Effects of Favorable Interest Rate Changes
Favorable interest rate changes, in particular a decrease in the borrowing rate, increase the
attractiveness of borrowing relative to delinquency in the first period. Delinquency thus decreases,
in terms of the fraction of individuals who are delinquent as well as the average delinquent amount.
This can be seen by observing that changing R affects the borrowing-delinquency tradeoff
expressed in (2.6.3) by lowering the marginal cost of borrowing for any given borrowing level. The
marginal cost of delinquency and the marginal cost of borrowing are then equated at a higher
borrowing level. That is, B˘1, as defined in (2.6.4), increases when R decreases.64 In light of the
thresholds and quantities established in Proposition 11, a higher B˘1 has the following effects on
first period delinquency:
• The fraction of individuals who pay D¯0 in full increases
• The fraction of individuals who are delinquent on the entire D¯0 decreases
• Individuals who are partially delinquent on D¯0 decrease their delinquent amount (some, as
noted above, to zero)
2.7. Conclusion
This paper shows that incorporating the possibility of default in the basic life-cycle model can
have significant implications for consumer behavior, as well as for the response of this behavior
to changes in other variables such as wealth and the interest rate. When the cost of default is
not sufficiently dependent on the amount defaulted upon, consumption is higher than it would
have otherwise been for those who might default, and marginal propensity to consume out of
wealth is negative. This has implications for the response to any price changes that make the
consumer better off, such as favorable interest rate changes. The wealth effects of such changes
work to decrease consumption through strengthening the link between first period consumption
and second period utility, a link that is initially weakened by the possibility of default.
As noted in the introduction, the results are relevant for multiple economic issues linked to
the effects of the return to saving and the cost of borrowing on consumer behavior. They are
particularly relevant for thinking about the effects of bank account ownership, and imply that
64To see this, note that the partial derivative of the RHS of (2.6.4) wrt R is positive (the marginal cost of
borrowing increases in R), while the derivative wrt B˘1 is negative. Since the LHS of (2.6.4) (the marginal cost of
delinquency) is constant, decreasing R increases B˘1, the borrowing level at which the marginal costs are equal.
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models without the possibility of default might underestimate the role of account ownership in
encouraging saving and discouraging excessive borrowing of previously unbanked individuals - a
relatively default-prone population for whom there might not be enough information to enable
the accurate pricing of individual loans. A more comprehensive model of the effects of bank
account ownership might also include transactional costs such as check cashing and, perhaps
more importantly, self-control problems and limited attention to the need to save which result
in over-consumption. Account ownership has been argued to help address self-control problems
through mental accounting (Dupas and Robinson (2013)) and might also address limited attention
through default mechanisms such as direct deposit of income into savings vehicles.65 However, a
more general point is that if individuals are subject to self-control problems that result in over-
consumption, lowering the borrowing rate might be welfare-reducing because it would cater to
these problems, similar to lowering the price of any good that is subject to self-control problems.66
This paper is mainly concerned with the implications of allowing for bankruptcy-style default
where debts are discharged in full. Delinquency, the failure to repay some portion of due debts
on time, is another important phenomenon in unsecured credit markets. Extending the model to
several periods where both default and delinquency are possible, as Athreya, Sánchez, Tam, and
Young (2012) have recently done, is therefore an obvious way to enrich it. A step in that direction
is taken in Section 2.6, which allows choice of the amount repaid but does not specify separate
implications for delinquency and default.67 As this paper demonstrates, the way in which the
costs of failing to repay in full are modeled, in particular their dependence on the amount unpaid,
will determine the implications for the effects of interest rate changes on consumer behavior.
65As Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) put it, “financial institutions . . . should not be simply viewed from a
financial cost-saving point of view but instead should be understood to affect the lives of people by easing their
planning, facilitating their desired actions and enabling their resistance to temptation.”
66Morse (2011) makes this point in the context of access to payday loans.
67In Athreya, Sánchez, Tam, and Young (2012) both delinquency and default carry a fixed cost and exclude the
household from credit markets for one period. Default relieves the household of all obligations, however, while
delinquency allows lenders to garnish some portion of income and involves a revaluation of the amount outstanding.
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Figure 2.1: The Marginal Benefit and Opportunity Cost Curves
I plot the marginal benefit and the opportunity cost of first period consumption for a range of first period
consumption (C1) levels. The top plot includes the two curves for an individual with initial wealth (Y1)
equal to 38, while the bottom plot includes the curves for an individual with initial wealth (Y1) equal to
28. Both plots use CRRA preferences with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 3, as well as the
following parameters: β = 1, RS = RB = 1, Y2 = 20,Y2 = 50, D¯0 = 10. The cost of default is fixed and
equal to u(20) − u(15).
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Figure 2.2: The Value Function for Various Levels of Initial Wealth
I plot the value function for several initial wealth levels, specified at the top of each plot. The
dashed lines mark Ĉ1(Y1), as defined in Section 2.3.B, and the maxima of the value functions are
marked by ∗. I use CRRA preferences with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 3, as
well as: β = 1, RS = RB = 1, Y2 = 20,Y2 = 50, D¯0 = 10. The cost of default is fixed and equal
to u(20)− u(15).



























































































































































































Figure 2.3: The Consumption Function
I plot the consumption function for a range of initial wealth (Y1) values. Ŷ1 and Yˇ1, as defined
in Propositions 3 and 4, are marked on the figure. I use CRRA preferences with a coefficient
of relative risk aversion equal to 3, as well as the following parameters: β = 1, RS = RB = 1,
Y2 = 20,Y2 = 50, D¯0 = 10. The cost of default is fixed and equal to u(20)− u(15).

















Figure 2.4: Initial Wealth Thresholds
I divide initial wealth (Y1) into the regions established in Propositions 3, 4 and 5. The top two rows
contain information on saving and borrowing in the various regions and on the ex-ante probability
of default. The bottom row shows the directions of the effects of favorable interest rate changes
on the thresholds separating the regions, as established in Proposition 7.
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Chapter 3
Asset Pricing in the Dark: The
Cross Section of OTC Stocks1
3.1. Introduction
While hundreds of studies have investigated expected return patterns in listed stocks that trade
on the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ, many U.S. stocks—roughly one-fifth of the number of stocks
listed on the major exchanges—trade in OTC markets. The definition of an OTC stock is one
that trades on either the OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB) or OTC Link (formerly Pink Sheets,
or PS) interdealer quotation system, where at least one licensed broker-dealer agrees to make a
market in the stock. We examine market data for 6,668 OTC firms from 1977 through 2008. To
our knowledge, this is the largest dataset of U.S. stock prices to be introduced to research since
the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) added data on NASDAQ stocks in 1984.
The OTC and listed stock markets consist of many similar firms and market participants.
More than 80% of OTC firms with market capitalizations above $1 million are traded in listed
markets either before, concurrently, or after their OTC trading activity. Most broker-dealers who
act as market makers in OTC stocks are also market makers in listed markets. Moreover, many
investors, including retail investors and hedge funds, actively trade both groups of stocks.
There are, however, three important differences between OTC and listed stocks. First, there is
far lower liquidity in OTC markets than on the major exchanges. Second, whereas firms in listed
1This chapter is co-authored with Andrew Ang and Paul Tetlock of Columbia University.
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stock markets must file regular financial disclosures, disclosure requirements for firms traded in
OTC markets are minimal, if non-existent, for most of our sample period.2 Third, non-institutional
(i.e., retail) investors are the primary owners of most OTC stocks, whereas institutional investors
hold significant stakes in nearly all stocks on listed exchanges, including small stocks. Possibly as
a consequence of low ownership by institutions, the main lenders of shares, short selling of OTC
stocks is difficult, expensive, and rare.
We exploit these features of OTC and listed stock markets to distinguish among myriad theories
of return premiums. Differentiating theories whose predictions depend on stocks’ information
environments and investor clientele using only the listed markets is challenging because all listed
stocks are subject to the same reporting requirements and nearly all are held by institutions.3
We estimate return premiums both within and across OTC markets and listed markets, sorting
stocks by the characteristics that distinguish the two markets. This combined cross-market and
within-market identification strategy allows for powerful tests of competing theories because the
data exhibit enormous heterogeneity along both dimensions.
In light of the large cross-market differences in liquidity, we devote special attention to mea-
suring illiquidity premiums. We find that the return premium for illiquid stocks is much higher
in OTC markets than in listed markets. One of our key liquidity measures is the proportion of
non-trading days (PNT ), where higher PNT indicates higher illiquidity, and we sort OTC stocks
into PNT quintiles. When constructing listed return factors, we focus on “comparable” listed
stocks with market capitalizations similar to the typical OTC stock to control for differences in
firm size. We first evaluate factors’ pre-cost returns. We find that an OTC illiquidity factor has
an annual Sharpe ratio of 0.91, whereas the comparable listed illiquidity factor has a Sharpe ratio
of just 0.14.
Asset pricing theories based on transaction costs, such Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and
Constantinides (1986), do not explain the OTC illiquidity premium. These theories predict that
stocks exhibit positive pre-cost risk-adjusted returns that increase with bid-ask spreads to compen-
sate rational investors for their expected trading costs. Empirically, the most liquid OTC stocks
exhibit risk-adjusted monthly pre-cost returns of –4.0%, implying that their post-cost returns are
even more negative. In addition, the typical OTC investor incurs trading costs of less than 50
2After June 2000, firms listed on the OTCBB but not the PS must have at least 100 shareholders, file annual
reports, hold annual shareholder meetings, and meet other governance requirements (see Bushee and Leuz, 2005).
3Researchers can also use international data, like Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) who estimate illiquidity
premiums, or different asset classes like Karolyi and Sanders (1998), to study determinants of return premiums.
International studies are hampered by different treatments of creditor rights and securities not having the same
claims to cash flows across countries.
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basis points per month, suggesting that the magnitudes of trading costs are too small to explain
our findings. Data errors or microstructure biases in OTC stocks also do not explain the OTC
illiquidity premium. Such errors and biases should be smaller in the most liquid stocks and would
bias the returns of OTC stocks upward, implying their returns after adjusting for illiquidity effects
and data errors should be even more negative.
The strongly negative returns of liquid OTC stocks are consistent with the idea that limits to
arbitrage allow the OTC illiquidity premium to remain so high during our 32-year sample. Given
the difficulty in short selling even liquid OTC stocks, an arbitrageur could be unable to attain the
high Sharpe ratio of the OTC illiquidity premium. We also provide evidence that trading costs,
while relatively insignificant for the typical OTC investor who trades very infrequently, could
severely limit the effectiveness of short-horizon arbitrage in OTC stocks.
Next we test whether the well-known return premiums for stocks with low market capitaliza-
tions (“size”), high ratios of book equity to market equity (“value” or B/M), low idiosyncratic
volatility (“volatility”), and high past returns (“momentum”) generalize to OTC markets.4 Inter-
estingly, the return premiums for size, value, and volatility are similarly large in OTC markets and
comparable listed markets. In contrast, the return premium for momentum is considerably smaller
and less robust in OTC markets than in listed markets.5 Most of the OTC return premiums above
are driven by the negative returns on the short legs of the long-short portfolios, again consistent
with theories in which limits to short selling affect prices.
We find that traditional factor models—using factors constructed from listed returns—do not
account for the large illiquidity, size, value, and volatility return premiums in OTC markets. We
also show that the correlations between OTC return factors and their listed counterparts are
typically well below 0.5. The correlation between the OTC illiquidity factor and the listed Pastor
and Stambaugh’s (2003) illiquidity factor is close to zero. These facts show that the OTC factor
structure differs significantly from the factor structure of listed stocks, presenting a challenge for
explanations of return premiums based on economy-wide risk factors.
Our final tests examine whether theories based on behavioral biases and limits to arbitrage can
explain OTC and listed return premiums. Models analyzing the impact of differences in opinions
and limits on short sales could apply to both OTC and listed markets. In Appendix D, we present
4Studies of listed stocks by Banz (1981), Fama and French (1992), Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006),
and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) provide early evidence of the size, value, volatility, and momentum premiums,
respectively.
5Momentum is often thought to be pervasive in that it occurs in many different countries and asset classes (see,
for example, Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013)).
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a model of OTC stock pricing inspired by the theories of Miller (1977), Duffie, Garleanu, and
Pedersen (2002), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). The key mechanism is that, when investors’
opinions diverge, costs of short selling discourage the participation of investors with the most
pessimistic views of a stock. This causes overpricing followed by negative risk-adjusted returns.
In the model, investors’ overconfidence in their preferred valuation signals causes disagreement.
Disclosure of financial information reduces differences in opinion by resolving uncertainty over
which investors can disagree.
The model predicts that differences in opinion and overpricing are associated with high values
of four firm characteristics: trading volume, return volatility, market capitalization, and market-to-
book equity ratio (M/B). These relations are stronger for stocks with higher investor overconfidence
and those with fewer disclosures. The model’s first four predictions are consistent with the evidence
that OTC stocks with high volume, volatility, size, and M/B exhibit negative abnormal returns.
Importantly, we also find evidence consistent with both sets of the model’s predicted interaction
effects. Motivated by Barber and Odean (2000) evidence that retail investors are overconfident,
we use a stock’s institutional ownership as an inverse measure of investor overconfidence. We show
that the return premiums for PNT , volume, volatility, value, and size are 1.0% to 4.4% per month
larger in OTC stocks that are not held by institutions. We then measure OTC firms’ disclosure
of book equity data, which is basic financial information relevant for valuation. Empirically, OTC
return premiums based on three proxies for disagreement—PNT , volume, and volatility—are 1.4%
to 1.6% per month larger among stocks with undisclosed book equity.
Our cross-market findings are also consistent with the idea that our model of overpricing
applies more to OTC markets than listed markets. Our evidence indicates that short selling is
more difficult in OTC markets; and the lower disclosure and higher proportion of retail clientele in
OTC markets suggest investor disagreement could be greater. The fact that the OTC illiquidity
premium exceeds the listed premium is consistent with this notion. Moreover, we find that the
return on the entire OTC market is actually significantly negative at –0.8% per month, implying
widespread overpricing of OTC stocks. This negative return is driven by the OTC stocks with the
most trading activity, which likely exhibit the highest investor disagreement.
Although our model of overpricing provides a plausible account of many return premiums, it
does not make clear predictions for the momentum premium. We investigate momentum further
and find evidence that is most consistent with Hong and Stein’s (1999) model based on the
gradual diffusion of information across investors. The lack of momentum for most OTC stocks is
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consistent with the idea that investors do not attend closely to most OTC firms’ fundamentals,
perhaps because these firms lack credibility. We also find that momentum is strongest among OTC
stocks that disclose basic financial information and the largest OTC firms, which presumably have
more credibility. Furthermore, momentum among large OTC firms does not exhibit any reversal
over five years, which is consistent with Hong and Stein’s (1999) model but is hard to reconcile
with some alternative models of momentum.
3.2. Related Studies of OTC Stocks
Only a few studies investigate stock pricing in OTC markets.6 Studies by Luft, Levine, and
Larson (2001) and Eraker and Ready (2011) find that the average OTC market return is negative
during their sample periods spanning 1995 to 2008. Although we use the OTC market return as
a factor in some of our tests, we focus on the cross section of OTC returns.7 In many cases, the
differences among OTC stocks’ returns are much larger than the (negative) OTC market premium
and are not explained by exposures to the OTC market factor.
Studies of OTC firms’ liquidity and disclosure are also relevant. Three studies examine how
liquidity changes for stocks moving from listed markets to the OTC markets. Sanger and Peterson
(1990) show that quoted bid-ask spreads triple for 57 firms that are delisted and then trade in
OTC markets from 1971 to 1985. Harris, Panchapagesan, and Werner (2008) show that volume
falls by two-thirds, quoted bid-ask spreads double, and effective spreads triple for 1,098 firms that
are delisted from NASDAQ in 1999 to 2002 and subsequently trade on OTC markets. Macey,
O’Hara, and Pompilio (2008) also find higher spreads for most of the 58 NYSE stocks moving to
OTC markets in 2002. These studies suggest that the shift in trading to OTC venues actually
causes stocks to become less liquid.
Leuz, Triantis, and Yue Wang (2008) investigate a firm’s decision to “go dark,” which means
a firm ceases to report to the SEC while continuing to trade publicly in OTC markets. They find
that the 480 firms going dark between 1998 and 2004 experience negative average abnormal returns
of –10% upon announcement. Our study analyzes the returns of all OTC firms, including those
that have chosen to go dark (a minority), those that have never reported to the SEC, and those
6Bollen and Christie (2009) examine various aspects of OTC stock microstructure, but do not investigate cross-
sectional return premiums.
7Luft and Levine (2004) also explore the how OTC stocks’ returns are related to their size and liquidity, but
they do not perform formal statistical tests presumably because their sample spans only the five years from 1996
to 2000.
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that currently report to the SEC. All OTC firms’ past disclosure policies and financial reports are
available to investors and thus should be reflected in stock prices insofar as they affect investors’
valuations.
3.3. OTC Market Data
A. Institutional Details
Our data consist of US common stocks traded in the OTCBB and PS markets from 1977
through 2008. We obtain these data through MarketQA, which is a Thomson Reuters data ana-
lytics platform. The OTC markets are regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA), formerly the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), and the SEC to enhance
market transparency, fairness, and integrity. For most of our sample, the defining requirement of
an OTC stock is that at least one FINRA (formerly NASD) member must be willing to act as a
market maker for the stock.
As of June 2010, over 211 FINRA firms were market makers in OTC stocks, facilitating
daily trading activity of $395 million ($100 billion annualized). The most active firms, such
as Archipelago Trading Services and Knight Equity Markets, are also market makers in stocks
listed on the NASDAQ and are SEC-registered broker-dealers. FINRA requires market makers to
trade at their publicly displayed quotations.
Prior to 2000, the key formal disclosure requirement for firms traded on the OTCBB and PS
was Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. This provision applies only to OTC firms with more than
500 shareholders of record and $10 million in assets. Yet the vast majority of beneficial owners of
OTC firms are not shareholders of record as their shares are held in “street name” through their
brokers. So even large OTC firms can circumvent this disclosure requirement.
FINRA and SEC regulation of OTC markets, however, has increased substantially since 2000.
After June 2000, firms quoted on the OTCBB must have at least 100 shareholders, file annual
reports, hold annual shareholder meetings, and meet other governance requirements (Bushee and
Leuz, 2005). However, these disclosure requirements do not apply to PS firms, and they did not
apply to OTCBB firms for most of our sample.
We later provide evidence suggesting that the majority of investors in the firms traded ex-
clusively on OTC markets are individuals rather than institutions. Individual investors can buy
and sell OTCBB and PS stocks through most full service and discount brokers, such as E-Trade,
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Fidelity, and Schwab. However, short selling OTC stocks is difficult for investors, especially in-
dividuals. We collect short selling data for a sample of 50 OTC stocks and 50 similarly-sized
listed stocks in June 2012.8 A retail customer of Fidelity could buy all 100 of these stocks, but
the broker would allow short selling in only one of the OTC stocks and eight of the listed stocks.
Despite the constraints on individuals, for the 50 listed stocks, short interest as a percentage of
floating shares averages 4.1% and exceeds 0.1% for all 50. In contrast, for the 50 OTC stocks,
short interest averages just 0.5% and is lower than 0.1% for 28 of the stocks—though it is positive
for all but seven stocks. We infer that it is hard for individual investors to short most small stocks;
and nearly all investors have difficulty shorting OTC stocks. Thus, the OTC market is a natural
place to test theories of limits on short sales.
B. OTCBB and PS Data
We examine the universe of firms incorporated in the US with common stocks that are traded
in OTC markets from 1977 through 2008. Our analysis uses only OTC firms without stocks that
have been listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or Amex exchanges within the last three months. We
purposely exclude listed firms to ensure that we are analyzing a set of firms that is as orthogonal
as possible to those listed on the traditional venues. MarketQA provides daily trading volume,
market capitalization, and closing, bid, and ask prices for these firms.
To ensure adequate data quality, we further restrict the sample to firms meeting the following
requirements in the previous month:
• Non-missing data on stock price, market capitalization, and returns
• Stock price exceeds $1
• Market capitalization exceeds $1 million in 2008 dollars
• At least one non-zero daily return
• Positive trading volume—imposed only after 1995 when volume data are reliable.9
The price restriction above follows Ince and Porter (2006), who find that errors in computed
returns are more likely for firms with prices of less than $1.10 The market capitalization restriction
8These data are available upon request.
9Prior to 1995, some OTC firms’ volume data is recorded as missing when it is actually zero and vice versa. We
set all missing volume to zero prior to 1995 because we find that such firms have low volume when volume data
become available. Our results are virtually unchanged if we treat these firms’ volume data as missing instead.
10In untabulated results, we find that using a minimum price of $0.10 results in similar OTC return premiums.
126
is designed to eliminate thinly traded and economically unimportant firms that would otherwise
dominate equal-weighted portfolios. The non-zero return and positive volume restrictions exclude
thinly traded firms that suffer from bid-ask bounce and nonsynchronous trading issues.11 Our
final OTC sample includes an average of 486 firms per month.
C. Comparison to Listed Stocks
We compare our sample of OTC stocks to common stocks listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ,
or Amex exchanges using CRSP data. We define three groups of stocks: active, eligible, and
comparable. Active stocks have at least one non-zero daily return in the past year. Eligible stocks
meet our data requirements in Section 3.3.B. Comparable stocks in the listed sample consist of the
2N eligible listed firms with the lowest market capitalizations, where N is the number of listed
firms with a market capitalization below the median market capitalization in OTC markets in
each month. These listed firms are comparable to OTC firms in terms of size.
Table 3.1 provides a snapshot of summary statistics for the OTC, comparable listed, and
eligible listed samples in July of 1997—a typical month of OTC market activity. In this month,
the median market capitalization of an OTC stock is $12.9 million, as compared to $36 million
for the eligible listed sample. The difference in total market capitalization is much larger ($21.3
billion versus $9.59 trillion) because the largest listed firms are enormous and because there are
12 times fewer OTC stocks (600 OTC stocks versus 7,127 listed stocks). The annualized median
OTC trading volume is only 2.2% of the median eligible listed trading volume ($2.3 million versus
$101 million, respectively).12 The aggregate annualized transactions in OTC stocks exceed $8.2
billion, whereas trades in eligible listed stocks exceed $11.4 trillion.
[Insert Table 3.1 here]
By design, the OTC sample is more similar to the comparable listed sample described in the
second column of Table 3.1. In particular, the median size is identical in the two samples ($12.9
million). Although median sizes match perfectly, the mean size in the OTC markets is larger
($35.5 million) than that of the comparable listed sample ($12.7 million) because some OTC firms
are quite large, as discussed below.13 In July 1997, the mean of OTC trading volume at $13.7
11These filters also minimize the impact of market manipulation on our results. Aggarwal and Wu (2006), Böhme
and Holz (2006), and Frieder and Zittrain (2007) show that market manipulation can affect OTC stocks.
12Listed trading volume statistics do not adjust for possible double-counting of NASDAQ interdealer trades.
13The average fraction of shares floating is reasonably similar for the smaller samples of 50 OTC firms (53%
floating) and 50 similarly-sized listed firms (35% floating) in June of 2012.
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million is very similar to that of the comparable listed sample at $12.8 million. Although mean
volumes match well, the median OTC volume is smaller than that of the comparable listed sample
($2.3 million vs. $6.1 million, respectively), which is not surprising given the thinner OTC market.
In summary, the comparable listed sample is a benchmark group that is close in terms of size and
trading characteristics to the OTC firms.
Averaging across all months in our sample, the number of firms is 5,228 in the listed sample
and is 5,708 in the active listed universe. The averages are 486 in our OTC sample and 3,357 in
the active OTC universe. The OTC sample contains fewer firms than the active OTC universe
partly because 30% of OTC firms have a stock concurrently listed on the NASDAQ, making them
ineligible for the sample.14 When imposed individually, our sample filters for a non-zero daily
return, minimum price of $1, non-missing price, minimum market capitalization of $1 million, and
non-missing market capitalization eliminate 28%, 28%, 21%, 19%, and 16% of active OTC firms,
respectively. Notably, none of these sample requirements has much impact on the listed sample,
which contains 92% of the active firms in CRSP in an average month.
We now compare the size, volume, and number of firms in the OTC and eligible listed samples
over time. For this comparison, we transform the size and volume data to minimize the influence
of outliers which sometimes reflect data errors. In each month, we compute the difference in the
cross-sectional average of the logarithms of size and ($1 plus) volume in the two samples. After
taking the difference, we invert the log transform to obtain a ratio that can be interpreted as the
OTC characteristic divided by the listed characteristic.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the size, trading volume, and number of firms in the OTC sample as a
percentage of the corresponding amounts in the eligible listed sample. The number of firms in the
OTC sample averages 10% of the number in the listed sample, though this percentage increased to
24% by the end of 2008. The average firm size and trading volume in the OTC sample are an order
of magnitude smaller than they are in the listed sample. The average OTC stock is 11% of the size
of the average listed stock. The average OTC stock’s volume is just 6% of that of the average listed
stock. The relative size of OTC stocks has almost always been higher than their relative volume,
consistent with lower liquidity in OTC markets. This gap between relative size and volume widens
after 2000, as more illiquid firms are now traded in OTC markets relative to listed markets.15 The
14In untabulated tests, we find that cross-listed OTC and NASDAQ stocks exhibit return premiums much like
other listed stocks. The impact of NYSE versus NASDAQ listing choice has been studied in Baruch and Saar
(2009) and others. International cross-listing effects have been studied by Baruch, Karolyi, and Lemmon (2007)
and others.
15As explained in footnote 9, a structural break in OTC volume reporting causes the gap to appear to widen in
July 1995. Average OTC volume would be lower prior to July 1995 if volume data on all OTC firms were available.
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increase in the number of OTC firms in the late 1990s outpaces the concurrent rise in the number
of listed firms. The relative increase in OTC firms after 2003 coincides with the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act when many listed firms to chose to “go dark.”
[Insert Figure 3.1 here]
Although the typical OTC firm is smaller than most listed firms, there are several large OTC
firms that have market capitalizations similar to large listed firms. Table 3.2 lists the firm size
and month in which the 10 largest firms in our sample attain their peak size. These firms have
market capitalizations measured in billions. The largest firm, Publix Supermarkets, reaches a
market capitalization of $88 billion at the end of our sample in December 2008. It would rank
18th in size in the listed sample in that month, which exceeds the median of the top percentile.
Several large companies, such as Delphi Corp., trade on PS after delisting from NYSE, NASDAQ,
or Amex. We inspect the entire time series of data for all 77 OTC firms with peak sizes exceeding
$1 billion. We correct 19 errors arising from an incorrect number of shares outstanding. Such
errors apply mainly to the largest of these 77 firms and do not affect their returns. Still, these
data errors suggest one should be careful when interpreting OTC size data and value-weighted
portfolio returns.
[Insert Table 3.2 here]
In summary, the typical OTC stock is smaller, less liquid, and harder to short than the typical
listed stock. However, the largest 10% of OTC stocks are comparable in size to the median-sized
listed stock. The number of firms in our OTC sample is substantial, averaging almost 10% of all
listed stocks and increasing dramatically after 2000. Thus, although the OTC market is much
smaller than the market for listed stocks, the OTC universe is a powerful new venue to test the
determinants of return premiums.
3.4. Variable Definitions
This section summarizes the key variables used in our analyses. Our return predictability tests
require estimates of stocks’ monthly returns and betas. We also measure several firm character-
istics known to predict returns in listed stocks, such as size, book-to-market equity, past returns,
idiosyncratic volatility, and illiquidity.
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We compute a stock’s return as the monthly percentage change in MarketQA’s “total return
index” variable, which is a cumulative stock price that accounts for dividends and splits.16 We
assign a monthly index value based on the last available daily index value. Our sample filters
ensure that this value is available within the last month. Our tests use two past return variables:
past one-month returns (Ret[-1]) which capture short-term serial correlation and past 12-month
returns (Ret[-12,-2]), not including the past month, which capture stock price momentum.
Idiosyncratic volatility is defined relative to the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, as
in Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). To estimate a stock’s volatility in month t, we use
a time-series regression from month t–2 to t–1 of the stock’s daily return on the daily market
(MKT), size (SMB) and value (HML) factors, as defined in Fama and French (1993). The stock’s
idiosyncratic volatility (V olatility) in month t is the log of the standard deviation of the residuals
from its time series regression. We use the same regression procedure as described in Appendix
E, except that we apply this to daily rather than monthly observations.
Our analyses use three measures of individual stock liquidity. The main illiquidity measure
is the proportion of days with no trading volume (PNT ) in each month. The PNT variable
measures an investor’s ability to trade a stock at all, which is highly relevant in illiquid markets
such as the OTC market. This measure more directly measures a lack of trading than Lesmond,
Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) proportion of days with zero returns. The variable V olume is the
log of one plus a stock’s monthly dollar volume. The variable Spread is the difference between a
stock’s ask and bid quotes divided by the bid-ask midpoint from the last day when both quotes
are available. These other two illiquidity measures capture the amount of trading and the cost of
trading in a stock, respectively.
Our return predictability tests use data on firm disclosure, institutional holdings, size, and
book-to-market ratios. Firm disclosure (Disclose) is a dummy variable that is one if a firm’s
book equity data is available from either Compustat, Reuters Fundamentals, or Audit Analytics.
We define book equity data as available if it appears in a firm’s annual report dated between 7
and 19 months ago. Institutional holdings (InstHold) is a dummy variable indicating whether
a firm’s stock appears as a holding of at least one institutional manager or mutual fund that
filed Form 13F, N-CSR, or N-Q with the SEC in the past three months, as recorded by Thomson
Reuters. Firm Size is the log of the most recently available market capitalization, as computed by
16Much like Ince and Porter (2006), we correct firms’ returns in cases in which extremely improbable return
reversals occur—e.g., a firm’s stock price changes from $57.00 to $5.70 and back to $57.00. None of the main
results depend on our correction procedure, which is available upon request.
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MarketQA. The book-to-market variable (B/M) is the log of the ratio of book-to-market equity.
We Winsorize all independent variables at the 5% level to minimize the influence of outliers.
[Insert Table 3.3 here]
Table 3.3 reports summary statistics of returns and variables for OTC stocks and comparable
listed stocks in Panels A and B, respectively. The mean monthly return of OTC stocks is slightly
negative at –0.04% compared to 0.66% for comparable listed stocks, which is consistent with
Luft, Levine, and Larson (2001) and Eraker and Ready (2011). The cross section of monthly
OTC returns is also significantly more disperse than listed stocks, with cross-sectional standard
deviations of 28.08% and 19.46%, respectively. OTC stocks are substantially more volatile than
comparable listed stocks, with average monthly average volatilities of 6.56% and 4.29% for the
OTC and listed samples, respectively. The size and book-to-market distributions of firms in the
OTC and comparable listed samples are similar.
However, the OTC and listed samples exhibit very different levels of disclosure, institutional
ownership, and liquidity. The mean of the Disclose dummy for book equity data is 0.60 in the
OTC sample and 0.83 in the comparable listed sample, suggesting that 40% of OTC firms choose
not to disclose accounting data whereas only 17% of small listed firms omit this information.17
Table 3.3 shows that an average of 26% of OTC stocks are held by institutions (InstHold), as
compared to 71% of comparable listed stocks. This suggests that the investor clientele in OTC
markets is mainly retail, while institutions play a bigger role in listed markets.
The average of log volume (V olume) is much smaller for OTC stocks (8.25) than for listed
stocks (10.77). OTC stocks also trade much less frequently: the mean fraction of days with no
trading in a month, PNT , is 0.55 for OTC stocks compared to 0.20 for listed stocks. The 95th
percentile PNT value is 0.94, implying the least frequently traded OTC stocks trade just one day
per month. Average OTC Spreads are quite high at 0.15 versus 0.08 for comparable listed stocks.
We explicitly account for the impact of the bid-ask bounce bias in OTC stocks’ average returns
using the Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and Kalcheva (2010) method described below.
Panel C in Table 3.3 shows average cross-sectional correlations among OTC firms’ character-
istics and their betas on listed return factors. Nearly all of the pairwise correlations are much less
17Some of the lack of book equity data reflects incomplete coverage in our data sources. In unreported analyses,
we find that our three data sources have significantly overlapping coverage, but no single source subsumes the
others.
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than 0.5. The exception is the large negative correlation of –0.84 between PNT and V olume,
which indicates that these two variables reflect a common source of OTC illiquidity.
3.5. Comparing the Cross Sections of OTC and Listed Re-
turns
Following researchers studying listed stocks, we construct calendar-time portfolios of OTC
stocks ranked by characteristics to estimate the expected returns of OTC factors. We compare
OTC factor returns to those in the comparable listed and eligible listed samples. Forming factors
has the advantage that the means of the portfolios have economic interpretations as return premi-
ums. These portfolio tests also do not require linearity assumptions imposed by regressions. The
disadvantages of portfolios are that confounding effects can obfuscate return premiums based on
univariate sorts and they lead to less powerful tests. Accordingly, we also present cross-sectional
regressions below in which we jointly estimate return premiums. Our analysis focuses on portfolios
ranked by two illiquidity measures, PNT and V olume. We also estimate the returns of factor
portfolios ranked by size, value, volatility, and momentum.
To construct portfolios, we sort firms into quintiles at the end of each month based on the firm
characteristic of interest, such as a firm’s PNT value in that month. A long-only quintile portfolio
return in month t is the weighted average of returns in month t of firms in the quintile, as ranked
by their characteristics in month t–1 among sample firms. A long-short factor portfolio return
is the difference between the returns of the top and bottom quintile portfolios. The portfolios
use three sets of weights: equal-weighted (EW), value-weighted (VW), and weighted by the prior
month’s gross return (gross-return weighted or GRW). Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and Kalcheva
(2010) show that the expected return of a GRW portfolio is the same as that of an EW portfolio,
except that it corrects for the bid-ask bounce bias noted by Blume and Stambaugh (1983).18 A
long-only portfolio’s excess return is its monthly return minus the monthly risk-free rate prevailing
at the end of the prior month. Each factor portfolio’s alpha is the intercept from a time-series
regression of its monthly returns on various monthly factor returns. All standard errors are based
on the robust estimator in Newey and West (1987).19
18In unreported tests, we simulate OTC stock returns in the presence of empirically realistic bid-ask bounce and
non-trading, as well as persistent 50% errors in recorded prices that occur with 5% probability. For portfolios sorted
by PNT values, we find that the bias in observed monthly GRW portfolio returns is always less than 0.85%, and
adjusting for the bias would only strengthen our main results.
19We follow Newey and West (1994) recommendation to set the number of lags equal to the highest integer less
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To measure factor loadings in portfolios that may be infrequently traded, we include six
monthly lags of each factor and report the sum of the contemporaneous and six lagged coeffi-
cients as the factor loading.20 We analyze five factors based on listed returns, including the MKT,
SMB, HML, momentum (UMD), and illiquidity (ILQ) factors. We define UMD using Carhart’s 12-
month momentum measure (1997) and ILQ using Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) volume-induced
reversal measure. We create a sixth factor equal to the value-weighted OTC market return minus
the standard (30-day Treasury Bill) risk-free rate, which we refer to as “OTC MktVW.” Our three
return benchmarks are the OTC CAPM, Listed CAPM, and the Listed Five-Factor models. The
OTC CAPM and Listed CAPM models include only the OTC market and listed market factors,
respectively. The Listed Five-Factor model consists of the MKT, SMB, HML, UMD, and ILQ
factors.
We summarize the return premiums for each OTC factor in Table 3.4. Panel A shows the
Sharpe ratios of each OTC and listed factor and their information ratios (alphas divided by
idiosyncratic volatilities) relative to the factor model benchmarks. Panel B displays the average
monthly returns and alphas of each OTC factor relative to the factor model benchmarks. Panel
C shows the listed factor loadings of OTC factors. Panels D and E report the analyses of Panels
B and C for comparable listed stocks. The returns in Table 3.4 do not include trading costs, and
we use them to test theories’ predictions of pre-cost returns.
[Insert Table 3.4 here]
Table 3.4 shows three interesting comparisons between factor premiums in OTC markets and
those in comparable listed markets: (1) the illiquidity return premium is much larger in OTC
markets; (2) the size, value, and volatility premiums are similar in OTC and listed markets;21 and
(3) the momentum premium is much smaller in OTC markets.
A. Liquidity Premiums
The first four rows of Table 3.4, Panel A report the illiquidity premiums. The raw Sharpe
Ratios of the OTC illiquidity factors based on PNT and V olume are both large at 0.91 and –0.90,
respectively. Both PNT , which captures whether investors trade, and V olume, which quantifies
than 4 ∗ (T/100)(2/9), where T is the number of periods in the sample. For our sample of 383 months, applying
this formula results in a lag length of 5 months.
20Our method is the monthly analog to the one proposed by Dimson (1979), who analyzes stocks that are
infrequently traded at the daily frequency.
21All OTC and listed value portfolios exclude firms with negative book equity.
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how much they trade, appear to be relevant aspects of liquidity for OTC stocks. The average
returns of the value-weighted PNT factor (PNTVW ) are also highly positive and significant. They
are lower than the GRW returns partly because size-based weightings place the lowest weights on
the least liquid stocks, which have the highest returns.22
In contrast to the large OTC premiums based on the PNT and V olume measures of illiquidity,
the listed premiums based on these measures are tiny and insignificant. For comparable and eligible
listed stocks, the Sharpe ratios and information ratios based on either liquidity measure are 0.30
or lower and are statistically insignificant. Our analysis of illiquidity premiums complements
the results from numerous studies of listed US and international stocks, including Amihud and
Mendelson (1986), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lundblad (2007), and Hasbrouck (2009). These studies show that the least liquid listed
stocks have higher returns than the most liquid listed stocks, though the magnitude of the listed
illiquidity premium depends on the liquidity measure and time horizon. In particular, listed
illiquidity premiums constructed by sorting on price impact rather than volume measures could
differ from those examined here.
Neither the Listed CAPM nor the Listed Five-Factor model, which includes the illiquidity
(ILQ) factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), can explain the OTC PNT and V olume illiquidity
premiums. In fact, the OTC PNT factor’s information ratio of 1.34 with respect to the Listed Five-
Factor model is larger than its Sharpe ratio of 0.91. The OTC illiquidity premiums become larger
after controlling for listed risk factors mainly because the OTC illiquidity factors are negatively
correlated with the listed market and SMB factors. Panel C of Table 3.4 shows that the OTC PNT
factor has negative market and SMB betas of –1.24 and –1.02, respectively, and an insignificant
ILQ beta. The very negative beta on the market and SMB factors and the insignificant ILQ beta
pose a serious challenge for theories in which the OTC illiquidity premium represents compensation
for bearing systematic risk as measured by listed factors.
Next we test whether asset pricing theories that emphasize transaction costs, such as Amihud
and Mendelson (1986) and Constantinides (1986), can account for the OTC illiquidity premium.
In such theories, prices adjust until investors’ post-cost risk-adjusted expected returns are equal
across assets and equal to the risk-free rate, assuming one can costlessly trade the risk-free asset.
This implies that all risky portfolios’ pre-cost alphas should be positive by an amount reflecting
22In general, we do not focus on the value-weighted returns of OTC portfolios because these results are sensitive
to interactions between the large OTC size premium and the other factor premiums. Panel A of Table 3.5 in the
following section reports how each return premium varies with firm size.
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the cost of trading risky assets, where cost is equal to bid-ask spread times the average investor’s
turnover. We test this hypothesis in Table 3.5 for OTC and listed portfolios sorted by illiquidity
measures. In each month, we either sort stocks into PNT deciles (Panel A), or into 10 bid-
ask spread ranges (Panel B), using increments of 2.5% from 0% to 25%. Because these finely
partitioned sorts result in portfolios with fewer than 10 firms in the early years when liquidity
data are limited, Table 3.5 only includes data from August 1995 through December 2008.
[Insert Table 3.5 here]
The results in Table 3.5 are inconsistent with several implications of trading cost theories. First
and foremost, the pre-cost CAPM alphas of the OTC stocks in all but one of the bottom four
(eight) deciles of PNT (Spread) are significantly negative, implying that their post-cost alphas
must be even more negative. The OTC stocks with the lowest PNT values have especially negative
pre-cost alphas of –3.98% per month, whereas the comparable listed stocks with the lowest PNT
values have roughly zero pre-cost alphas of –0.06%. Both groups of low PNT stocks have similar
turnover and the OTC stocks actually have higher bid-ask spreads (6.3% versus 4.6%). Thus,
a transaction cost theory would predict that the OTC stocks should have higher returns, rather
than returns that are 3.92% lower; and it would not predict negative risk-adjusted returns for any
group of stocks.
Moreover, the magnitudes of trading costs incurred by OTC investors are small relative to
the pre-cost return premiums in Table 3.4. In Constantinides’ (1986) model, an asset’s illiquidity
premium is equal to the representative investor’s one-way trading cost, which is the asset’s turnover
multiplied by half of its bid-ask spread. The last two columns in Table 3.5 report twice this amount
and show that the round-trip costs range from 0.14% for the highest PNT stocks to 1.30% for the
lowest PNT stocks. These magnitudes are much smaller than the top minus bottom decile PNT
premium of 5.34% (3.98 – (–1.36)). Furthermore, because equilibrium trading costs decrease with
PNT , subtracting trading costs from returns would increase the magnitude of the PNT premium.
Unreported tests show the same point applies to the V olume premium and five of the other six
premiums reported in Table 3.4. OTC investors incur higher trading costs in low PNT and high
V olume OTC stocks because they trade these stocks more by definition, which more than offsets
the lower average spreads associated with these stocks. This is an important difference between
liquidity measures based on volume versus price impact, such as bid-ask spread. Although OTC
investors trade low Spread stocks more often, they incur lower costs in such stocks (see Panel B)
135
because of their low spreads.
We also test the unique predictions of Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) model, which assumes
heterogeneous investors with exogenously specified horizons. This theory predicts that the risk-
adjusted returns of portfolios sorted by bid-ask spreads will be increasing and weakly concave.
Intuitively, the marginal compensation for illiquidity diminishes with bid-ask spreads because
investors with longer horizons choose to hold illiquid stocks in equilibrium, and they require less
additional compensation per unit increase in spread than short-horizon investors. We formally
test for monotonicity and concavity by constructing long-short portfolios based on the 10 spread-
sorted portfolios in Panel B. The monotonicity portfolio puts increasing weights of (–5, –4, –3, –2,
–1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) / 15 on the 10 spread portfolios, while the concavity portfolio applies initially
increasing and then decreasing weights of (–2, –1, 0, 1, 2, 2, 1, 0, –1, –2) / 3. The concavity
portfolio represents the difference between two long-short illiquidity factors formed within spread
ranges of [0%, 12.5%] and [12.5%, 25%]. Its expected return is zero if the return-spread relation
is linear, positive if it is concave, and negative if it is convex.
The results from the monotonicity and concavity tests are ostensibly inconsistent with the
implications of trading cost theories. The monthly alpha of the monotonicity portfolio based on
spread sorts is only slightly positive (0.54%) and is statistically insignificant. The monthly alpha
of a monotonicity portfolio formed from PNT sorts in Panel A is significantly higher at 3.75%.
Furthermore, the concavity portfolio based on spread sorts exhibits a significantly negative alpha
of 2.63% per month, meaning that the spread-return relation is actually convex, not concave.
The results in Table 3.5 are also inconsistent with the hypothesis that data errors and mi-
crostructure biases, such as bid-ask bounce, explain the OTC illiquidity premium. Both panels
demonstrate that the negative alphas of liquid OTC stocks are the primary driving force behind
the observed illiquidity premium. These negative alphas are unlikely to be spurious because errors
and microstructure biases are smaller among liquid stocks and typically produce an upward bias,
implying that the liquid OTC stocks’ true alphas may be even more negative.
In unreported tests, we investigate whether the OTC illiquidity premium is driven by survivor-
ship bias. As we show in Table 3.7 below, the annual return of a PNT factor portfolio with a
12-month holding period is 32.9% (12 * 2.74%). For the top and bottom PNT decile portfolios,
12-month returns are missing for 15.5% and 16.5% of firms during the post-formation period. The
similarity in these 12-month disappearance rates suggests survivorship bias does not explain the
OTC illiquidity premium. Furthermore, the annual return of the 12-month PNT factor portfolio
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of 32.9% is twice as high as the 16% disappearance rates above. Thus, even an enormous return
differential of –50% between the disappearing high and low PNT firms would explain only one
quarter (–50% * 16% / 32.9% = 24.3%) of the OTC illiquidity premium.
B. Size and Value Premiums
Table 3.4 shows that the size, value, and volatility premiums found in listed markets also exist
in OTC markets and have similar magnitudes. Panel A indicates that the annual Sharpe ratios of
the GRW size and value factors in the OTC market are –1.02 and 0.82, respectively, as compared
to –0.98 and 1.19 in the comparable listed sample. This evidence demonstrates that the size and
value premiums are robust to the differences across OTC and listed markets.
While the magnitudes of these premiums are similar, neither the listed size nor the listed value
factor explains much of the variation in the OTC size and value factors. In Panel B, the monthly
alpha of the OTC size factor is –2.81% after controlling for its loading on the listed size factor and
the other four listed factors. These listed factors explain just 8.1% of the variance in the OTC
size factor, as reported in the R2 columns in Panel C. Even after controlling for the five listed
factors, the monthly alpha of the OTC value factor is still 2.29%. Although the loading on the
listed value (HML) factor is positive, all five listed factors explain just 25.3% of the variance in
the OTC value factor. Hence there are independent size and value factors in the OTC market
that are not captured by listed factors.
C. Volatility Premium
Panel A in Table 3.4 shows that OTC stocks with high volatility have lower average returns
than those with low volatility. The Sharpe ratio of the OTC volatility factor at –0.55 is close
to the corresponding listed Sharpe ratios at –0.75 and –0.64. Panel B shows that the alpha of
the OTC volatility factor with respect to the listed CAPM is significantly negative at –2.63% per
month. At first glance, OTC stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility seem to exhibit low returns
just like listed stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.
Interestingly, the OTC volatility factor’s negative alpha is much smaller in the OTC CAPM
regression. The OTC market itself has an overall negative return: Panel A of Table 3.4 reports
that the Sharpe ratio of the OTC market is –0.52. The fact that there is no idiosyncratic volatility
effect in OTC markets after controlling for the OTC market factor implies that a single root cause
137
could explain both the low return of the OTC market and the low returns of highly volatile OTC
stocks. Panel C shows that the OTC market beta of the long-short OTC volatility factor is 1.07
and that exposure to the OTC market explains 15.5% of the variance in the volatility factor. Panel
C of Table 3.4 also indicates that the OTC volatility factor has a negative loading of –1.38 on the
listed illiquidity factor, implying that the volatility effect in OTC stocks is related to the modest
illiquidity premium in listed stocks.
D. Momentum
The third key result is that the return premium for momentum in OTC markets is surprisingly
small. Whereas the Sharpe ratio of 1.56 for listed momentum is the largest among all the compa-
rable listed premiums in Table 3.4, Panel A, the Sharpe ratio of 0.41 for OTC momentum is the
smallest of the OTC premiums. Panel E in Table 3.4 shows that the OTC and listed momentum
factors are significantly positively correlated.23 This explains why the information ratio of the
OTC momentum factor against the Listed Five-Factor model, which includes listed momentum,
is close to zero at 0.09.
The OTC momentum premium shown in Table 3.4 is much smaller than the momentum pre-
mium in listed stocks reported in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and the high Sharpe ratio of 1.30
for momentum in the eligible listed universe. The average OTC momentum premium has the
same sign as the listed premium, but the magnitude of the OTC premium is at least three times
smaller, depending on the exact specification. This evidence contrasts with the robust evidence
that illiquidity, size, value, and volatility premiums exist in the OTC markets. Only the OTC
illiquidity premium is significantly larger than its listed counterpart.
E. OTC Market Returns
The last rows in Panels A to C of Table 3.4 report time-series regressions using the excess return
on the value-weighted OTC market as the dependent variable. The alpha of the OTC market is
negative, regardless of which listed factor model is used (also see Eraker and Ready (2011)). In
addition, the listed CAPM explains only 43.5% of the variation in the OTC market, while the
five-factor model explains 57.3% and leaves 42.7% unexplained. This is broadly consistent with
the inability of the other systematic listed factors to explain much of the variation in the OTC
23Like the listed momentum factor, the OTCmomentum factor exhibits statistically and economically significantly
lower returns in January: its January Sharpe ratio is –0.89 versus a non-January Sharpe ratio of 0.54.
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size, value, momentum, illiquidity, and volatility factors.
Motivated by the differences in volatility and liquidity between OTC and listed stocks in
Table 3.3, we explore the empirical relationship between the OTC market premium and the OTC
volatility and illiquidity premiums. In an untabulated regression, we find that the OTC market
has highly significant loadings on the OTC volatility and PNT factors with t-statistics of 3.85
and –5.98, respectively. Moreover, after controlling for these two factors, the OTC market’s alpha
changes from –0.74% to 0.01% (i.e., near zero). This regression establishes strong links between
the OTC volatility and illiquidity premiums and the negative OTC market premium.
F. Multivariate Cross-sectional Regressions
We also estimate return premiums using monthly multivariate linear regressions that simulta-
neously control for firms’ betas and characteristics. Table 3.6 reports Fama and MacBeth (1973)
return predictability coefficients, along with Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parenthe-
ses. The point estimate is the weighted-average of monthly coefficients, where each coefficient’s
weight is the inverse of its squared monthly standard error as in Ferson and Harvey (1999). As
before, we use GRW returns to correct for bid-ask bounce bias. We group regressors into firms’
betas on the MKT, SMB, HML, and UMD factors and firms’ characteristics based on size, book-
to-market equity, volatility, past returns, and illiquidity.24 Regressions I, II, and III include only
betas, only characteristics, and both betas and characteristics, respectively. In Appendix E, we
explain how we estimate firms’ betas and adjust them to account for nonsynchronous trading. The
three sets of columns in Table 3.6 represent estimates of return premiums in the OTC, comparable
listed, and eligible listed samples.
[Insert Table 3.6 here]
There are two main findings from Table 3.6. First, firms’ betas do not strongly predict returns
in any of the three samples, especially in Regression III which includes both firms’ betas and char-
acteristics. This echoes Daniel and Titman (1997) findings in listed stock markets. Although using
estimated betas as regressors induces an attenuation bias in the coefficients on betas, this bias can-
not explain why half of the beta coefficients are negative and statistically significant in Regression
I. Furthermore, controlling for firms’ betas has virtually no impact on the coefficients on firms’
24Regression specifications I and II also include an unreported dummy variable for firms with missing or negative
book equity variable to keep these firms in the sample without affecting the coefficient on book-to-market equity.
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characteristics, which are nearly identical in Regressions II and III. The weak predictability from
betas indicates that most of the predictive power in the cross section comes from characteristics,
and supports our use of characteristics in constructing portfolios.
Second, with few exceptions, jointly estimating return premiums on firms’ betas and charac-
teristics results in premiums that are quite similar to those using portfolio methods. For example,
the PNT coefficient in the OTC sample in Regression III is 4.053, which implies a 3.36% per
month (4.053  (0.08 – 0.91)) difference in returns between firms ranked at the medians of the
top and bottom quintiles of PNT (0.08 and 0.91, respectively). This magnitude closely matches
the top-to-bottom quintile difference in the GRW returns of PNT portfolios of 2.92% per month
in Table 3.4.B. The same qualitative result applies to the other return premiums. These findings
in Table 3.6 show that none of the return premiums estimated using univariate portfolio sorts
in Table 3.4 is due to the correlations among firm characteristics. This makes sense in light of
the low cross-correlations among the variables reported in Table 3.3.C. Consequently, we focus on
portfolio tests in the rest of the paper.
3.6. Testing Theories of Limited Arbitrage and Behavioral
Biases
We exploit the differences between the OTC and listed markets as well as within-market
heterogeneity on several dimensions to test asset pricing theories based on limits to arbitrage and
behavioral biases. Our main strategy is to contrast return premiums in subsamples of OTC and
listed stocks, and we use additional tests to shed further light on the momentum premium.
A. Trading Costs as a Limit to Arbitrage
We first test whether trading costs limit the extent to which arbitrageurs can exploit the pre-
cost returns of OTC factors in Table 3.4. We estimate the post-cost returns of an arbitrageur who
takes positions in each of the OTC factors, assuming that the investor pays each stock’s bid-ask
spread in every round-trip trade. Studies such as Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz (2012) show that
spread data overstate the trading costs incurred by arbitrageurs who use sophisticated strategies
to minimize costs. Our post-cost return calculation is more relevant for the average investor in
OTC markets.
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We compute post-cost returns at rebalancing frequencies between 1 and 24 months to evaluate
how arbitrageurs’ profitability depends on their portfolio turnover. We rebalance portfolios at
n-month frequencies using the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) method in which 1/n of the firms in
each portfolio can change in each month based on rankings of firms’ characteristics in the prior
month. As before, we focus on portfolios with GRW weights, which remain gross-return weighted
in the absence of rebalancing. We also analyze VW and liquidity-weighted (LW) portfolios to
assess whether arbitrageurs lower their trading costs by concentrating on large and liquid stocks.
The LW weights are inversely proportional to stocks’ bid-ask spreads.25
Table 3.7 reports pre-cost and post-cost returns of GRW portfolios and breakeven rebalancing
frequencies and spreads for the post-cost factor portfolios. The breakeven frequency (spread) is
the rebalancing frequency (bid-ask spread) at which the post-cost return of the factor portfolio is
closest to 0%. Table 3.7 reports the pre-cost returns, post-cost returns, and breakeven spreads of
the GRW OTC factors with rebalancing frequencies of 1 and 12 months. We complement the table
with Figures 3.3A and 3.3B, which show the GRW OTC factors’ pre-cost returns and post-cost
returns at rebalancing frequencies ranging from 1 to 24 months.
[Insert Table 3.7 here]
[Insert Figures 3.3A and 3.3B here]
The main finding in Table 3.7 is that the post-cost returns for arbitrageurs trying to exploit
the OTC factors are much lower than the factors’ pre-cost returns. Even at the annual rebalancing
frequency, the post-cost GRW returns of all six OTC factors are less than 1% per month and are
not statistically significantly greater than 0%—in contrast to the pre-cost returns that are as high
as 2.74% per month and almost always statistically significant. Only the PNT , V olume, and
V alue factors exhibit positive post-cost GRW returns at the annual frequency, which is why the
GRW breakeven horizons of these factors are less than one year. If an arbitrageur uses VW or LW
strategies, the breakeven horizons decline for these three strategies and the breakeven horizon for
the Size factor decreases to less than one year. However, one cannot profitably exploit the OTC
Momentum and V olatility factors with a one-year rebalancing frequency, regardless of which
weighting scheme one uses.
25Because limited spread data are available, we compute post-cost returns only in the second half of the sample
(1993 to 2008) and estimate costs based on average portfolio turnover multiplied by average bid-ask spreads.
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Figures 3.3A and 3.3B show that pre-cost GRW factor returns monotonically decrease with
frequency presumably because the information used to form the portfolios gradually becomes
outdated at longer frequencies. Despite this effect, the post-cost factor returns steadily increase
with frequency because the longer frequency portfolios have much lower trading costs. At the
24-month frequency, the post-cost returns of the PNT and V alue factors exceed 1% per month,
but only the V alue factor return is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The breakeven spread columns in Table 3.7 indicate that effective bid-ask spreads must be
quite high—the average across the six factors is 12.3%—in order to deter arbitrage at the one-year
rebalancing frequency. However, because the median OTC spread in Table 3.3.B is 10%, it seems
that OTC trading costs are indeed high enough to limit the effectiveness of arbitrage, especially
when one also considers the limits on short selling in OTC markets noted earlier. Such limits help
explain why these large OTC return premiums persist, but one needs a model of investor behavior
- such as the one in Appendix D - to understand why premiums arise in the first place. We now
turn to tests that allow us to distinguish among theories of limited arbitrage.
B. Evidence from Double Sorts
We measure return premiums within each market in subsamples of stocks sorted by characteris-
tics that distinguish OTC and listed markets: institutional holdings, disclosure, and size. We select
these three characteristics to construct powerful tests of competing theories of return premiums.
We form double-sorted portfolios by first ranking stocks based on a distinguishing characteristic
in month t–1 and sorting them into portfolios with sufficiently many stocks. In these initial sorts,
we use two portfolios when sorting on the two binary variables (InstHold and Disclose), and
three portfolios when sorting on size. Within each of these portfolios, such as stocks not held
by institutions, we sort stocks into terciles based on the characteristics, such as liquidity, used in
constructing factors. Holding each distinguishing characteristic (e.g., institutional holdings) con-
stant, we measure return premiums (e.g., illiquidity) as the difference between returns in month t
of stocks in the top and bottom terciles from the second sort. Our method also allows us to test
whether the distinguishing characteristic is priced within each tercile from the second sort.
Table 3.8 shows the excess returns from these double-sorted portfolios. Panel A shows that
the return premiums for illiquidity (both PNT and V olume) and size are much larger within
OTC stocks that are not held by institutions. Panel B indicates that both illiquidity premiums
and the volatility premium are roughly twice as large among OTC stocks that do not disclose
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book equity. Panel C shows the OTC illiquidity premium is larger among small stocks, while the
OTC momentum premium is four times larger among big stocks. Twelve of the 13 statistically
significant differences in return premiums in Table 3.8 exhibit the same signs in the OTC and
comparable listed samples, though the magnitudes are often smaller in the listed sample. We now
discuss the implications of these results and others for theories of return premiums.
[Insert Table 3.8 here]
C. Testing Theories of Investor Disagreement and Limits on Short Sales
We test Miller’s (1977) hypothesis that investor disagreement combined with limits on short
sales leads to overpricing and negative abnormal returns. As we show in Appendix D, this theory
can help explain the illiquidity, size, volatility, and value premiums in OTC and listed markets
because these characteristics are natural proxies for investor disagreement. In particular, both of
our OTC illiquidity measures are based on trading volume, which is directly linked to investor
disagreement as formalized in Propositions 1 and 2 in Appendix D.
There are several additional testable implications of this theory. If retail (institutional) in-
vestors are more (less) likely to disagree, stocks not held by institutions should exhibit higher
return premiums based on proxies for disagreement. A complementary story is that a lack of
institutional ownership could be a proxy for limits on short sales, as suggested by Nagel (2005),
which are associated with larger overpricing in Miller’s (1977) theory. Consistent with both in-
terpretations, Panel A in Table 3.8 shows that the return premiums for illiquidity (both PNT
and V olume measures), volatility, value, and size are 0.96% to 4.39% per month larger in OTC
stocks that are not held by institutions. The differences in the illiquidity and size premiums are
especially large and highly statistically significant. Hinting at a role for limits on short sales, the
premiums among non-held stocks arise mainly from the extremely negative returns of stocks with
high liquidity, size, volatility, and valuation. There are also significant differences in the illiquidity
(PNT and V olume) premiums between stocks held and not held by institutions in the comparable
listed sample, suggesting similar mechanisms could operate in listed markets.
In the model in Appendix D, the impact of differences in opinion is especially strong among
OTC stocks that do not disclose basic financial information. Investors are likely to hold widely
divergent views about the financial condition of firms without disclosures, implying overpricing
of such firms’ stocks will be more severe. Consistent with this idea, Panel B in Table 3.8 shows
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that the return premiums based on four proxies for disagreement—PNT , volume, volatility, and
size—are 1.38% to 1.64% per month larger among OTC stocks that do not disclose book equity.
The differences in all premiums except for size are significant at the 5% level. The difference in
size premiums is significant at the 10% level.
We further test disagreement theories by analyzing whether disclosure itself can predict returns.
If the disclosure of financial information helps to resolve investor disagreement, as predicted by
the model in Appendix D, disclosing firms will earn higher returns than non-disclosing firms.26
We look for a disclosure premium within firms in the top terciles of liquidity and volatility, where
disagreement could significantly affect investors’ valuations. Panel B of Table 3.8 shows that
disclosing firms do exhibit higher returns than non-disclosing firms, especially among liquid and
volatile firms. The disclosure premium is 1.52% [= –1.04 – (–2.56)], 1.78%, and 1.37% per month,
respectively, when evaluated within the PNT , volume, and volatility terciles representing the most
liquid and volatile firms. All three premiums are statistically significant, economically large, and
in line with the theory in Appendix D.
Furthermore, the negative market returns on OTC stocks are consistent with the overpricing
argument. Investor disagreement can cause overpricing of the entire market when there are market-
wide limits on short sales (e.g., Jarrow (1980)). Because few OTC stocks can be shorted and there
is no tradable index of OTC stocks that can be shorted, limits on short sales plausibly apply to the
OTC market as a whole. Thus, disagreement combined with limits on short sales could explain
the negative returns of the OTC market. It could also help explain the strong empirical links
between the OTC market premium and the OTC premiums for illiquidity and volatility, which
could all stem from the same underlying investor disagreement.
Lastly, Miller’s (1977) theory could help explain why the coefficients on market beta are neg-
ative and statistically significant in predicting returns in Table 3.6. He argues that “the riskiest
stocks are also those about which there is the greatest divergence of opinion.” If so, in the pres-
ence of limits on short sales, stocks with the highest systematic risk (i.e., beta) could become so
overpriced that they exhibit lower future returns than stocks with low risk.
26Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) develop a theory of attention that makes a similar prediction. Firms can choose
whether to disclose financial information to investors with limited attention. In equilibrium, firms do not disclose
if they have negative news, knowing that investors fail to take this self-selection into account. This theory predicts
that investors overprice firms that do not disclose, implying that these firms have lower returns than disclosing
firms.
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D. Testing Theories of Momentum
Firms traded in OTC markets disclose much less information than those in listed markets, and
retail investors dominate in OTC markets. This suggests that theories emphasizing how investors
react to information and the role of institutions could explain the relatively small OTC momentum
premium. This section presents evidence that is most consistent with Hong and Stein’s (1999)
model of momentum based on the gradual diffusion of information.
Two elements in Hong and Stein’s (1999) model are necessary for momentum. First, there
must be a group of “newswatcher” investors who only attend to firms’ fundamentals and disregard
firms’ stock price movements. Such newswatchers may not follow many OTC firms. Greenstone,
Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) argue that investors view financial information disclosed by
most OTC firms as less credible than information from listed firms. In contrast, OTC firms’
stock prices are reliable, verifiable, and widely available. If OTC stocks lack newswatchers, they
would not exhibit momentum. This argument is consistent with the evidence in Tables 3.4 and
3.5 showing that OTC momentum is on average lower than listed momentum.
The second key element in Hong and Stein’s (1999) model is the gradual transmission of
information across newswatchers. The model predicts that momentum is stronger and longer-
lasting when information transmission is slower. Because fewer investors hold and discuss OTC
stocks, information transmission is likely to be slower in OTC stocks than in listed stocks. Under
this reasoning, momentum should be strong and long-lasting among OTC stocks that newswatchers
might follow, such as large OTC firms and those that disclose key financial information. Consistent
with this prediction, Panels B and C of Table 3.8 shows that momentum is two to four times higher
among OTC stocks that newswatchers might follow. Specifically, momentum is 1.78% and 1.55%
per month, and highly statistically significant, among the largest OTC firms and those that disclose
book equity, respectively, while it is only 0.41% and 0.61%, and insignificant, among the smallest
OTC firms and those that do not disclose book equity.
Next we examine the time horizon of momentum in OTC markets. We construct long-short
momentum portfolios at various horizons using the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) method, similar
to the rebalanced portfolios examined in Table 3.7.27 Table 3.9 reports the momentum portfolios’
GRW and VW returns at horizons up to five years. There is no momentum (–0.08% per month)
27This procedure entails two steps. First, we form top and bottom quintile portfolios based on stocks’ Ret[ 12,-2]
as of month t–k. Second, to measure returns n years after portfolio formation in each month t, we apply GRW
weights to the 12 monthly returns of the extreme quintile portfolios formed in months t–n ∗ 12 to t–n ∗ 12–11. The
average difference in the extreme quintile portfolios’ returns is the momentum premium at the n-year horizon.
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at the one-year horizon in OTC markets using the GRW method. There is, however, significant
one-year momentum (1.57% per month) in the VW OTC portfolios, but this places extremely
large weights on a few big OTC firms.
[Insert Table 3.9 here]
Analyzing the long-term returns of momentum portfolios in OTC and listed markets helps us
differentiate theories of momentum. In the models of Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998), momentum originates from investors’ underreaction to tangible firm-specific
information, such as news about firm earnings, and thus momentum need not reverse.28 In con-
trast, in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) theory, momentum arises from “continuing
overreaction” to intangible information, implying that momentum eventually reverses. Table 3.9
shows that VW momentum portfolios in OTC markets exhibit positive but statistically insignifi-
cant returns of 0.45% per month in years two through five after portfolio formation. In addition,
momentum in listed markets exhibits limited reversal in the eligible sample and no reversal in the
comparable-size sample in years two through five.29 The observed lack of reversal lends support
to the two underreaction theories of momentum: Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998).
An alternative explanation for the weak GRW momentum premium in OTC markets is the
small role of institutional investors in OTC markets. In listed stock markets, institutions herd
(e.g., Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias, 2004) and institutions follow momentum strategies (e.g.,
Badrinath and Wahal (2002); Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003)). Gutierrez and Prinsky (2007)
and Vayanos and Woolley (2013) argue that momentum in listed markets partly arises because
of agency issues in these delegated institutional money managers. Our cross-market evidence is
broadly consistent with this view. Table 3.4 shows that momentum is three times higher among
comparable listed stocks, which are far more likely to be held by institutions (see Table 3.3).
However, the evidence within the OTC market is ostensibly inconsistent with the theory that
institutions per se cause momentum. Panel A in Table 3.8 shows that OTC stocks experience
nearly identical momentum (1.97% versus 2.18% per month) whether or not they are held by
institutions. Nevertheless, the types of institutions likely differ across OTC and listed markets.
28Because we lack earnings data for OTC firms, we cannot test several predictions of the Barberis, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998) model, which is based on a representative investor’s underreaction and overreaction to sequences of
news. However, Loh and Warachka (2012) argue that listed stock price reactions to sequences of earnings surprises
are inconsistent with this model.
29Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) show that momentum in listed stocks partially
reverses in their samples.
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Large asset managers that are subject to the delegated agency problems described by Vayanos and
Woolley (2013) play important roles in listed markets. Table 3.3 shows that few large institutions
invest in OTC stocks. However, small hedge funds without reporting obligations could significantly
affect OTC market prices. These smaller institutions may not be subject to the same agency
issues as the largest institutions. Future theories on institutional investors and momentum should
account for the different roles played by these various types of investors.
3.7. Concluding Discussion
While many cross-sectional return premiums in listed markets, such as size, value, and volatil-
ity, generalize to OTC markets, other return premiums are strikingly different. The premium
for illiquidity in OTC markets is several times larger than in listed markets. The pronounced
momentum effect in listed markets is economically small in OTC markets. Listed return factors
cannot explain the majority of the variation in OTC return factors.
Variation in the illiquidity, size, value, and volatility premiums within OTC markets is consis-
tent with theories in which disagreement and limits on short sales cause temporary overpricing.
Variation in the momentum premium within OTC markets is most consistent with Hong and
Stein’s (1999) theory based on the gradual diffusion of information. We test and find only lim-
ited support for several alternative explanations of these premiums, including theories based on
exposures to systematic factor risk and those based on transaction costs.
The return premiums in OTC markets offer insights into the future of listed markets. For
example, the finding that size, value, and volatility premiums exist in OTC markets provides
new evidence that these premiums are robust to differences in market structure and liquidity,
and therefore could persist in the future. The finding that the most actively traded OTC stocks
appear to be overpriced could also have an important counterpart in listed markets: Ofek and
Richardson (2003), Baker and Stein (2004), and others show that apparent speculative bubbles are
often associated with high trading volume. Our evidence suggests that such bubbles are magnified
when investors must price assets in the dark, and thus improved financial disclosures could mitigate
future bubbles.
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Figure 3.1: OTC Sample Characteristics as a Percentage of Listed Sample Characteristics
For each month, we plot the average size, average trading volume, and number of stocks in the OTC
sample as a percentage of the corresponding statistics in the eligible listed sample. To minimize the
influence of outliers and possible data errors, we transform the size and volume data for this comparison.
In each month, we compute the difference in the cross-sectional average of the logarithms of size and
($1 plus) volume in the two samples. Then we invert the log transform to obtain a ratio that can be
interpreted as the OTC characteristic divided by the listed characteristic. We exclude volume data from
firms with zero monthly volume prior to July 1995, which is the date when volume data become reliable.
The eligible listed sample consists of the CRSP stocks satisfying the same data requirements as the OTC




































Figure 3.2: The Value of $1 Invested in Illiquidity Factors
We graph the cumulative returns for illiquidity factors in the OTC, comparable listed, and eligible listed
samples. We use a logarithmic scale to represent the evolution of the value of a $1 investment from
December 1976 to December 2008 for the illiquidity factors from each market. In all three markets, we
sort stocks into quintiles according to their monthly PNT values, where PNT is the fraction of non-trading
days in a month. Each PNT factor return is the difference between the gross-return-weighted returns of
firms in the top and bottom PNT quintiles. We also plot the cumulative return of the value-weighted
Pastor-Stambaugh illiquidity factor from the eligible listed sample. We assume that an investor begins
with $1 long and $1 short and faces no margin or other funding requirements. To facilitate comparison, we
scale the long-short portfolio positions in the OTC and eligible listed factors so that the volatility of these
portfolios is equal to the volatility of the long-short portfolio based on the comparable listed factor. The
comparable listed sample consists of stocks that are comparable to stocks in the OTC sample in terms of
size, as described in Section 3.3.C. The eligible listed sample consists of all listed stocks that satisfy the
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Figure 3.3: Impact of Trading Costs and Rebalancing Frequency on Arbitrageur Returns
We plot the average monthly returns of long-short OTC factor portfolios that are rebalanced at various
frequencies using the method in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in which up to 1/n of the firms in each
portfolio change in each month, based on rankings of OTC firms’ values of the characteristics listed in
the first column in the prior month. In both figures, rebalancing frequencies are indicated on the x-axis
and stocks’ returns are weighted by their prior month’s gross return (GRW). In Panel A, we plot average
pre-trading cost returns. In Panel B, we plot average post-trading cost returns for an arbitrageur who pays
stocks’ bid-ask spreads on each round-trip trade. Estimated monthly costs are equal to average portfolio
turnover multiplied by average bid-ask spreads. Figures are based on 192 months of data from January
1993 through December 2008.




































Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for the OTC and Listed Samples in July 1997
We report statistics for size, volume, and the number of firms in the OTC, comparable listed, and eligible
listed samples in July of 1997, a typical month in terms of our OTC sample size. We construct the
comparable listed sample to have the same median size as the OTC sample. The eligible listed sample
consists of all listed stocks that satisfy the same data requirements as the OTC stocks in our sample, as
described in Section 3.3.B.
OTC Comparable Listed Eligible Listed
Total Market Capitalization (Billions) 21.3 15.1 9,592
Median Market Capitalization (Millions) 12.9 12.9 36
Mean Market Capitalization (Millions) 35.5 12.7 1,346
Trading Volume (Annualized Billions) 8.2 15.2 11,472
Median Trading Volume (Annualized Millions) 2.3 6.1 101
Mean Trading Volume (Annualized Millions) 13.7 12.8 1,608

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.9: Long–term Returns of Momentum Portfolios
This table contains average returns for long-short momentum portfolios constructed at various time hori-
zons using the method described in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). We first form top and bottom quintile
portfolios for each month t − 1 based on stocks’ momentum, defined as the return from month t − 12
to month t − 2. Returns within each extreme quintile portfolio are either weighted by the prior month’s
gross returns (“GRW returns”) or value weighted (“VW returns”). Then, to measure momentum returns
n years after portfolio formation in each month t, we equally weight the 12 monthly returns of the extreme
quintile portfolios formed in months t− n ∗ 12 to t− n ∗ 12–11. The top minus bottom quintile portfolio
return is the momentum premium at the n-year horizon. We compute returns for portfolios within our 3
samples: OTC stocks, stocks included in the comparable listed sample, which consists of stocks that are
comparable to stocks in the OTC sample in terms of size, as described in Section 3.3.C, and stocks included
in the eligible listed sample, which consists of all listed stocks that satisfy the same data requirements as
the OTC stocks in our sample, as described in Section 3.3.B. We denote statistical significance at the 5%
and 1% levels using * and ** symbols, respectively. These statistical tests employ Newey and West (1987)
standard errors with five lags based on the formula from Newey and West (1994).
Comparable Listed
OTC Stocks Stocks Eligible Listed Stocks
Horizon in GRW VW GRW VW GRW VW
Months Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns
[1,1] 1.39** 3.15** 2.10** 1.97** 1.68** 1.29**
[1,12] -0.08 1.57** 0.58** 0.75** 0.44* 0.47
[13,24] -0.75 0.71 -0.12 -0.03 -0.21 -0.23
[25,36] -0.07 0.37 0.13 0.24 -0.17 -0.11
[37,48] -0.66 0.37 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.08
[49,60] -0.99 0.42 -0.08 0.18 -0.29** -0.20
[13,60] -0.56 0.45 0.02 0.12 -0.13 -0.10
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1. Do you currently have any checking accounts?
• Yes
• No
** If answered Yes: Do you have a checking account at a bank, a credit union, or both? Or
maybe someplace else?
• At a bank
• At a credit union
• Someplace else
** If answered At a Credit Union: Which credit union do you have your checking account at?
(Please remember that your answers will remain completely confidential)
[Neighborhood Trust; Brooklyn Cooperative; Lower East Side People’s FCU; Bethex; Union
Settlement; ERDA; other credit union]





** If answered Yes: Do you have a savings account at a bank, a credit union, or both? Or
maybe someplace else?
• At a bank
• At a credit union
• Someplace else
** If answered At a Credit Union: Which credit union do you have your savings account at?
(Please remember that your answers will remain completely confidential)
[Neighborhood Trust; Brooklyn Cooperative; Lower East Side People’s FCU; Bethex; Union
Settlement; ERDA; other credit union]
** If has any credit union account:
3. Did you become a credit union member before or after attending the "Getting Ahead"
workshop?
• I became a member before attending the workshop
• I became a member after attending the workshop
• I don’t remember
** If answered No to both 1 and 2 (if has no type of account):








** If has savings account and is saving:
6. Where do you save? Your savings account? Or someplace else (like at home)? Or both?
• My savings account
• Someplace else (like home)
7. Thinking back to 3 years ago, were you saving at that time?
• Yes
• No
** If answered Yes to both 4 and 6 (if saving both now and 3 years ago):
8. Compared to 3 years ago, do you now save more, less, or about the same? That is, do you
put aside more, less or about the same?
• I save more now than I did 3 years ago
• I save less now than I did 3 years ago
• I save about the same now as I did 3 years ago
** If currently saving:
9. The next question is a bit sensitive and you can refuse to answer if it makes you uncomfort-
able. Do keep in mind, though, that your answers will be kept totally confidential. The question
is: thinking about all of your savings, about how much do you have saved up right now (in $)?
** If currently not saving:
9. The next question is a bit sensitive and you can refuse to answer if it makes you uncomfort-
able. Do keep in mind, though, that your answers will be kept totally confidential. The question
is: do you have any money saved up, and if so, about how much (in $)?
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III. Financial Services Usage
** If answered Yes to either 1 or 2 (if has any type of account):
10. Do you have direct deposit set up on your account?
• Yes
• No
• I don’t know
** If answers to 1 and 2 indicate any type of credit union account:
11. Have you ever taken out a loan from your credit union?
• Yes
• No
** If answered Yes: Which type of loan did you take from your credit union?
***(read out the options. respondent can give more than one answer)***
• A credit-builder/secured loan (also known as goal-saver, socio-credito and sociedad)
• A debt consolidation loan
• Another type of loan (such as a personal loan)
** If answers to 1 and 2 indicate any type of credit union account:





13. Do you sometimes cash your checks at check cashing places?
***(if the person deposits checks in his account using check-cashing places, this counts as
"No")***
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• Yes, I do so sometimes
• No, I never do so
14. In the past year, have you taken out a loan anywhere that is not a bank or a credit union?
I’m talking about things like payday loans, pawnshops, loan sharks or loans offered on the internet.
• Yes
• No
15. Thinking back to 3 years ago, did you take out any loans of this type around that period?
• Yes
• No
• I don’t know
IV. “Financial Fragility”
16. Do you have an emergency fund to help you deal with situations such as an expensive
health issue or a car breaking down?
• Yes
• No
** If answered Yes: This again is a bit of a sensitive question, but if you can, I’d appreciate it
if you could tell me: About how much money do you have in your emergency fund (in $)?
17. Say that some unexpected need arose and you had to come up with $1500 within the next
month. How confident are you that you would be able to do so? The options are:
***(please read all of the options out loud)***
• I am certain I could come up with the full $1,500
• I could probably come up with $1,500
• I could probably not come up with $1,500
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• I am certain I could not come up with $1,500
** If answered anything other than “certain that could not”: And how would you go about
getting these $1500 if you had to? I’ll read you some options. Please tell me if you would use that
method (you can say as many as you would like).
• draw from emergency fund/ savings
• borrow from family or friends
• use my credit card
• take out a loan from bank/credit union
• take out a loan from a pawnshop/payday loan/loan shark/ internet
• some other method
V. Spending Behavior
18. Are you currently using a budget to plan and follow your monthly income and expenses?
• Yes
• No




19. Do you feel that you have a good sense of how much money you normally spend on various
categories, like food, transportation, child care or entertainment?
• Yes, I feel that I have a good sense of how much I spend on various categories
• No, I do not feel that I have a good sense of how much I spend on various categories
20. Do you feel that you’re currently spending more than you should be?
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• Yes, I feel that I’m currently spending more than I should be
• No, I do not feel that I’m currently spending more than I should be
21. Many people spend money on things and later wish that they hadn’t. Compared to 3 years
ago, do you now spend more, less or about the same on these types of things?
• I spend more now on these types of things than I did 3 years ago
• I spend less now on these types of things than I did 3years ago
• I spend about the same now on these types of things as I did 3 years ago
VI. Miscellaneous
22. On a scale of 1-5, how stressed do you feel about your personal finances and debt in
general? 1 being the least stressed and 5 being the most stressed. 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5?
23. On a scale of 1-5, how knowledgeable do you feel about managing your money on a daily
basis? 1 being the least knowledgeable and 5 being the most knowledgeable. 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5?
24. During the last 6 months, was there a time when you and your family were not able to
pay your rent, mortgage, or utility bills on time?
• Yes
• No
25. During the last 6 months, did you not get or postpone getting any type of medical care
because you couldn’t afford it? This includes filling a prescription for drugs.
• Yes
• No









An Information Asymmetry Leads
to a Flat Rate-Amount Schedule
In this section I show that when the borrower’s expected second period income is unknown
to the lender, a flat borrowing rate-borrowed amount schedule is the only incentive compatible
contract.
Consider the setting described in Section 2.2 except that rather than a single Y˜2 distribution,
there is a continuum of second period income types j ∈ [J, J ].1
Y˜ j2 , the second period income of type j, is uniformly distributed. The distributions of all types
have the same variance but different means, such that types range from J (“worst type”) to J
(“best type”):
Y˜ j2 ∼ U [Y j2 , Y j2 ]
[Y j2 , Y
j
2 ] = [j − a, j + a]
where 2a is normalized to 1. Type is uncorrelated with initial wealth Y1 and unknown to the
lender.
In a full-information competitive setting, each type would be offered a rate-amount schedule
that would satisfy a lender zero-profit condition. Since the lender gets nothing in case of default
(when Y˜ j2 < Ŷ2(B1, R)),2 this schedule would satisfy, for each type j:




Y j2 − Ŷ2(B1, R)
where Rf is the risk-free rate and ψ is the cost of intermediation, proportional to the amount
borrowed.
When types are unknown, borrowers might be screened through their choice of the borrowed
amount B1. I now show that in the setting described in this model (with a fixed cost of default
Λ) there is no rate-amount schedule which successfully screens borrowers, and the only incentive
compatible contract is one where there is a single borrowing rate for loans of all sizes. For simplicity
I assume that all types have the same initial wealth.
A rate-amount schedule is a contract which specifies Bj1 and Rj for each type j. I first show
that a rate-amount schedule cannot be incentive compatible for any two types G and B s.t.
E(Y˜ G2 ) > E( ˜Y B2 ) if it implies DebtB > DebtG, where both types have zero probability of default
for their own allocation as well as for the other type’s allocation.3 Recalling that Ŷ2 is an increasing
function of Debt, we get the following ordering:











Incentive compatibility requires UG(BG1 , RG) > UG(BB1 , RB) and UB(BB1 , RB) > UB(BG1 , RG).






2 −Debtj in all states here, so the IC constraints are:
u(Y1 +BG1 ) + β
Y G2ˆ
Y G2




u(Y1 +BB1 ) + β
Y B2ˆ
Y B2




Combining the two IC constraints, we get:
3Recall that Ŷ2 < Y2 implies that it is never optimal to default in the second period. In the original formulation
of the model it was assumed that Y2 is s.t. all borrowers might find it optimal to default if a bad state realizes, but
with many types it seems reasonable to assume that those with relatively high expected incomes never default for




(u(Y˜2 −DebtG)− u(Y˜2 −DebtB))dY˜2 ≥
Y B2ˆ
Y B2
(u(Y˜2 −DebtG)− u(Y˜2 −DebtB))dY˜2
Y B2ˆ
Y B2
(u(Y˜2 +X −DebtG)− u(Y˜2 +X −DebtB))dY˜2 ≥
Y B2ˆ
Y B2
(u(Y˜2 −DebtG)− u(Y˜2 −DebtB))dY˜2
where X = E(Y˜ G2 ) − E( ˜Y B2 ) > 0. This inequality does not hold since marginal utility is
decreasing. That is, such a contract cannot be incentive compatible for both types.
I now show that a rate-amount schedule cannot be incentive compatible if it implies DebtB <
DebtG for any types G and B s.t. E(Y˜ G2 ) > E( ˜Y B2 ), where both types have positive probability
of default for their own allocation as well as for the other type’s allocation:











Any type j choosing Debtk will find it optimal to default in the second period if and only if



































Since DebtB < DebtG, this does not hold.
It follows that the only possible type of contract is one where Debt is constant across types. A
rate-amount schedule where R varies with the amount borrowed B1 while Debt is held constant
(i.e. where R decreases in B1 and their product is held constant) cannot be incentive compatible
since second period consumption is determined by Debt. No type would ever choose to borrow a
low amount at a high rate if he can keep second period consumption constant and consume more
in the first period by borrowing a higher amount at a lower rate.
It follows that a screening contract based on the amount borrowed cannot be incentive com-
patible in the setting examined here. The borrowing rate will therefore be flat in the amount








(Y j2 − Ŷ j2 )Bj1(R)dj





Proofs of Propositions in Chapter
2
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Assuming decreasing marginal utility of consumption (u′′(.) < 0), the RHS of (2.3.1)
increases faster in Y˜2 than does the LHS when Debt > 0. The existence of a threshold Ŷ2 directly
follows.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. When Λ(Debt) = Λ, (2.3.7) is reduced to:
βR2[(1− dŶ2
dDebt
)u′(Ŷ2 −Debt)− u′(Y2 −Debt)]
As marginal utility is always positive, it is sufficient that dŶ2dDebt ≥ 1 for this quantity to be
negative. I now show that this is always the case with a fixed cost of default Λ(Debt) = Λ.
Applying the implicit function theorem on (2.3.2) with a general cost of default Λ(Debt), the







Assume that the sign of dŶ2dDebt is the same for all debt levels. The denominator is positive
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since marginal utility is decreasing. The numerator is positive for any default cost function where






















which contradicts (2.3.2). It follows that the numerator of (C.0.1) is positive as well.
A necessary and sufficient condition for dŶ2dDebt ≥ 1 is therefore u′(Ŷ2) ≥ Λ′(Debt). For a fixed
cost of default Λ(Debt) = Λ, this holds with a strong inequality.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. I first show that there is some threshold
....
Y1 above which a unique “default impossible”
solution exists and is preferred to any “default possible” interior solution.
In the C1 region where default is impossible, the derivative of the value function wrt C1 is:
u′(C1)− βRE(u′(Y˜2 −Debt))
The second derivative is u′′(C1) + βR2E(u′′(Y˜2 −Debt)) < 0. It follows that there is at most
one “default impossible” solution C∗1 ≤ Ĉ1. For such a solution to exist, the value function must
decrease at Ĉ1 (it must be past its maximum), i.e.
u′(Ĉ1) ≤ βRE(u′(Y˜2 −Debt(Ĉ1))) = βRE(u′(Y˜2 − D¯0 − (Ĉ1 − Y1)R))
Since ∂Ĉ1∂Y1 = 1,
1 the LHS is decreasing in Y1 and the RHS is constant in Y1. It follows that
there is some threshold Y1 above which a unique “default impossible” solution exists and below
which no such solution exists.
1This is the case since Debt(Ĉ1) is constant (see (2.3.3)).
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When a “default impossible” solution exists, there might also exist an interior “default possible”
solution. I now show that when this is the case, the value of the former relative to the latter
increases in Y1. It follows that there must be a
....
Y1 threshold above which the “default impossible”
solution is chosen over any other interior solution.
Consider two initial wealth values Y˙1 < Y¨1 for which both types of interior solutions exist:
“default impossible” solutions C˙∗1 and C¨∗1 and “default possible” solutions ˙C∗∗1 and C¨∗∗1 . The value
of the “default possible” relative to the “default impossible” solution for the wealthier individual
is:




Examining the RHS of (2.3.5), note that the opportunity cost of first period consumption
depends only on the value of Debt = (C1 − Y1)R+ D¯0. It follows that there are C1 values:
C˜∗1 = C¨∗1 − (Y¨1 − Y˙1)
C˜∗∗1 = C¨∗∗1 − (Y¨1 − Y˙1)
which, if consumed by the less wealthy individual, generate the same opportunity cost as the
wealthier individual’s interior solutions, since Debt is the same:
opp_cost(C˜∗1 , Y˙1) = opp_cost(C¨∗1 , Y¨1)








The value of the “default possible” relative to the “default impossible” solution for the less
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wealthy individual is:2
U( ˙C∗∗1 )− U(C˙∗1 ) =
˙C∗∗1ˆ
C˙∗1






















(u′(C1)− opp_cost(C1, Y˙1))dC1 (C.0.5)
Since (C.0.2) is equal to U(C¨∗∗1 )−U(C¨∗1 ), ((C.0.3) + (C.0.4) + (C.0.5)) is the difference between
the less wealthy and the wealthier individuals in the relative value of the “default possible” solution.







opp_cost(C1, Y˙1)dC1 > (C¨∗1 − C˜∗1 )(opp_cost(C˜∗1 , Y˙1)− opp_cost(C˜∗∗1 , Y˙1)) =
= (Y¨1 − Y˙1)(u′(C¨∗1 )− u′(C¨∗∗1 ))
where the inequality follows from the opportunity cost of Y˙1 increasing around C¨∗1 and decreasing
around C¨∗∗1 and from C¨∗1 −C˜∗1 = C¨∗∗1 −C˜∗∗1 = Y¨1− Y˙1, and the equality follows from the definitions





(opp_cost(C1, Y˙1)− (u′(C1))dC1 > −(Y¨1 − Y˙1)(opp_cost(C¨∗1 , Y˙1)− u′(C¨∗1 )) =
= −(Y¨1 − Y˙1)(opp_cost(C¨∗1 , Y˙1)− opp_cost(C¨∗1 , Y¨1))
2I assume that Y˙1 and Y¨1 are close enough s.t. C˜∗1 < C˙∗1 < C¨∗1 < ˜C∗∗1 < ¨C∗∗1 < ˙C∗∗1
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where the inequality follows from the value function decreasing past the optimum C˙∗1 and
having a negative second derivative around C˙∗1 and from C¨∗1 − C˙∗1 < C¨∗1 − C˜∗1 = Y¨1 − Y˙1, and the
equality follows from the optimality of C¨∗1
It follows that:
(C.0.3) + (C.0.4) > (Y¨1 − Y˙1)[(u′(C¨∗1 )− u′(C¨∗∗1 ))− (opp_cost(C¨∗1 , Y˙1)− opp_cost(C¨∗1 , Y¨1))]
For arbitrarily small (Y¨1− Y˙1), opp_cost(C¨∗1 , Y˙1)−opp_cost(C¨∗1 , Y¨1) is arbitrarily close to zero
and the expression is positive (since u′(C¨∗1 )− u′(C¨∗∗1 ) > 0).
Adding (C.0.5), which is positive since ˙C∗∗1 is a local maximum for Y˙1, we get that U( ˙C∗∗1 )−
U(C˙∗1 ) > U(C¨∗∗1 )− U(C¨∗1 ), and that the value of the “default impossible” solution relative to any
interior “default possible” solution increases in Y1. The existence of
....
Y1 follows.
Now, consider the corner solution (borrowing up to the borrowing constraint). In Proposition
4 I show that the value of the corner solution relative to any interior solution is decreasing in Y1.
It follows that there must be some Ŷ1 ≥
....
Y1 value above which the unique “default impossible”
solution is preferred to any other interior solution as well as to the corner solution.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Borrowing up to the borrowing constraint (choosing the corner solution) is optimal in case
no interior solution exists and in case interior solutions exist but are inferior to borrowing up to
the constraint.
Proposition 3 shows that there is some initial wealth threshold above which a “default impos-
sible” solution exists and below which it does not. I now show that there is a similar threshold
for “default possible” solutions. Consider an initial wealth level Y˜1 for which there is a “default




u′(Y˜2 − (C˜1 − Y˜1)R− D¯0)dY˜2 (C.0.6)
It is easy to show that when the opportunity cost (the RHS of (C.0.6)) is decreasing in C1, it is
increasing in Y1. It follows that for any initial wealth level Y˜1 s.t. Y˜1 > Y˜1 for which no “default
impossible” solution exists, the RHS of (C.0.6) at C˜1 is higher than u′(C˜1), i.e. the value function
is decreasing at C˜1. Since the value function is increasing at low values of C1, an interior “default
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possible” solution Ĉ1 < C˜1 < C˜1 must exist for Y˜1. It follows that there is some initial wealth
threshold above which an interior solution exists.
The corner solution is also chosen for some initial wealth values for which an interior solution
exists. I now show that the value of the corner solution relative to the value of any interior solution
decreases in Y1, so that there is a Y1 threshold below which the corner solution is always chosen
and above which it is never chosen.
Denote first period consumption corresponding to the corner solution by C1 = Y1 +B1, where
B1 is the borrowing constraint, and the value (expected utility) of consuming C1 by U(C1). Since
the corner solution dictates that an extra unit of initial wealth be entirely consumed in the first
period, dU(C1)dY1 = u




6= 1 for any interior solution C∗1 , i.e.
dU(C∗1 )
dY1
> u′(C∗1 ) (consuming an extra unit of wealth in its entirety is suboptimal at an interior
solution).
Since C∗1 < C1 and since marginal utility is decreasing, we have:
dU(C1)
dY1
= u′(C1) < u′(C∗1 ) <
dU(C∗1 )
dY1
That is, the value of any interior solution increases by more than does the value of the corner
solution as we increase Y1. It follows that there is an initial wealth threshold Yˇ1 above which an
interior solution C∗1 is preferred to the corner solution C1 and below which the corner solution is
preferred.3
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In Proposition 6 it is shown that MPC < 0 for individuals with initial wealth Y1 < Ŷ1 and
0 < MPC < 1 for those with Y1 > Ŷ1. For Y1 < Yˇ1 individuals, who hit the borrowing constraint,
MPC = 1. Borrowing (C1 − Y1) therefore weakly decreases in income for all individuals.
It follows that for any given interest rate R at which funds are both borrowed and saved, there
is a threshold income level Y`1(R) above which the individual saves and below which he borrows.
3Note that for some parameters, we might have Yˇ1 = Ŷ1, i.e. Y1 < Ŷ1 individuals borrow up to the constraint
and have positive probability of default, and Y1 > Ŷ1 individuals consume an amount such that they never default.
I assume that this is not the case, i.e. that there is an initial wealth region where interior “default possible” solutions
are chosen.
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The RHS is opp_cost. Its derivative wrt R is opp_costR , since
dŶ2
dR = 0 when B1 = 0. The RHS
therefore increases in R. Since marginal utility is decreasing, Y`1(R) must decrease in R for the
LHS to increase in R as well. It follows that for RS < RB we have Y`1(RB) < Y`1(RS). Individuals
with initial wealth between the 2 thresholds Y`1(RB) < Y1 < Y`1(RS) neither borrow nor save,
wishing to borrow at RS and save at RB .
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem on the FOC and noting that ∂opp_cost∂Y1 = − ddC1 opp_cost,




Where U ′′(C1) is the second derivative of the value function, always negative at an optimum. It
follows that the sign of MPC is determined by the sign of the derivative of the opportunity cost
wrt C1 at the optimum. Noting that U ′′(C1) = u′′(C1)− ddC1 opp_cost and assuming that the cost
of default is fixed (which leads to ddC1 opp_cost < 0 for potential defaulters at the optimum), the
proposition follows.
4I assume D¯0 > Y2 for all individuals, i.e. the fixed pre-existing obligation is large enough so that an individual
must be saving in order to ensure that he is not forced to default in the case that Y2 realizes. This gives Y`1(RS) < Ŷ1,
and means that both Y`1(RS) and Y`1(RB) are in the region where the effective first order condition is the one for
“default possible” consumption levels (C1 < Ĉ1).
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Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The first point can be seen by recalling the proof of Proposition 3. A “default impossible”
solution is chosen at initial wealth values for which:5 6
u′(Ĉ1) ≤ βRSE(u′(Y˜2 − D¯0 − (Ĉ1 − Y1)RS)) (C.0.7)
When the cost of default is fixed, Ĉ1(Y1) is defined by:
u(Y2)− Λ = u(Y2 − (Ĉ1 − Y1)RS − D¯0)
Since the LHS is constant and Ĉ1 − Y1 < 0 by assumption (see footnote 4), increasing RS
results in a higher Ĉ1 for any given Y1 level, s.t. Debt = (Ĉ1−Y1)RS − D¯0 remains constant. The
RHS of (C.0.7) subsequently increases and the LHS decreases for any given Y1 level. It follows
that (C.0.7) is relaxed and Ŷ1, the initial wealth threshold at which (C.0.7) holds with equality,
decreases.
The second point can be seen by considering the individual with initial wealth Yˇ1 who is
indifferent between hitting the borrowing constraint (choosing the corner solution) and choosing
the interior “default possible” solution (see Proposition 4). Denote first period consumption at
the borrowing constraint by C1 = Yˇ1 +B1. As the borrowing constraint is defined by u(Y2)−Λ =
u(Y2− (B1R+D¯0)), a decrease in R leads to an increase of B1R in B1 so that B1R stays unchanged
(B1R is the negative of the derivative of B1 wrt R).7 Since second period utility is not affected, the
value of the corner solution increases by B1R u′(C1) when R decreases.
Consider now the pre-change interior solution for Yˇ1, denoted by C∗1 (note that it has the same
value as borrowing up to the constraint, by definition of Yˇ1). Let us examine the change in value
if the individual maintains C∗1 in response to a decrease in RB . In that case, the only change in



















5I assume here that where a “default impossible” solution exists, it is always chosen over the corner solution as
well as over a “default possible” solution, if one exists. See the proof of Proposition 3 for more on this issue.
6RS is the relevant rate here since I assume D¯0 > Y2, so that at Ĉ1 the individual must be saving (see footnote
4).
7Other specifications of the borrowing constraint might respond differently to a decrease in R, or might be
determined jointly with R.
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′(C1), i.e. that the increase in value implied by maintaining the pre-change interior solution
C∗1 in response to a decrease in RB (which is not the optimal response) is higher than the increase


















((C1 − Yˇ1)u′′(C1) + u′(C1))dC1
(C1− Yˇ1)u′′(C1) + u′(C1) is likely negative over the range (C∗1 , C1). To see this, note that this




where EIS(C1) is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at C1 and the LHS is the inverse
of the fraction of consumption that is borrowed (this is identical to the condition in Proposition
9). For the high borrowing levels implied by consuming in the range (C∗1 , C1), it is likely that this




′(C∗1 ) > B1R u′(C1).
Since maintaining C∗1 in response to a decrease in RB is generally not the optimal response for
an individual who always chooses the interior solution (see Proposition 8), the value of the corner
solution increases by less than does the value of the interior solution at Yˇ1, and the threshold is
lowered.
The third point can easily be seen from the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. As no individuals transition between saving and borrowing (see Proposition 7), we can
derive the general effect of a change in the interest rate on consumption and apply it to savers and





[opp_cost+ (C1 − Y1) d
dC1
opp_cost] (C.0.9)
8For example, for CRRA preferences with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 3, the condition in
(C.0.8) holds for any C1 value which implies that borrowing accounts for more than 13 of consumption. This seems
reasonable for consumption levels in this range, which are relatively very high.
198
which, incorporating the expression for MPC derived in Proposition 6 and the definition of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution EIS(C1) = − u
′(C1)






= −(1−MPC)EIS + Y1 − C1
C1
MPC
The first term (the substitution effect) is always negative at an interior solution sinceMPC < 1
(see Proposition 6). The second term (the wealth effect) is positive for those who initially save
(for whom Y1 > C1) and have positive MPC (savers with zero probability of default) as well as
for those who initially borrow and have negative MPC (borrowers with positive probability of
default). It is negative for those who initially borrow and have positive MPC (borrowers with
zero probability of default (see footnote 44 in Chapter 2) as well as for those who initially save and
have negative MPC (savers with positive probability of default). Parts 1 and 2 of the proposition
directly follow.
Part 3 of the proposition follows from considering the wealth effects just described as well as
the dependence of the magnitude of the substitution effect (the first term of (2.5.1)) on MPC.
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. The probability of default is (Ŷ2 − Y2) and the expected defaulted-upon amount is:
E(Def) = Pr.(Def) ∗Debt = (Ŷ2 − Y2)Debt


















Debt+ (Ŷ2 − Y2))
In the proof of Proposition 2, I show that dŶ2dDebt =
u′(Ŷ2−Debt)−Λ′(Debt)
u′(Ŷ2−Debt)−u′(Ŷ2)
> 0. It follows that the
signs of both dŶ2dR and
dE(Def)
dR depend on the sign of:
dDebt
dR




which is positive if and only if C1−Y1C1 > −dC1dR RC1 .
To derive the equivalent condition, plug in dC1dR from (C.0.9) and use the first order condition





[u′(C1) + (C1 − Y1)u′′(C1)]
Which can be rewritten as:
dDebt
dR
= C1(1−MPC)(C1 − Y1
C1
− EIS(C1)) (C.0.10)
where EIS(C1) = − u
′(C1)
C1u′′(C1) is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at C1, equal to
1
ρ
for the case of CRRA preferences with coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ.
Since MPC < 1 at any interior solution (see Proposition 6), (C.0.10) is always negative for
initial savers (for which C1−Y1 < 0). It follows that increasing RS always decreases the probability
of default as well as the expected defaulted-upon amount of initial savers. For initial borrowers,








The derivative of the LHS (the fraction of C1 that is borrowed) with respect to Y1 is MPC∗Y1−C1C21 ,
which is always negative for borrowers (for whom Y1 < C1) given that MPC < 1. It follows that
the condition in (C.0.11) is a condition on initial wealth: with CRRA preferences, individuals less
wealthy than some threshold will have dDebtdR > 0, and individuals wealthier than that threshold
will have dDebtdR < 0. Since borrowing decreases monotonically in initial wealth (MPC < 1 for
interior solutions), this initial wealth threshold corresponds to an initial borrowing threshold.
The claim that the probability of default and the expected defaulted-upon amount decrease
for those who start saving as a result of favorable rate changes and increase for those who start
borrowing is trivial when considering dDebtdR .
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Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. The LHS of (2.6.3) is constant, while the RHS, which is the marginal cost of borrowing
(equal to the opportunity cost of C1), increases in B1.9








it is clear that for borrowing levels B1 < B˘1, the marginal cost of borrowing is lower than the
marginal cost of delinquency Λ1 and the constraint Del1 ≥ 0 is hit. For borrowing levels B1 > B˘1,
the marginal cost of borrowing is higher than Λ1 and the constraint Del1 ≤ D¯0 is hit.
It follows that it is optimal to borrow up to B˘1 while paying D¯0 in full. That is, consumption
levels C1 < Y1 − D¯0 + B˘1 involve only borrowing and no delinquency. Once B˘1 is borrowed, the
marginal costs of borrowing and delinquency are equal, and it is optimal to finance additional
consumption by being partially delinquent on D¯0 since higher levels of borrowing imply a higher
marginal cost. Once delinquent on the full amount (at C1 = Y1 + B˘1), additional consumption
can only be financed by additional borrowing.
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Let us examine the opportunity cost of C1 (the RHS of (2.6.5)) for the 3 delinquency-
borrowing tradeoff regions defined in Proposition 10, noting that it is equal to the RHS of (2.6.3).
Region 1: C1 < Y1 − D¯0 + B˘1: Opportunity cost is increasing in this region, since B1 increases in
C1.10 It is lower than Λ1.
Region 2: Y1 − D¯0 + B˘1 ≤ C1 < Y1 + B˘1: Opportunity cost is flat in this region, since B1 does
not change in C1 (B˘1 is borrowed throughout the region). It is equal to Λ1 (see (2.6.4)).
Region 3: Y1 + B˘1 ≤ C1: Opportunity cost is increasing in this region since B1 increases in C1. It
is higher than Λ1.
9Where Ŷ2 ≤ Y2, i.e. where the ex-ante probability of delinquency is zero, the derivative of the RHS of (2.6.3)
wrt B1 (equal to the opportunity cost) is equal to −βR2E(u′′(Y˜2 −Debt)) > 0. Where Ŷ2 > Y2, this derivative is
equal to βR2(Λ2−u′(Y2−Debt)). Assuming that at the highest possible income realization Y2 it is always optimal
to pay in full (Y2 −Debt > C2), we have that Λ2 > u′(Y2 −Debt) and the derivative is positive in this region as
well.
That is, with a constant marginal cost of delinquency the opportunity cost curve increases in C1 everywhere and
the implications of a decreasing opportunity cost established above, such as negative MPC, do not occur.
10See footnote 9 for the derivative of the opportunity cost of C1 wrt B1
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Since the RHS of (2.6.5) is equal to Λ1 for C1 levels that are in region 2, it is optimal to choose C1
in this region if and only if u′(C1) = Λ1. That is, if and only if C1 = Y1 + B˘1 − D¯0 +Del1 = C1,
where (u′)−1(Λ1) ≡ C1. Examining the two extreme C1 values that define the region (for which
Del1 = 0 and Del1 = D¯0), it follows that individuals with first period income C1 − B˘1 < Y1 <
C1 + D¯0 − B˘1 satisfy u′(C1) = Λ1 while borrowing B˘1. First period consumption in this region is
Y1 + B˘1 + (Del1 − D¯0) = C1, regardless of the value of Y1 (MPC = 0), and delinquency is equal
to C1 − (Y1 − D¯0 + B˘1).
Consider now individuals with first period income Y1 > C1 + D¯0 − B˘1. For these levels of income
we have u′(Y1−D¯0 +B˘1) < Λ1. It follows that for these levels of Y1, first period consumption must
be lower than implied by borrowing B˘1 and paying D¯0 in full (i.e. consuming C1 = Y1− D¯0 + B˘1)
in order to satisfy (2.6.5). It follows that individuals with these levels of first period income choose
C1 in the first delinquency-borrowing tradeoff region from Proposition 10, borrowing B1 < B˘1 and
paying D¯0 in full. They consume Y1 − D¯0 +B1 > C1.
For individuals with first period income Y1 < C1 − B˘1, we have u′(Y1 + B˘1) > Λ1. First period
consumption must be higher than that implied by borrowing B˘1 and being delinquent on the entire
D¯0 (i.e. consuming C1 = Y1 + B˘1) in order to satisfy (2.6.5). It follows that individuals with these
levels of income choose C1 in the third delinquency-borrowing tradeoff region from Proposition
10, borrowing B1 > B˘1 and being delinquent on the entire D¯0. They consume Y1 +B1 < C1.
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Appendix D
Model of OTC Stock Pricing
Our stylized model of OTC stock prices features costly short selling and differences in investors’
opinions. We analyze the price of a single equity-financed firm in three periods: 0, 1, and 2. At
date 0, the firm has assets in place normalized to $1. At date 2, the firm liquidates all assets and
pays all cash flows. The share price of the stock (p) endogenously adjusts to clear the market. We
normalize the supply of stock to one and the return on the risk-free asset to zero.
We assume short selling costs are related to the cost of locating shares to borrow. Short sellers
borrow shares from share lenders, such as brokers or custodians, who incur deadweight quadratic
costs of finding shares (c/2)(shares lent)2, where c > 0. Share lenders pass these costs on to short
sellers who can borrow shares and pay total dollar fees of (c/2)(shares short)2. Based on this total
fee, the average borrowing fee per share is f = f(shares short) = (c/2)(shares short). This lending
fee (f) is akin to a negative rebate rate earned on collateral posted to borrow shares. We assume
share owners do not receive payment when share lenders lend their shares.
There are two types of risk-neutral overconfident investors and N investors of each type. Each
investor owns 1/(2N) of the firm’s shares at date 0. At date 1, investors observe two public signals,
SA and SB , about the firm’s date 2 earnings (pi2). Earnings satisfy pi2 = SA+SB +u1 +u2, where
SA, SB , u1 and u2 are independently uniformly distributed from [–σ,+σ] and σ ≥ 0 is a measure
of fundamental volatility. Stockholders receive 1 + pi2 at date 2.
The two types of investors differ in which signal they believe more, where the parameter
η ∈ [0, 1] represents agents’ overconfidence in their preferred signal. Specifically, the investors
mistakenly perceive the ut components of earnings to be correlated with their preferred signals.
Type X ∈ {A,B} believes that these components of earnings satisfy ut = ηSX + (1 − η2)1/2νt,
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where t = 1 or 2, and the νt are uniformly distributed from [–σ,+σ] and independent of each
other, SA, and SB . Both types’ beliefs are correct if and only if η = 0.
We consider two variants of the model: one in which the firm publicly discloses financial
information (e1 = SA+SB +u1) about date 2 earnings at date 1, and one without such disclosure.
We denote the date 1 earnings beliefs of investor type X ∈ {A,B} by EX . Based on only the two
signals, the rational expectation of the firm’s date 2 earnings is SA + SB . At date 1, investors’
earnings expectations in the cases with and without financial disclosure are given by:
No disclosure:
EA = (1 + 2η)SA + SB (D.0.1)
EB = (1 + 2η)SB + SA
Disclosure:
EA = (1 + η)SA + SB + u1 (D.0.2)
EB = (1 + η)SB + SA + u1.
Define the difference in opinion between investors to be DO = |EA − EB ||. From the above
expressions, financial disclosure decreases difference in opinion as follows:
No disclosure:
DO = 2η|SA − SB | (D.0.3)
Disclosure:
DO = η|SA − SB |. (D.0.4)
For simplicity, we analyze the model’s symmetric rational expectations equilibrium in which
each investor takes the market price as given and investors within each type use the same strategies.
Type X ∈ {A,B} chooses qX at date 1 to maximize expected profit, implying
qX ∈ argmax{qX(1 + EX–p1)–I(qX < 0)(c/2)q2X}, (D.0.5)
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where I( ) is an indicator function. The more optimistic type, for which EX = max(EA, EB),
chooses a long position, has a linear profit function, and buys stock until the price satisfies
1 +max(EA, EB)–p1 = 0. (D.0.6)
This condition implies the stock price reflects only the beliefs of the optimistic investors:
p1 = 1 +max(EA, EB) = 1 + (EA + EB)/2 +DO/2. (D.0.7)
Because prices reflect optimistic investors’ beliefs, the pessimistic investor type chooses to short
the stock and has a quadratic profit function. The pessimistic type’s demand satisfies
min(qA, qB) = (1 +min(EA, EB)–p1)/c = –DO/c < 0 if η > 0. (D.0.8)
The second-order condition for pessimistic investors is satisfied because their expected profit
is quadratic in qX and –c < 0. Optimistic investors are also maximizing because their expected
profit is zero for all qX > 0. Market clearing [N(qA + qB) = 1] implies optimists’ demand is
max(qA, qB) = 1/N +DO/c if η > 0. (D.0.9)
The resulting average stock lending/borrowing fee per share is
f = (c/2)|min(qA, qB)| = DO/2. (D.0.10)
In expectation, the equilibrium price at date 1 (p1) exceeds the efficient price (p1e) that would
prevail if there were no overconfidence. The efficient price is
No disclosure:
p1e = 1 + SA + SB (D.0.11)
205
Disclosure:
p1e = 1 + SA + SB + u1. (D.0.12)
We define overpricing (Ovp) as the equilibrium price minus the efficient price (p1–p1e):
No disclosure:
Ovp1 = 2ηmax(SA, SB) (D.0.13)
Disclosure:
Ovp1 = ηmax(SA, SB). (D.0.14)
At date 0, before the signals are known, expected overpricing is
E[Ovp1] = E[DO]/2 > 0 if η > 0. (D.0.15)
At date 0, all investors anticipate the date 1 equilibrium, so the price is
p0 = 1 + E[DO]/2 > 1 if η > 0. (D.0.16)
The date 0 price is higher than its efficient value of 1 because expected overpricing is positive
due to expected differences in opinion. As a consequence of overpricing, at date 0 the stock’s
expected return E[r] from date 1 to date 2 is negative and given by
E[r] = E[p2–p1] = –E[DO]/2 < 0 if η > 0. (D.0.17)
Expected return decreases with expected difference in opinion, which arises from overconfi-
dence. The overconfidence bias causes the stock’s expected return to be lower than the risk-free
rate of zero even though investors are risk-neutral.
Equilibrium trading volume from date 0 to date 1 is:
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V olume = |Nmax(qA, qB)–1/2| = 1/2 + (N/c)DO if η > 0. (D.0.18)
where 1/2 is the initial share endowment of type A investors. Expected trading volume is thus:
E[V olume] = 1/2 + (N/c)E[DO] if η > 0. (D.0.19)
Return volatility at date 1 is the standard deviation of the change in price, which is
√
V ar[p1 − p0] = (1/2)
√
V ar[EA + EB +DO] = (1/2)
√
V ar[EA + EB ] + (1/2)E[DO]2
(D.0.20)
where the second equality is based on the properties of the two uniformly distributed signals.
In summary, ex ante overpricing increases with expected difference in opinion, which is consis-
tent with Miller (1977) and related theories. The equilibrium relies on the assumptions that the
cost of short selling is positive (c > 0) and convex and that investors are overconfident (η > 0).
Firm disclosure of financial information reduces differences in investors’ opinions.
We now establish seven model predictions based on the above equilibrium.
Proposition 12. If η > 0, expected return is negative and decreases with expected difference in
opinion. If η = 0, expected return is zero, and an equilibrium with no trading exists.
Proof. If η > 0, expected return is –E[DO]/2, so it decreases withE[DO]. If η = 0, then DO = 0
regardless of disclosure; and all traders believe firm value is 1 +EA = 1 +EB , so this must be the
equilibrium date 1 price. In this case, the price p1 = 1 + E(pi2) is efficient and equal to E(p2),
implying that expected return is the risk-free rate of zero. At the price p1, all traders are content
to hold their initial endowments, implying an equilibrium with no trading exists.
Proposition 13. If η > 0, expected trading volume increases with expected DO and is thus
negatively related to expected return.
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Proof. If η > 0, E[V olume] = 1/2+(N/c)E[DO], which increases with DO. By substituting E[r] =
–E[DO]/2, we obtain E[V olume] = 1/2–(2N/c)E[r], which shows the negative relation.
Proposition 14. If η > 0, an increase in σ leads to an increase in expected DO, a decrease in
expected return, and an increase in return volatility.
Proof. E[DO] is proportional to ηE[|sA–sB |] = (2/3)ησ, where the equality is based on the expec-
tation of a random variable with a uniform difference distribution [(2/3)σ]. Thus, E[DO] increases
proportionally with σ. Because expected return is –E[DO]/2, it decreases proportionally with σ.
Return volatility is proportional to σ because both the E[DO]2 term and the V ar[EA + EB ] in
the return variance expression in Equation (D.0.20) are proportional to σ2, and volatility is the
square root of variance.
Proposition 15. If η > 0, market equity (M) and the ratio of market-to-book equity (M/B)
increase with expected DO and thus size and M/B are negatively related to expected return.
Proof. Because the firm’s book value is 1, its M = M/B = p0 = 1 + E[DO]/2. Thus, M/B and
M depend linearly on E[DO], which is negatively related to expected return.
Proposition 16. The average stock lending fee per share (f) increases with expected DO and is
negatively related to expected return.
Proof. From Equation (D.0.10), the average lending fee is f = DO/2, which increases proportion-
ally with DO. Expected return decreases with E[DO] and thus with the lending fee.
Proposition 17. An increase in overconfidence (η) increases expected DO and decreases expected
return. In addition, higher η amplifies each of the effects in Propositions 1 to 5.
Proof. Regardless of disclosure, expected DO is proportional to ηE[|SA–SB |], which increases with
η. Expected return is –E[DO]/2, which must decrease with η. Because the effects in Propositions
1 to 5 all rely on the expression for expected DO and this expression increases with η, an increase
in η amplifies each of these effects.
Proposition 18. Expected difference in opinion is higher and expected return is lower with no
firm disclosure; and a lack of disclosure amplifies the effects in Propositions 1 to 5.
Proof. From Equations (D.0.3) and (D.0.4), non-disclosure increases DO by η|SA–SB | and in-
creases E[DO] by ηE[|SA–SB |]. Because Propositions 1 to 5 rely on the expression for expected
DO, which decreases with disclosure, a lack of disclosure amplifies these effects.
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The model delivers several intuitive results. Proposition 12 shows that difference in opinion
(DO) decreases expected return if agents are overconfident (η > 0). If agents are not overconfident,
the model predicts no trading and no overpricing because agents agree on the firm’s value. Thus,
Proposition 12 formally justifies our PNT (non-trading) proxy for no DO and its positive relation
with expected return. Proposition 13 extends this idea to trading volume. An increase in expected
DO increases expected shorting demand from the pessimistic investor type, which generates high
trading volume. Because agents trade more when they disagree more and disagreement causes
overpricing, stocks with high volume tend to be more overpriced.
Propositions 14 and 15 show that expected differences in opinion are also positively related
to return volatility, firm size, and firms’ ratios of market-to-book equity. Intuitively, an increase
in the firm’s fundamental volatility (σ) increases return volatility and expected DO because the
public signals that generate disagreement are more volatile. In addition, an increase in expected
DO increases overpricing and thus the firm’s market capitalization, justifying size as a proxy for
DO. Similarly, an increase in expected DO produces a higher stock price, holding book value
constant, thereby raising the firm’s M/B ratio, which justifies M/B as a proxy for DO. In this
stylized model, size and M/B are the same because book value is normalized to 1. Allowing firms’
book values (B) to differ would generate cross-sectional variation in M/B ratios and overpricing
even among firms with identical size (M).
Proposition 16 shows that markets with higher lending fees, such as OTC markets, will exhibit
larger overpricing. This proposition is consistent with studies such as D’avolio (2002) that interpret
lending fees as arising from differences in investors’ opinions.
Proposition 17 shows that an increase in investors’ overconfidence (η) increases DO because
disagreement results from placing excessive weight on different public signals. This overconfidence
channel justifies DO proxies based on retail trading if retail traders are especially prone to over-
confidence. In addition, Proposition 17 implies that stocks held primarily by retail investors are
more subject to the overpricing effects in Propositions 12 to 16. This motivates our double-sorting
methodology in which the initial sort is based on the presence of institutional (non-retail) investors.
Proposition 18 shows that a lack of firm disclosure increases differences in opinion because
investors agree on how to interpret basic financial disclosures made by the firm. As a result,
non-disclosure is associated with higher overpricing. Intuitively, lack of disclosure increases the
uncertainty over which investors can disagree, which increases expected overpricing. Furthermore,





Estimating Betas and Accounting
for Nonsynchronous Trading
To estimate a stock’s betas in month t on return factors, we use a time series regression of the
stock’s monthly return on the monthly return factors from month t–24 to month t–1. In cases
in which a stock is not traded for one month or longer, we cumulate monthly factors during the
entire non-trading period to align the stock and factor returns. We compute stocks’ betas on the
MKT, SMB, and HML factors using the three-factor Fama and French (1993) regression. We
compute betas with respect to the UMD momentum factor constructed by Kenneth French, which
was originally used by Carhart (1997), and the illiquidity factor (ILQ) of Pástor and Stambaugh
(2003) using regressions of returns on MKT, SMB and HML in addition to the respective factor.
We require at least 10 observations in each regression.
Because many OTC stocks do not trade every day, we correct stocks’ raw betas for non-
synchronous trading by extending the method in Lo and MacKinlay (1990). Suppose that the
unobservable, “true” return process for stock i is
Rit = αi + Ftβi + εit (E.0.1)
where Ft is a 1 × m vector of factor returns. The econometrician only observes prices and
returns in periods when trading occurs. We denote the probability that stock i does not trade
by pi and assume this probability is constant across periods. If a security does not trade for
several periods, the observed return when it eventually does trade is the sum of all unobserved
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true returns per period. Formally, we define a variable Xit(k) as follows:
Xit(k) =

1 if stock itraded in period tbut did not trade in all kperiods prior to t
0 otherwise
This definition implies that Xit(k) = 1 with probability (1 − pi)pki . Now we can write the





We assume that factor returns (Ft) are independent and identically distributed over time with
E(Ft) = µF and
V ar(Ft) = ΣF =










We estimate regressions of observed monthly returns on observed monthly factors. The ob-
served beta vectors that we estimate are
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Simplifying and rearranging Equation (E.0.4) yields a relation between stock i’s true beta and
its observed beta and alpha:



















When Ft is a scalar, such as an intercept in a factor regression, this formula simplifies to









We obtain the parameters required for computing βi as follows. First, we estimate the observed
betas and alphas (βoi and αoi ) for each firm for each month with regressions using the 24 previous
months. Next, we estimate the factor means and covariances (µF and ΣF ) for each regression
during the same 24 months. Lastly, we estimate the probability of a stock not trading pi using
the proportion of months in which the stock did not trade during the regression period. We then
substitute these parameter estimates into Equation (E.0.6) to estimate stock i’s true beta.
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